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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the cost of credit in the micro-finance industry in South Africa.  
The study situates micro-lending agreements within the law of contract, beginning 
with an examination of contractual fairness in terms of the common law: the 
fundamental principle of freedom of contract that underpins the common law of 
contract; the principle that agreements contrary to public policy should not be 
enforced; and the impetus given by constitutional values that inform public policy.  In 
regard to moneylending transactions, common law usury law will be explained. 
  
The study then goes on to trace the origins and rapid growth of the micro-finance 
industry which was made possible by its exemption in 1992 from the Usury Act 73 of 
1968.  The upshot of this development was that registered micro-lenders have for 
nearly 14 years charged excessive interest rates, and continue to do so.  The dire 
socio-economic impact of these high interest rates on individual consumers and low-
income communities is then demonstrated: how borrowers of small loans soon 
become over-indebted; the loss of billions of rands every year to low-income 
communities in the form of interest on micro-loans. 
 
The study then shifts to the legislative response to the need for consumer protection 
in regard to consumer credit.  The extensive credit law review process is explained, 
resulting ultimately in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, which allows the Minister to 
prescribe limits on interest rates and fees in all sectors of the consumer credit 
market. 
 
The prescribed limits on the cost of credit in the micro-finance sector are thoroughly 
explained and analysed, with particular reference to the implications of each element 
  
iii
iii
of the credit costing structure, and the combined impact of the total cost of credit on 
different types and sizes of loans.  The envisaged maximum interest and fees will 
markedly alter the positions of micro-lenders and consumers, and receive careful 
analysis. 
 
The study closes with a summary of findings in the thesis, which includes suggested 
amendments to the National Credit Regulations and a review of possible legal 
challenges to the high cost of credit on smaller loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv
iv
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract              ii 
Table of Contents            iv 
List of Tables             ix 
 
Chapter One – Introduction 
1.1 The general purpose of this study          1 
1.2 The specific goals of the research          3 
1.3 Structure of the thesis           4 
 
Chapter Two – Fairness in the South African Law of Contract 
Outline               6 
2.1 The traditional approach: freedom of contract        6 
2.2 Philosophical underpinnings of the law of contract        9 
2.2.1 A rules-based approach          9 
2.2.2 A standards-based approach        10 
2.2.3 Examples of the rules-based approach and implications   
 for contractual fairness        11 
2.2.4 Conclusion          14 
2.3 Public policy in the law of contract        15 
 2.3.1 Some background history        15 
 2.3.2 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes        16 
 2.3.3 Towards a clearer understanding of public policy     20 
 2.3.4 Public policy and constitutional values      22 
  2.3.4.1   Introduction         22 
  2.3.4.2   The impact of constitutional values on public policy   23 
  2.3.4.3   The role of public policy in developing the common   
  law          23 
  2.3.4.4   Limitations on the impact of constitutional values on  
     public policy         25 
2.3.4.5   Conclusion         26 
2.4 Good faith in the law of contract        27 
2.4.1 All contracts are bonae fidei        27 
2.4.2 Theories of good faith         29 
2.4.3 “A brief turn towards fairness”       30 
2.4.4 Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom    30 
  
v
v
2.4.5 Conclusion          32 
2.5 Legislative responses to contractual unfairness      33 
2.5.1 South African Law Commission Project 47: Unreasonable   
Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts    34 
2.5.2 The Consumer Protection Bill       38 
2.6 Conclusion           41 
 
Chapter Three – Usury Laws in regard to Consumer Credit 
Outline             45 
3.1 The common law in regard to usury        45 
3.1.1 General historical background       45 
3.1.2 The common law         46 
3.2 Usury legislation: an historical overview       50 
 3.2.1 First-generation consumer credit legislation      50 
 3.2.2 Second-generation consumer credit legislation     51 
 3.2.3 Third-generation consumer credit legislation      53 
 3.2.4 The National Credit Act        54 
3.3 The in duplum  rule          56 
 
Chapter Four – the Regulation of the Cost of Credit in the Micro-finance 
Industry in South Africa 
Outline             62 
4.1 The position until 1992         62 
4.2 The exemption of micro-loans from the Usury Act      64 
4.2.1 The 1992 Exemption Notice        64 
4.2.2 The 1999 Exemption Notice        67 
4.2.3 The Lurama case         69 
4.2.4 The 2005 Exemption Notice        70 
4.3 The National Credit Act and Regulations       70 
4.4 Conclusion           72 
 
Chapter Five – the Socio-economic Impact of No Limits on the Cost of Credit 
Outline             73 
5.1 Two credit markets and the perpetuation of poverty      73 
5.2 Impact on individual consumers        75 
5.3 Different types of loans and their impact       78 
5.3.1 30-day loans and the debt spiral       78 
5.3.2 Term loans and over-indebtedness       80 
  
vi
vi
5.4 Consumption finance          81 
5.5 Consumer ignorance and illiteracy        84 
5.6 Impact on poor communities         86 
 5.6.1 The size of the micro-lending industry      86 
 5.6.2 Growth of the industry        87 
 5.6.3 Borrowers’ income profiles and levels of indebtedness    89 
 5.6.4 Summary of findings         91 
5.7 Common law illegality of high interest-bearing loans     92 
 5.7.1 The in duplum rule         93 
 5.7.2 Interest provisions contrary to public policy      93 
 5.7.3 Common law usury law        95 
5.8 The unregistered sector and the legacy of no interest rate limits    96 
 
Chapter Six – An Analysis of the National Credit Act and Regulations 
Outline             99 
6.1 A brief overview of the National Credit Act     100 
6.1.1 Background to the Act      100 
6.1.2 Purpose of the Act       102 
6.1.3 New consumer credit institutions     104 
6.1.4 Over-indebtedness and reckless credit    105 
6.2 The legislative framework for the prescribed limits   
on the cost of credit        108 
6.2.1 The enabling provisions      108 
6.2.2 Interest        109 
6.2.3 The initiation fee       110 
6.2.4 The service fee       111 
6.2.5 Other fees, costs and charges     111 
6.2.6 Contraventions of the Act      112 
6.3 The prescribed limits on the cost of credit     115 
 6.3.1 Different categories of loans and their interest rate limits  116 
 6.3.2 The cost of the initiation fee      117 
 6.3.3 The cost of the service fee      118 
 6.3.4 Maximum limits and probable market costs    120 
 6.3.5 Periodic review of the cost of credit     121 
6.4 An analysis of the new cost of credit      122 
 6.4.1 A comparison between the current and envisaged     
cost of credit        122 
6.4.2 The implications of the initiation fee     124 
  
vii
vii
6.4.3 The implications of the service fee     126 
6.4.4 The danger of masking the total cost of credit   129 
6.4.5 The combined impact of interest, the initiation fee     
and the service fee       130 
6.4.5.1   An illustration of the total cost of credit   130 
6.4.5.2   A review of the illustration of the total cost     
  of credit by way of selected examples   133 
6.4.5.3   Deductions from the illustration of the cost  
  of credit       136 
 6.4.6 The socio-economic impact of the new cost of credit  138 
  6.4.6.1   Policy, regulation and practical results    138 
  6.4.6.2   Impact on individual consumers    139 
  6.4.6.3   One-month loans and the debt spiral   141 
  6.4.6.4   Over-indebtedness and poverty    143 
 6.4.7 Suggested amendments to the Regulations    143 
  6.4.7.1   Remove or reduce the initiation fee    143 
  6.4.7.2   Remove or reduce the service fee    145 
  6.4.7.3   Lower the maximum size of short term loans  146 
  6.4.7.4   Setting appropriate levels for interest rates   146 
6.4.8 The likely growth of the unregistered sector    151 
6.5 Legal challenges to the high cost of credit on smaller loans   153 
 6.5.1 Application of the in duplum rule     154 
 6.5.2 Common law illegality of the high cost of credit on  
smaller loans        154 
 6.5.3 Judicial review of the service fee     156 
6.5.4 Judicial review of various regulations that contribute to the  
excessive cost of credit      156 
6.5.5 The nature of the proposed judicial review proceedings  157 
 6.5.5.1   Reasons for administrative action    158 
 6.5.5.2   Irrationality as a ground for judicial review   159 
 6.5.5.3   Unreasonableness as a ground for review   161 
 6.5.5.4   The role of proportionality in controlling  
  administrative action      162 
6.5.5.5 Remedies in proceedings for judicial review  162 
 6.5.6 Other legal remedies       163 
 
 
 
  
viii
viii
 
Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
Outline           164 
7.1 The rapid growth of the micro-lending industry  
with no interest rate limits       164 
7.2 The dire consequences of excessive interest rates    165 
7.3 Legal recourse and the need for legislative intervention   166 
7.4 The cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Act   167 
7.4.1 Shortfalls in the credit costing structure    167 
7.4.2 The impact of the excessive cost of smaller loans   168 
7.4.3 Suggested amendments to the Regulations    168 
7.4.4 Legal challenges to the high cost of credit on smaller loans  169 
 
Appendix – Micro-lending loan amortisation schedule    171 
 
Bibliography           
Textual sources and mode of citation       
Table of cases          
Legislation and Government Notices        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix
ix
 
  List of Tables 
 
        Table Description 
 
A Comparison of the cost of credit for the two credit markets – middle- / 
high-income vs low-income consumers 
B Sample survey of variable loan sizes and repayment periods viewed 
against monthly income 
C Illustration of the 30-day loan and resultant debt spiral 
D Outstanding loan book and annual turnover by loan term 
E Expenditure in South Africa from all sources of income 
F Loan usage 
G Literacy and basic education levels of South Africans aged 15 and 
over 
H1 Growth of the micro-finance industry 
H2 Annual growth rate of the micro-finance industry 
J Size of industry by type of lending entity 
K Change in numbers of indebted households by income group 
L Total debt and consumption debt by income category 
M Initiation fees for different size loans 
N The effective cost of the service fee on different size loans 
P Illustration of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations  
– short-term loans 
Q Illustration of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations  
– unsecured loans 
R Sample survey of variable short term loan sizes and repayment 
periods at the new cost of credit, viewed against monthly income 
S Illustration of the application of the new cost of credit to one-month 
loans and resultant debt spiral 
T Effect of proposed lower initiation fees on different size loans 
U Illustration of the application of reduced interest and fees to different 
loan sizes and types 
V Comparison of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit 
Regulations and suggested amendments 
 
  
 
1
Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The general purpose of this study 
 
The principal object of this research is to examine the law relating to the cost of credit 
in the micro-finance industry in South Africa.  The reasons for this study will become 
apparent from the narrative below, which illustrates the legal problem that this thesis 
seeks to address and provides a context for the research. 
 
Agnes is a 52 year old domestic worker earning R1 000 per month.  She is a single 
mother of two teenage children, and is the sole breadwinner in the household which 
includes her sister, who is ill with tuberculosis, and her sister’s young son.  She 
realises the value of education, having herself managed to complete only grade 9, 
and is determined that her children should complete their schooling.   
 
In January 2007 she has to buy school uniforms for the new school year, for which 
she needs R1 000.  She has a cheque account with a bank but she does not qualify 
for an overdraft facility and her bank is not willing to give her a loan.  She has been 
warned not to borrow from the mashonisas1 in her neighbourhood, who have a 
reputation for being harsh, charging exorbitant interest rates and taking borrowers’ 
identity documents or bank cards.  There are a number of micro-lending enterprises 
in the town in which she lives, and she diligently shops around to find the cheapest 
available credit.  All the businesses that she visits charge interest of at least 30% per 
month.  In desperation she approaches a local community advice office, where a 
paralegal advises her that there will be a new law in place on 1 June 2007 which will 
force micro-lenders to charge much lower interest rates – 5% per month on smaller 
loans – and that she should try to wait until June before borrowing money.  There are 
certain items like shoes that her children cannot do without, so she decides to borrow 
R500 from Cash Loans CC, and to wait until July before borrowing a further R500, 
when she will buy the remaining clothing.  She is told that if she takes out a one 
month loan of R500, she will have to repay R650 at the end of the month, and 
calculates that she will not be able to afford to do that.  She decides instead to repay 
                                                 
1 Xhosa translation for moneylender.  Mashonisas are township lenders who operate outside of the 
formal sector (Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” 28 
http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 (accessed 14 March 2006). 
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the loan over six months in order to ensure that the loan is repaid before she takes 
out the next loan.  The loan repayments will be R189 per month. 
 
In a period of only six months, Agnes will have to repay R1134, being well over 
double the amount that she borrows, and will use 19% of her monthly income to do 
so.  This will have a terrible impact on the household, leaving only R811 per month 
for her to pay for necessities such as food, rental, municipal services, clothing, 
medicine and transport.  Of the total of R1134 that she will repay to the micro-lender, 
R634 will be paid to service the debt, representing over 10% of her total income for 
six months.  If Agnes had had no basic arithmetic skills, she may have ill-advisedly 
agreed to repay R650 at the end of one month, which would have left her family with 
only R350 to live on.  This may have forced her to take out a further loan of R650 at 
the end of the month, and she would have very quickly ended up in a permanent debt 
trap. 
 
Agnes’ predicament represents the hard reality faced by millions of South Africans – 
the vast majority of the economically active population – on an ongoing basis.  Low 
incomes relative to the cost of living ensure that these people have to borrow money 
in order to provide for the basic necessities of life.  The lack of security for their debt 
ensures in turn that they will pay much more for credit.  The typical interest rate of 
30% per month (360% per year) that is common today2 is 18 times the current 
maximum interest rate prescribed by the Usury Act.3  The cost of debt for lower 
income consumers is therefore proportionately higher, indeed at least 18 times 
higher, than that of wealthier consumers who will qualify for a bank loan or other 
credit.  People with low incomes become over-indebted because of their poverty 
(being forced through need to turn to micro-lenders), and their poverty is exacerbated 
as a result.  Many people become permanently indebted because of basic economic 
needs, making loan repayments on an indefinite basis. 
 
When Agnes returns to the micro-lender for her next loan of R500 in July 2007, she 
expects to pay interest at 5% per month as the paralegal had advised her.  She has 
already calculated that she will be able to afford to repay this loan within a month, 
and the amount that she will have to repay will be R525 (the R500 loan plus 5% 
interest, amounting to R25).  To her horror, however, she discovers that the second 
                                                 
2 See 4.2.3 below. 
3 The current maximum for loans less than R10 000 is 20% per annum (GN 1100, Government Gazette 
26809, 17 September 2004), which will remain in force until 31 May 2007. 
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loan will cost as much to repay over one month as the first loan.  As a result, she has 
no choice once again but to repay the loan over six months. 
 
The maximum interest rate on short-term loans in terms of the National Credit 
Regulations4 will be 5% per month, but the new initiation and service fees introduced 
by the National Credit Act5 and Regulations will ensure that the total cost of credit on 
a loan of R500 could be as much as 31% per month.6  Borrowers of small loans such 
as Agnes are likely to pay more or less the same as they do in the current regime of 
no interest rate limits.7 
 
1.2 The specific goals of the research 
 
 
The overriding question that the research will aim to answer is: do current and 
envisaged regulated limits on the cost of credit in South Africa afford appropriate 
protection to recipients of micro-loans? 
 
The specific goals of the research are to achieve the following: 
  
(a) To present all relevant law that impacts on the current and envisaged cost of 
credit in the micro-finance industry, including the common law, legislation and 
constitutional considerations, and to examine the extent to which this law can 
protect borrowers of high-cost loans. 
 
(b) To demonstrate the socio-economic impact of high credit costs on lower-
income individuals and communities as effectively as possible. 
 
(c) To enhance understanding and appreciation of the gravity of the problem of 
the high cost of credit.8 
  
                                                 
4 National Credit Act (34/2005): Regulations, R489 Government Gazette 28864, 31 May 2006, which will 
come into effect on 1 June 2007 in terms of Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit 
Act 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006. 
5 Act 34 of 2005. 
6 See Table P in Chapter Six below. 
7 See 6.4 below for a thorough analysis of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Act and 
Regulations. 
8 The negative impact of the high cost of credit on consumers is usually not appreciated nor understood 
even by those who qualify for bank loans, who are often well educated.  There is an extremely high level 
of ignorance of the gravity of the problem amongst lawyers, academics, economists and politicians alike.  
This lack of interest and concern appears to stem largely from the fact that the negative impact of these 
high costs is not felt personally by such people. 
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(d) To conduct a thorough analysis of the cost of credit provisions in the National 
Credit Act and Regulations and their impact, including a comprehensive 
assessment of the full implications of each element of the cost of credit. 
 
(e) To develop a persuasive argument for keeping the cost of credit in the micro-
finance industry as low as possible. 
 
(f) To propose a suitable approach for establishing appropriate levels for interest 
rates and fees, and to make suggested amendments to the National Credit 
Regulations. 
 
(g) To consider potential legal challenges to the high cost of credit in terms of the 
current and envisaged law that could form the basis of strategic litigation to 
combat high credit costs. 
 
(h) To make a constructive contribution to a just and equitable outcome for the 
regulation of limits on the cost of credit in the micro-finance sector. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Micro-finance agreements form part of consumer credit law, which in turn is situated 
firmly within the milieu of the law of contract.  The thesis therefore commences in 
Chapter Two with an examination of the common law in regard to contractual 
fairness in general, the impact of constitutional values and their indirect application to 
contract law, and certain legislative reforms in the realm of consumer law.   
 
The focus will then narrow down in Chapter Three to the common law in regard to 
usury, with an emphasis on moneylending transactions.  Usury legislation and the in 
duplum rule (common law and legislation) will then be reviewed.   
 
The law in regard to contractual fairness (Chapter Two) and usury law (Chapter 
Three) provide the context for the specific focus of the thesis, being the cost of credit 
in the micro-finance industry.  Further, a consideration of the law in regard to 
contractual fairness and usury will make it possible to establish the extent to which 
such law could assist in achieving equitable levels for the cost of credit in the micro-
finance industry. 
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In Chapter Four the enquiry will focus squarely on the birth and growth of the micro-
finance industry in South Africa, including the position prior to regulation in 1992, the 
various exemptions to the Usury Act and the Lurama case.   
 
In Chapter Five, the consequences of the failure to cap interest rates in the micro-
lending industry for a period of nearly 14 years will be discussed, with an emphasis 
on the socio-economic hardships suffered by lower-income individuals and 
communities, and the negative impact on poverty alleviation in general.  It will be 
shown that these consequences could render contractual clauses providing for 
exorbitant interest rates unenforceable in terms of the common law discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three. 
 
Finally, the cost of credit provisions in the National Credit Act and Regulations will be 
thoroughly explained and analysed in Chapter Six.  The full implications of the 
envisaged maximum interest and fees on the total cost of credit will be closely 
scrutinised, and the socio-economic impact of these costs will be considered.  
Specific amendments to the National Credit Regulations will be proposed, as well as 
potential litigation to combat high credit costs in terms of the Regulations.  The 
chapter will also include a brief overview of certain consumer protection measures in 
the Act that do not relate to the cost of credit, but which are of some relevance to this 
study.   
 
The thesis will conclude in Chapter Seven with a summary of the specific findings 
made in the study. 
 
The overarching research methodology has been desktop research of relevant legal 
texts, journal articles, legislation, cases, policy documents, survey and research 
material and other materials, all available in hard copy or on the internet.  Some ad 
hoc case studies will be referred to, but the research will not be based upon empirical 
survey material. 
 
The thesis reflects the law as stated in the sources available to me as at 1 December 
2006. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Fairness in the South African Law of Contract  
 
 
Outline 
 
In this chapter, the question of fairness in the South African law of contract in general 
will be examined, in order ultimately to address the extent to which the law relating to 
contractual fairness might have a role to play in achieving equitable levels for the 
cost of credit in the micro-lending industry.  The focus will be on the common law in 
regard to contractual fairness, with constant reference to constitutional values and 
their indirect application to contract law.  The main purpose of the chapter will be to 
establish what the current law is in regard to contractual fairness and equity, with 
some analysis thereof.  The traditional approach of freedom of contract, the 
philosophical underpinnings of our contract law, public policy and good faith will be 
separately considered, all with reference to constitutional considerations.  The 
chapter will conclude with a brief review of current legislative intervention in regard to 
contractual fairness and consumer protection.  In Chapters Three and Four the 
enquiry will narrow down to usury laws and the cost of credit in the micro-lending 
industry, respectively. 
 
2.1 The traditional approach: freedom of contract 
 
The South African law of contract has its foundation firmly in laissez-faire economic 
liberalism, which stresses a non-interventionist, individualistic approach to contract.1  
Parties to every contract are perceived to have absolute individual autonomy,2 being 
free to decide whether, with whom and on what terms they contract,3 summarised in 
the time-honoured term “freedom of contract”.4  Such autonomy is given expression 
through the legal concept of consensus to a contract.5  The principle of sanctity of 
                                                 
1 Bhana and Pieterse “Towards a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and 
Afrox Revisited” (2006) 122 SALJ 865 at 867. 
2 Wynn’s Car Hire Products (Pty) Ltd v First National Industrial Bank Ltd 1991 (2) SA 754 (A). 
3 According to Hawthorne in “The Principle of Equality in the Law of Contract” (1995) THRHR 157 at 
163, the doctrine of freedom of contract appears to be used in four distinct senses: freedom to negotiate 
terms without interference; freedom to agree terms that will be given full effect without interference; 
freedom to contract with whom one chooses; and freedom to choose not to contract. 
4 See, for example, Atiyah The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (1979) 388–405. 
5 Visser “The Principle pacta servanda sunt in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law, with Specific Reference 
to Contracts in Restraint of Trade” (1984) 101 SALJ 641; Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 867. 
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contract is the corollary of this freedom, best described in the famous statement of 
Sir George Jessel MR in Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson:6 
 
“If there is one thing that more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by courts of justice.”7 
 
This dictum encapsulates a further linked principle which is fundamental to our law of 
contract, namely that the courts will enforce contracts, captured in the Latin 
expression pacta sunt servanda.  Thus Christie8 finds “the starting point of the 
common law” in Burger v Central South African Railways,9 in which Innes CJ stated 
that: 
 
“[O]ur law does not recognise the right of a court to release a contracting party from 
the consequence of an agreement duly entered into by him merely because that 
agreement appears to be unreasonable.”10 
 
Thus, since parties are understood to have negotiated and contracted on equal 
terms, the courts have traditionally preferred to adopt a hands-off approach, 
assuming the role of neutral umpires whose duty it is merely to ensure that the terms 
of the contract are strictly enforced.11  If a term of a contract is unreasonable, 
unconscionable or oppressive, should it be open to attack?  The default position is 
against interference,12 because intervention by the courts when parties have 
contracted freely and voluntarily would amount to a form of paternalism which is 
inconsistent with the parties’ freedom of contract.13  Further, judicial intervention is 
seen as a threat to the much-vaunted and worthy policy objective of legal certainty14 
and could open the floodgates to potential litigants, with the result that “vast numbers 
                                                 
6 (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at 465. 
7 This statement has been widely cited with approval in South Africa in: Wells v South African Alumenite 
Company 1927 AD 69 at 73; Marlin v Durban Turf Club & Others 1942 AD 112 at 131; Corbett “Aspects 
of the Role of Policy in the Evolution of Our Common Law” (1987) 104 SALJ 52 at 64. 
8 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 14. 
9 1903 TS 571. 
10 576. 
11 See Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979) 292-358. 
12 Lewis “Fairness in South African Contract Law” (2003) 120 SALJ 330 at 332. 
13 Christie Contract 14.  Christie goes on to note that this general principle of non-intervention has been 
“whittled away” by the common law, which will not enforce a contract that is in contravention of an 
unreasonable restraint of trade clause, or an unreasonable term in a contract that is signed without  
having been read, or in an unsigned document such as a ticket. 
14 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 868. 
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of default judgment, summary judgment and provisional sentence claims dealt with in 
this Division and in the Transvaal Provincial Division would be rendered bad in law”.15 
 
This traditional approach to contract law in its crudest form is expressed most 
effectively by the oft-quoted words of Professor Hahlo:16 
 
“Provided a man is not a minor or a lunatic, and his consent is not vitiated … his 
contractual undertakings will be enforced to the letter.  If, through inexperience, 
carelessness or weakness of character, he has allowed himself to be overreached, it 
is just too bad for him, and it can only be hoped that he will learn from his experience.  
The courts will not release him from the contract or make a better bargain for him.  
Darwinian survival of the fittest, the law of nature, is also the law of the market-place.” 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed its support for the classical, liberal 
understanding of freedom of contract, and has situated its support within two 
fundamental constitutional values – freedom and dignity:17 
 
“[C]ontractual autonomy is part of freedom.  Shorn of its obscene excesses, 
contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value of dignity.” 
 
And again:18 
 
“[T]he Constitution prizes dignity and autonomy, and in appropriate circumstances 
these standards find expression in the liberty to regulate one's life by freely engaged 
contractual arrangements.” 
 
Contractual autonomy is part of freedom because “freedom of contract is typically 
believed to enhance and affirm individual autonomy, and resonates in many respects 
with understandings of individual liberty in classical liberal theory.”19  Furthermore, it 
is arguable that several other constitutional rights such as freedom of association20 
                                                 
15 Kriegler J in Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1990 (1) SA 375 (W) 384A. 
16 Hahlo “Unfair Contract Terms in Civil Law Systems” (1981) 88 SALJ 70.  It is submitted that this 
approach is now outdated, out of touch with the modern South African reality, and in conflict with the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in an unequal society (s 39(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
17 Cameron JA in his concurring judgment in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para 94.  See also 
the pronouncement of Davis J in Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C): “Contractual 
autonomy is part of freedom”. 
18 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 8D. 
19 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 877. 
20 Section 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
  
 
9
and freedom of trade, occupation and profession21 serve to confirm the principle of 
freedom of contract.22  The Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have distanced 
itself from an alternative interpretation of the values of freedom and dignity that would 
support the promotion of contractual fairness.   
 
Finally, linked to the notion that consensus is the basis of contract is the idea that 
consensus necessarily implies that all contracts are entered into in good faith, which 
position was consistently adopted in Roman-Dutch law.23  Conversely, the value of 
good faith requires parties to honour their agreements, and it is asserted that the 
presence of consensus, together with the value of good faith, “renders our law of 
contract inherently equitable – the concept of good faith is said to have infused the 
law of contract with an equitable spirit”.24  This interpretation of good faith seems to 
contradict the possibility of the absence of good faith being used as a defence to 
render an unfair contract unenforceable, which will be discussed in 2.4 below. 
 
2.2 Philosophical underpinnings of the law of contract 
 
Concepts of freedom of contract, individual autonomy and the question of fairness 
and related issues in the common law of contract are concerned more with policy and 
values than with hard law.  In order to better understand the approaches of 
commentators and judges to these issues and the resultant development of the 
common law, it is enlightening and indeed essential to examine briefly the 
philosophical underpinnings or “political morality”25 that inform this law. 
  
2.2.1 A rules-based approach 
 
Writing in 1992, Cockrell argued persuasively that the traditional manner in which 
standard South African textbooks presented contract law was in the form of rules, as 
opposed to standards: “[A] seamless web of rules which possesses a determinative 
rationality of its own, such that answers to any disputes will be thrown up by the 
inexorable logic that is internal to the system itself”.26   This rules-based form “depicts 
contract law as a set of determinative rules that can be applied by judges to facts in a 
                                                 
21 S 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
22 Van Aswegen “The Implications of a Bill of Rights for the Law of Contract and Delict” (1995) 11 
SAJHR 50 at 69; Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 871. 
23 Christie Contract 7. 
24 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 867–868. 
25 Cockrell “Substance and Form in the South African Law of Contract” 109 (1992) SALJ 40 at 41. 
26 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 40. 
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mechanical way”.27  The role of the courts is limited to the “application of rules to 
proven facts in a non-creative manner”.28 
  
Whilst this rules-based interpretation is perhaps a deliberate over-statement of the 
actual position, there is a clear ring of truth to it.  This classical model and its 
underlying assumptions of individual autonomy and liberty to consent are presented 
in traditional South African contract law as axiomatic universal truths, expressed as 
unwavering rules of the common law of contract.29  The courts are thus free to 
concern themselves primarily with the enforcement of contracts rather than with their 
substantive fairness, and judicial discretion is limited.  The result is that parties can 
contract within a framework of predictability and efficiency, and a high degree of 
certainty in contract law is achieved.30 
 
2.2.2 A standards-based approach 
 
Cockrell argues that this widely-accepted classical model produces a distorted 
picture of modern South African law of contract, which is in fact “shot through with 
normative commitments”.31  Counter to this rules-based form is a preference for 
expressing contract law doctrines in the form of open-ended standards that “state 
normative propositions at a high level of abstraction” not easily reduced to specific 
rules, and that “allow for purposive adjudication by the courts”.32  Just legal outcomes 
are promoted at the expense of certainty, accommodating competing social and 
normative considerations like fairness, dignity and social equality.33 
 
This standards-based approach embraces a healthy measure of legal paternalism:34  
“The law attempts to establish ‘patterns of acceptable relationships’ informed by ‘a 
moral idea of the proper kinds of contractual relations in modern society, one based 
on trust’.”35  Contracts form part of the greater fabric of society, and so society should 
“exercise some control over contract, so as to ensure social justice and equality”.36  
                                                 
27 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 43. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 868. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 40. 
32 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 43.  Cockrell’s discussion draws heavily on an article by Kennedy “Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685. 
33 Du Plessis and Davis “Restraint of Trade and Public Policy” (1984) 101 SALJ 86 at 88; Bhana and 
Pieterse 2006 SALJ 868. 
34 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 868. 
35 Lubbe and Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract: Cases, Materials, Commentary 3 ed (1988) 242. 
36 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 868. 
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In South African contract law, these open-ended standards are public policy, the 
public interest, the general boni mores, good faith and reasonableness, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
2.2.3 Examples of the rules-based approach and implications for 
contractual fairness 
 
An excellent example of the individualistic rules-based approach was the case of 
Tjollo Ateljees (Eins) Bpk v Small37 which led to the demise of the doctrine of laesio 
enormis.  In short, this Roman Dutch (formerly Roman) doctrine provided that the 
buyer was entitled to rescind a contract where the price paid was more than double 
the market value of the goods, unless the seller was willing to repay the difference.38  
Likewise, the seller of movable or immovable goods was entitled to rescind a contract 
where the price paid was less than half the market value of the goods, unless the 
buyer was willing to make up the difference.39  In either event, therefore, a party that 
suffered an enormous loss as a result of the operation of an unfair contract was 
entitled to recourse.  The judgment of Van den Heever JA explicitly rejects the 
doctrine, on the basis that it was in conflict with the doctrine of freedom of contract: 
“The theory of laesio enormis implies that parties may not contract freely, that the law 
steps in and turns their contracts into something which neither intended.”40  Van den 
Heever JA objects strongly to the fact that the doctrine could not be formulated as a 
rule: 
 
“I am satisfied that despite all the learning relating to the rescission of contracts on 
the ground of laesio enormis nothing has evolved out of it which could be dignified by 
the name of a rule of positive law.”41 
 
And again: 
 
“Since the alleged rule encourages a party to divest himself of obligations which he 
has freely and solemnly undertaken, I do not consider it in harmony either with 
immanent reason or public policy.”42 
                                                 
37 1949 (1) SA 856 (A). 
38 Tladi “Breathing Constitutional Values into the Law of Contract: Freedom of Contract and the 
Constitution” 35 (2002) De Jure 306 at 310. 
39 Ibid. 
40 875. 
41 875 (my emphasis). 
42 873. 
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The court suggested that the doctrine should be repealed by way of legislation,43 
which in fact occurred three years later, signalling the end of a key tool for securing 
contractual fairness.44 
 
A more recent example of the rules-based approach was the case of Bank of Lisbon 
and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas,45 which was a landmark decision because it was 
a further major setback for the principle of equity in contract.  Prior to this decision, 
the exceptio doli generalis had generally been assumed to be a substantive equitable 
remedy against the enforcement of an unfair contract, or the enforcement of a 
contract in unfair circumstances.46  After a comprehensive review of the old and 
modern authorities, the majority (per Joubert JA) concluded that the exceptio is not 
part of our law, since it had never been received into Roman-Dutch law, nor into 
South African law.47  With a stroke of the judicial pen, Joubert JA rejected the 
exceptio “as a superfluous, defunct anachronism”,48  going on to state that all forms 
of equity remained subject to the “principle of law” and could not override a “clear rule 
of law”.49   For Joubert JA, the exceptio could have no validity unless it appears in 
modern law in the same form it took in Roman law, because “for a hard positivist, a 
proposition can only count as being legally valid if it has the right pedigree, if it can be 
identified by a rule of recognition”.50   
 
The strongly-contrasting dissenting judgment of Jansen JA, in which he argues for 
the retention of the exceptio, is of great interest.  He questions that both the 
substantive principle of individualism and the formal principle of certainty are 
absolute in the law:51 
 
“It is said that the recognition of the exceptio doli in this sense would be an infraction 
of the freedom of contract and the principle that pacta servanda sunt – that it would 
lead to legal uncertainty.  Freedom of contract, the principles of pacta servanda sunt 
and certainty are not however absolute values.” 
 
                                                 
43 Per Schreiner JA at 860. 
44 Tladi 2002 De Jure 311. 
45 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
46 Christie Contract 12; see Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 638–666 for a 
thorough exposition of the exceptio doli generalis. 
47 596–597 and 601–605. 
48 607B. 
49 606A. 
50 Lewis “Fairness in South African Contract Law” (2003) 120 SALJ 330 at 332. 
51 613B. 
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He goes on to recognise that the equity principle must be considered in this case:52 
 
“Moreover, the twin concepts of freedom of contract and pacta servanda sunt have, 
during this century, increasingly come under assault as a result of inter alia rampant 
inflation, monopolistic practices giving rise to unequal bargaining power and the 
large-scale use of standard-form contracts (often couched in small print).” 
 
Jansen JA’s words expose Joubert JA’s judgment as being “fixated on the doctrine 
itself rather than the principle underpinning it”.53   
 
The demise of the exceptio is a sideshow to the issue of achieving fairness in 
contract.  Christie concludes that it would not be desirable to bring the exceptio back 
to life again, “because the half-life of the exceptio from 1925 to 1988 showed it to be 
so entangled in its history that it was not a satisfactory instrument for modern courts 
to use”.54  The result was the loss of another mechanism to alleviate the harshness of 
unfair contracts or contract terms and to attain more equitable results in appropriate 
circumstances, and the law had to look to other mechanisms in order to do so.55 
 
Importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, although the exceptio was a defence 
to an action for specific performance, it was a good example of a legal standard that 
cannot be reduced to the form of a determinative rule, and Joubert JA clearly disliked 
the resultant open-ended discretion with which courts were vested.56  The decision 
was “predicated upon an extreme individualism which seeks to deny that the law may 
legitimately superimpose an overriding duty to act in good faith upon the voluntary 
arrangements of consenting adults”.57  The judgment was widely criticised in a similar 
vein for its “positivist-historical approach”58 and “absence of an in-depth discussion of 
general policy considerations or the responsibility of a court to ensure justice”.59  
Glover sums up the position succinctly:60 
 
                                                 
52 613D. 
53 Lewis  2003 SALJ 333. 
54 Christie Contract 13. 
55 See the discussion regarding public policy and good faith in 2.3 and 2.4 below. 
56 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 44. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Van der Merwe, Lubbe and Van Huyssteen “The Exceptio Doli Generalis: Requiescat in Pace – Vivat 
Aequitas” (1989) 106 SALJ 235 at 238. 
59 Christie Contract 12. 
60 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa (PhD 
thesis, Rhodes University, 2003) 129. 
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“The chorus of disapproval was indicative of a key trend: the classical laissez-faire 
theory of contract, fortified by the majority in the Bank of Lisbon case, was 
increasingly being exposed as a failure.” 
 
The Bank of Lisbon case prompted commentators and the courts to seek alternative 
ways to attempt to find a balance between law and equity in the law of contract.61 
 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Thus, concludes Cockrell, the assumption that South African contract law is “steeped 
in an axiomatic commitment to pure individualism framed in the form of clear rules” is 
“seriously at odds with large tracts of the contemporary law”, which “embody a very 
different style of normative commitment and which are characteristically expressed in 
a standards-based form”; they “exist alongside individualism in the law as a 
competing vision of communal life”.62 
 
“[A]ll that we can ask of contract law is that it mediate between self-interest and 
sociality in a self-conscious manner that does not blindly value legal doctrine as an 
end unto itself.”63 
 
It is noteworthy that Cockrell was writing prior to the constitutional era.  Without 
question, the introduction of the Bill of Rights further legitimates the use of general 
principles as a guide to the judiciary.64  These principles take the form of values and 
rights, and resemble very closely the standards-based form discussed above.  The 
impact of the Constitution on contractual fairness will be discussed in greater depth in 
2.3.4 below.  As far as the common law is concerned, the mechanism that the courts 
turned to in order to try to find a balance between rules and standards was the 
concept of public policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See 2.3 and 2.4 below. 
62 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 63. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Lewis 2003 SALJ 331. 
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2.3 Public policy in the law of contract 
 
2.3.1 Some background history 
 
The doctrine of “public policy” provides, in short, that contracts should occur in the 
public interest, and (its corollary) that agreements contrary to public policy are illegal 
and should not be enforced.65  This fundamental tenet of our law of contract66 is most 
forcibly stated in the well-known words of Innes CJ in Eastwood v Shepstone:67 
 
“Now this Court has the power to treat as void and to refuse in any way to recognise 
contracts and transactions which are against public policy or contrary to good morals.  
It is a power not to be hastily or rashly exercised; but once it is clear that any 
arrangement is against public policy, the Court would be wanting in its duty if it 
hesitated to declare such an arrangement void.  What we have to look for is the 
tendency of the proposed transaction, not its actually proved result.” 
 
Over the years, the courts, like Innes CJ, have counselled a measure of caution in 
the exercise of the power to refuse to enforce a contract on the grounds of policy,68 
which has the potential to be “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it 
you never know where it will carry you”.69  Lord Atkin in Fender v St John-Mildmay70 
said of public policy: 
 
“The doctrine should only be invoked in clear cases in which the harm to the public is 
substantially incontestable, and does not depend upon the idiosyncratic inferences of 
a few judicial minds…” 
 
Likewise, in Roffey v Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd,71 Didcott J provided a 
carefully-reasoned and cautious appraisal as to why public policy should not be given 
too much sway.  In upholding a covenant in restraint of trade in the face of a defence 
                                                 
65 Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa Vol 1, 2 ed (1951) paragraph 480 states that “[an] act 
which is contrary to the interests of the community is said to be an act contrary to public policy”.  Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law by Hutchison, van Heerden, Visser and van der Merwe 8 ed (1991) 324 
states that an agreement is contrary to public policy “if it is opposed to the interests of the State, or of 
justice, or of the public”. 
66 Ibid. 
67 1902 TS 294 at 302. 
68 Corbett 1987 SALJ 64. 
69 Burrough J in Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229 at 252. 
70 1938 AC 1 (HL) at 12, quoted by Smalberger JA in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
71 1977 (4) SA 494 (N). 
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of public policy, he was not prepared to allow a principle of fairness in contract to 
diminish the force of the sanctity of contract principle to any extent:72 
  
“I am satisfied that the South African law prefers the sanctity of contracts… The 
principle has a moral dimension too, which gives it a durability and universality 
beyond the norms of the marketplace.  This consists of its simple requirement that 
people should keep their promises.” 
 
2.3.2 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes73 is the leading authority on the modern law of illegality or 
unenforceability of contracts by common law,74 and represented a shift in the 
philosophical approach to public policy.  Delivering the majority judgment, 
Smalberger JA concedes at the outset that public policy is an expression of “vague 
import and what the requirements of public policy are must needs often be a difficult 
and contentious matter”.75  Yet he tackles the principles concerned in a carefully-
considered judgment, in order to give some substance to the meaning of the term:76 
 
“The interests of the community or the public are therefore of paramount importance 
in relation to the concept of public policy.  Agreements which are clearly inimical to 
the interests of the community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run 
counter to social and economic expedience, will accordingly, on the grounds of public 
policy, not be enforced.” 
 
In adopting the approach of “cautious boldness”77 enjoined on the courts by Innes 
CJ,78 Smalberger JA “struck the balance between boldness and caution”,79 in 
carefully weighing fairness against legal certainty.  He added: 
 
“No court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to 
public policy when the occasion so demands.  The power to declare contracts 
contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised sparingly and only in the 
clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from an 
arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power.  One must be careful not to conclude 
                                                 
72 505F-G. 
73 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
74 Christie Contract 343. 
75 7I-J. 
76 8C-D. 
77 Christie Contract 344. 
78 Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294 at 302. 
79 Christie Contract 344. 
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that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms (or some of them) 
offend one’s individual sense of propriety and fairness.”80 
 
Again, whilst Smalberger JA recognised that “public policy generally favours the 
utmost freedom of contract, and requires that commercial transactions should not be 
unduly trammelled by restrictions on that freedom”,81 he states in the next paragraph 
that “public policy should properly take into account the doing of simple justice 
between man and man”.82  As Lubbe explains:83 
 
“This necessitates the weighing up of competing considerations of a normative 
nature, the question to be answered being whether the general public interest in the 
enforcement of seriously intended agreements is in a particular case trumped by 
competing considerations germane to public policy in a manner requiring that it be 
denied legal operation.” 
 
Smalberger JA thus deliberately distances his judgment from the absolute sanctity of 
contract advocated by many commentators and courts over the years, and requires 
that there be limitations on the freedom of contract.  Realising that this approach 
might seem “counter-intuitive to many positivist judges”,84 Smalberger JA urges that 
“no court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to 
public policy when the occasion so demands”.85  Thus, whilst the power to declare a 
contract unenforceable should be “exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of 
cases”,86 Corbett, writing before the Sasfin judgment, reminded his readers that “the 
courts are constantly called upon to take fundamental policy decisions, and in doing 
so to weigh conflicting interests and strike a balance”.87 
 
A few months later, the Appellate Division reinforced the Sasfin majority judgment 
with a unanimous judgment in the case of Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) 
                                                 
80 9A-B.  
81 9E.  See also Magna Alloys & Research (SA) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) at 893I–894A; SA 
Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Beperk v Shifren en Andere 1964 (4) SA 760 (A) at 767A; Roffey v 
Catterall, Edwards & Goudre (Pty) Ltd 1977 (4) SA 494 (N); Lubbe “Bona fides, Billikheid en die 
Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg” (1990) 1 Stell LR 7 at 13; Afrox Health Care Bpk 
v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) para 23 at 38D. 
82 9G.  Smalberger JA was in fact quoting from a judgment of Stratford CJ in Jajhbay v Cassim 1939 AD 
537 at 544. 
83 Lubbe “Taking Fundamental Rights Seriously: the Bill of Rights and its Implications for the 
Development of Contract Law” (2004) 121 SALJ 400. 
84 Lewis  2003 SALJ 334. 
85 9A-B. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Corbett 1987 SALJ 65. 
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Ltd88 which, in the opinion of Christie, opened up the possibility of replacing the 
defunct exceptio doli generalis with an alternative method of “controlling contractual 
terms that are ‘plainly improper and unconscionable’ or ‘unduly harsh and 
oppressive’”89.  Christie then sums up the effect of Sasfin and Botha (now Griessel) 
in a number of propositions, which are helpful for a more systematic approach to the 
“often difficult problem”90 of public policy:91 
 
“1. Public policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract. 
2. Public policy properly takes into account the necessity of doing simple justice                         
between man and man. 
3. The power to declare a contract or a term in a contract contrary to public policy                 
and therefore unenforceable should be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest 
of cases. 
4. Nevertheless a contract or a term in a contract may be declared contrary to public 
policy if it is clearly inimical to the interests of the community, or is contrary to law or 
morality, or runs counter to social or economic expedience, or is plainly improper and 
unconscionable, or unduly harsh or oppressive.” 
 
In Juglal v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd,92 Heher JA added more flesh to these 
propositions:93 
 
“Because the courts will conclude that contractual provisions are contrary to public 
policy only when that is their clear effect ... it follows that the tendency of a proposed 
transaction towards such a conflict ... can only be found to exist if there is a 
probability that unconscionable, immoral or illegal conduct will result from the 
implementation of the provisions according to the tenor.  (It may be that the 
cumulative effect of implementation of provisions not individually objectionable may 
disclose such a tendency).” 
 
Consideration should also be given to the helpful words of Cameron JA in Brisley v 
Drotsky:94 
 
“The ‘legal convictions of the community’ – a concept open to misinterpretation and 
misapplication – is better replaced, as the Constitutional Court has itself suggested, 
                                                 
88 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) 782I–783C. 
89 Christie Contract 344, quoting Hoexter JA in Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 783B–C. 
90 Smalberger JA in Sasfin at 9E. 
91 Christie Contract 344–345. 
92 2004 (5) SA 248 (SCA). 
93 258. 
94 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 35D. 
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by the ‘appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied in the 
Constitution’.”95 
 
Not very long after Sasfin, in the case of Donnelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd,96 
Kriegler J pointed out that the effect of Sasfin is not to provide “a free pardon for 
recalcitrant and otherwise defenceless debtors”.97 
 
“[T]he maxim pacta sunt servanda is still a cornerstone of our law of contract.  
Nothing said or implied in the Sasfin case in any way serves to derogate from that 
important principle.”98 
 
Without question, though, Sasfin remains a leading case that will continue to guide 
the courts in deciding whether contracts at issue are contrary to public policy.99  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has continued to endorse the Sasfin approach to public 
policy.  In Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom,100 the court confirmed that a contractual 
clause that is so unreasonable that it conflicts with public policy is unenforceable, and 
public policy was shown to be an overarching corrective doctrinal control 
mechanism.101  Further, it will be seen in 2.4.4 below that since the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s preference for public policy over good faith,102 Sasfin “has become the 
leading case for testing the enforceability of contracts which in other jurisdictions 
would raise questions of good faith”.103 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Cameron JA was referring to Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) para 
56.  In regard to public policy and constitutional values, see 2.3.4 below. 
96 1990 (1) SA 375 (W). 
97 381E. 
98 381H. 
99 Christie Contract 346–347, lists a number of examples of contracts whose clauses have attracted 
scrutiny by the courts in this regard, namely: antenuptial contracts (Barnard v Barnard 2000 (3) SA 741 
(C) 753C–754F); contracts of cession (Interland Durban (Pty) Ltd v Walters 1993 (1) SA 223 (C)); 
suretyship (First National Bank of SA Ltd v Sphinx Fashions CC 1993 (2) SA 721 (W)); maintenance 
(Baart v Malan 1990 (2) SA 862 (E)); reinstatement of sequestration proceedings (Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd v Essop 1997 (4) SA 569 (D) 575E–577E and Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service 1998 (4) SA 1002 (SE) 1011F–1013B); settlement of property rights on 
divorce (Stembridge v Stembridge 1998 (2) All SA 5 (D) 13g–15b); tender bidding (Warrenton 
Munisipaliteit v Coetzee 1998 (3) SA 1103 (NC) 1111J–1113A); restraint of trade (Mossgas (Pty) Ltd v 
Sasol Technology (Pty) Ltd 1999 (3) All SA 321 (W) 334e–336a). 
100 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) 33H. 
101 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 398. 
102 See Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 
(SCA). 
103 Christie Contract 347. 
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2.3.3 Towards a clearer understanding of public policy 
 
But what is this public interest in accordance with which contracts should be 
concluded?  Or, how can the criteria for public policy be more clearly defined? 
 
First, it serves no useful purpose to draw a distinction between contracts contrary to 
the common law, those against public policy and those contra bonos mores, since 
the three expressions are interchangeable.104  Van der Merwe et al105 accept that the 
terms “public policy” and “public interest” can be used interchangeably,106 but seek to 
draw a distinction between public policy and public interest on the one hand and the 
boni mores of the community on the other hand.107  In my view, nothing much turns 
on this possible distinction. 
 
Second, the grounds upon which a contract may be unenforceable have over time 
crystallised out into specific categories,108 and most writers deal with unenforceable 
contracts under separate headings.109  Smalberger JA in Sasfin confirmed, however, 
that this is purely a matter of convenience,110  and these categories do not represent 
a numerus clausus,111 because, as Christie puts it, “human devilment and foolishness 
know no limits and the courts cannot set themselves limits which disable them from 
combating such things”.112 
 
Third, public policy is a question of fact, not law,113 and changes with “the general 
sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, manifested in public opinion”.114  
Conceptions of public policy are variable over space and time, and it has to be left to 
the courts to determine whether a contract is enforceable or not.115  It is “a flexible 
                                                 
104 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 7I–9A; Christie Contract 343–344; Kerr General Principles of the Law of 
Contract 6 ed (2002) 185, Footnote 42.  As Aquilius “Immorality and Illegality in Contract” Part 1 (1941) 
58 SALJ 337 at 344 puts it: “[I]n a sense... all illegalities may be said to be immoral and all immorality 
and illegality contrary to public policy.” 
105 Van der Merwe, van Huyssteen, Reinecke, Lubbe & Lotz Contract General Principles 2 ed (2003). 
106 Van der Merwe et al Contract 177. 
107 Ibid.  With reference to the norms governing sexual morals and honest and proper conduct as 
examples of everyday boni mores or standards of conduct set by society, they state at 177: “[T]hat 
which is in accordance with public policy and in the public interest would include that which is in 
accordance with good morals, although an agreement which is not immoral as such may for reasons of 
economic or other expediency nevertheless be against public policy and the public interest.” 
108 Corbett 1987 SALJ 64. 
109 See, for example, Christie Contract 335ff. 
110 8G. 
111 See Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 891H–I; Corbett (1987) 104 SALJ 64. 
112 Christie Contract 347. 
113 Christie Contract 345; Aquilius “Immorality and Illegality in Contract” (1941) SALJ 346; Ryland v 
Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C); Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (A). 
114 Lorimar Productions Inc v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 1129 (T).  
115 Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 890–893; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 400. 
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measure of variable content of the social adequacy of agreements”,116 for “it is only 
natural that perceptions as to what is or is not contrary to public policy may vary from 
era to era”.117  With the passage of time, courts may introduce new categories of 
public policy, or abandon or limit old ones.118  Thus, in Ryland v Edros119 Farlam J, a 
single judge in a provincial division, was able to make a different finding to that in 
Ismail v Ismail,120 an Appellate Division decision made 14 years earlier, in which 
potentially polygamous Muslim marriages were held to be contrary to public policy.121 
 
Fourth, writers have distinguished between superficial public opinion, “which can 
swing like the weathercock”122 and “seriously considered public opinion”123 as to the 
broader sense of justice and morality of society.  Adherence to the latter 
interpretation will ensure that contracts are not at the mercy of fickle public opinion.124  
Rather, only contracts “clearly inimical to the interests of the community”125 should 
not be enforced. 
 
Fifth, in a useful effort to give substantive content to the term “public interest”,126 van 
der Merwe et al127 suggest that this term should not be limited to the wider interests 
of society in general.  Rather, it should include the individual interests of the parties 
to the contract at issue, which may be at variance with the interests of the broader 
community, in which case it is possible that the public interest may be determined by 
individual interests.  Likewise, the sectional interests of the group to which the 
contracting parties belong, within the broader society, must be considered:   
 
“The guiding principle should be that sectional interests must be evaluated within the 
context of the wider interests of society as a whole: sections of a society have an 
interest in upholding the general interests of the society, whilst the society itself has 
an interest in maintaining sectional interests.”128 
 
                                                 
116 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 400. 
117 Corbett 1987 SALJ 64. 
118 Ibid. 
119 1997 (2) SA 690 (C). 
120 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A). 
121 There were also important constitutional considerations applicable in this case, which will be 
discussed in 2.3.4 below. 
122 Christie Contract 345. 
123 Ibid; Corbett 1987 SALJ 67–68. 
124 Christie Contract 345. 
125 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd  v Beukes 8C. 
126 Van der Merwe et al Contract suggest at 178 that the term “social interest” would be preferable. 
127 Van der Merwe et al Contract 178. 
128 Ibid.  See also Ryland v Edros 708–709. 
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It may therefore be in the public interest to protect sectional interests and customs 
above the interests and customs of the wider community.129 
 
Finally, in utilising the instrument of public policy, the courts are not required to 
conduct a comparative study, because it is internationally accepted that each country 
should develop and apply its own understanding of this principle.130 
 
2.3.4 Public policy and constitutional values 
 
2.3.4.1 Introduction 
 
The discussion above sets out the common law position in regard to public policy as 
it was prior to the constitutional dispensation,131 which is still the foundation for our 
law today.  Until constitutional considerations have been applied, however, the 
picture is not complete, because our understanding of common law public policy, as 
with all law, is overlaid by constitutional principles.  Constitutional rights and values 
are all-pervasive in our law,132 and demand to be considered at every juncture,133 and 
not simply tagged on at the end of a discussion.  In Brisley v Drotsky,134 Cameron JA 
had this to say in regard to the Constitution:135 
 
“All law now enforced in South Africa and applied by the courts derives its force from 
the Constitution. All law is therefore subject to constitutional control, and all law 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid. That includes the common law of 
contract, which is subject to the supreme law of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights 
applies to all law, and binds the Judiciary no less than the Legislature, the Executive 
and all organs of State. In addition, the Constitution requires the courts, when 
developing the common law of contract, to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.  These propositions, if they ever were controversial, are no longer 
so. They derive from the provisions of the Constitution itself, as the Constitutional 
Court has interpreted and applied them.”136 
 
                                                 
129 See, for example, Mohamed v Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A), in which the test for defamation was 
applied with reference to the Muslim community of the Western Cape. 
130 Christie Contract 17. 
131 This is so mainly because Sasfin was decided in 1989. 
132 Section 8(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides: “The Bill of Rights 
applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.” 
133 See s39(2) of the Constitution. 
134 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
135 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
136 Brisley v Drotsky 33F–G.  My emphasis. 
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2.3.4.2 The impact of constitutional values on public policy 
 
The indirect impact or radiating effect of the Constitution is clearly relevant to 
contractual fairness and public policy.  Christie states correctly that the Constitution 
“provides an exceptionally reliable statement of seriously considered public 
opinion”.137  That this is so is without question when one considers the widespread 
consultation and negotiation during its drafting, and the broad approval it has 
received.138  Once again, Cameron JA puts this most forcibly in a clear and 
unequivocal statement of the impact of the Constitution on the law of contract, and 
one can do no better than to quote him extensively:139 
 
“In its modern guise, ‘public policy’ is now rooted in our Constitution and the 
fundamental values it enshrines.  These include human dignity, the achievement of 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-
sexism. 
      It is not difficult to envisage situations in which contracts that offend these 
fundamentals of our new social compact will be struck down as offensive to public 
policy. They will be struck down because the Constitution requires it, and the values it 
enshrines will guide the courts in doing so. The decisions of this Court that proclaim 
that the limits of contractual sanctity lie at the borders of public policy will therefore 
receive enhanced force and clarity in the light of the Constitution and the values 
embodied in the Bill of Rights.” 
 
2.3.4.3 The role of public policy in developing the common law 
 
Public policy is likely to be the main instrument for applying or developing the 
common law of contract in terms of s8(3)(a) of the Constitution, in order to give effect 
to a provision of the Bill of Rights, and for developing the common law in terms of 
s8(3)(b) to limit such a right.140  Thus, de Vos141 suggests that the existing common 
                                                 
137 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” in Mokoro and Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights 
Compendium (2006) para 3H8.  He goes on to qualify this statement, however, by making it clear that it 
would be a mistake to treat the Constitution as the last word on public policy.  Rather, the Bill of Rights 
should inform the common law by developing it in terms of s8(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Brisley v Drotsky 34H–35B.  My emphasis.  These views were reiterated again in Napier v 
Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 7A–B. 
140 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium para 3H8.  Section 
8(3) provides: “When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
sub-section (2), a court – 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law 
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with s36(1). 
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law rule that contractual provisions that are contra bonos mores are unenforceable 
could be developed by treating as contra bonos mores any provision which is clearly 
at odds with the basic principles of the Bill of Rights.  Whilst constitutional values are 
of fundamental importance to our society, however, they do not contain an exclusive 
embodiment of the values that are in accordance with public policy in the law of 
contract.142 
 
Cameron JA points out that the courts have “a ‘general obligation’, which is not 
purely discretionary, to develop the law in the light of fundamental constitutional 
values”.143  Thus, whilst previously there was strong academic and judicial opinion 
that the courts should, in interpreting the law, have regard to the values and needs of 
society at the time (traditional public policy), they must now do so for there is a legal 
mandate to do so.144  Christie believes that the reliability of the Constitution as a 
statement of public policy “can and should” be used by the courts in applying the 
provisions of s8(2) and s8(3)(a).145  The constitutional imperative in s8(3)(a) – “a 
court … must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law…”146 – of which 
Cameron JA reminds us confirms that the courts are rather duty-bound to do so, and 
cannot choose not to do so.  As Cameron JA re-asserts more recently in Napier v 
Barkhuizen:147 
 
“[T]he common law of contract is subject to the Constitution.  This means that courts 
are obliged to take fundamental constitutional values into account while performing 
their duty to develop the law of contract in accordance with the Constitution.” 
 
This approach to developing the common law in terms of the interim Constitution148 
was adopted effectively by Farlam J in the case of Ryland v Edros149 in which he 
found, by virtue of the radiating effect of numerous provisions of the interim 
Constitution, that potentially polygamous Muslim marriages could no longer be 
regarded as contrary to public policy.150 
                                                                                                                                            
141 De Vos “Pious wishes or directly enforceable human rights?: Social Justice and Economic Rights in 
South Africa’s 1996 Constitution” 1997 SAJHR 67 at 101. 
142 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 
146–147 refers, for example, to the fundamentally important principle pacta sunt servanda, which is not 
articulated in the Bill of Rights. 
143 Brisley v Drotsky 34C–D. 
144 Lewis  2003 SALJ 337. 
145 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium para 3H8. 
146 Section 8(3)(a). 
147 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 6E–F. 
148 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
149 1997 (2) SA 690 (C), discussed in 2.3.3 above. 
150 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium para 3H8. 
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2.3.4.4 Limitations on the impact of constitutional values on public policy 
 
Further, the Constitution does not give the courts judicial licence to release litigants 
from contracts based upon subjective views of what is or is not just, nor to ignore 
judicial precedent.151  Rather, clear legal and factual justification will be required to 
declare contract terms unenforceable.  In Napier v Barkhuizen,152 Cameron JA warns 
against what amounts to pre-suppositions regarding the perceived meanings of 
constitutional values:153 
 
“[T]he constitutional values of dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms ... provide no general all-embracing touchstone for invalidating a 
contractual term.   
      Nor does the fact that a term is unfair or may operate harshly by itself lead to the 
conclusion that it offends against constitutional principle ... 
      This is not to envisage an implausible contractual nirvana. It is to respect the 
complexity of the value system the Constitution creates ... 
It is relatively easy to see how the Constitution's foundational values of non-
racialism and non-sexism could lead to the invalidation of a contractual term. Less 
immediately obvious is how the values of human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms may affect particular contractual 
outcomes. But Brisley and Afrox and Stott opened the door to precisely such 
determinations.” 
 
Smalberger JA’s statement that “the power to declare contracts contrary to public 
policy should be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases”154 is still 
relevant in the constitutional era.  Again, Cameron JA expresses this best:155 
 
“What is evident is that neither the Constitution nor the value system it embodies 
gives the courts a general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis of judicially 
perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability on the basis of 
imprecise notions of good faith.  On the contrary, the Constitution's values of dignity 
and equality and freedom require that the courts approach their task of striking down 
contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint. One of the reasons, 
                                                 
151 Lewis  2003 SALJ 338. 
152 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
153 8C–H. 
154 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 9B. 
155 Brisley v Drotsky 35D–E. 
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as Davis J has pointed out,156 is that contractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn 
of its obscene excesses, contractual autonomy informs also the constitutional value 
of dignity.” 
 
Thus, Cameron JA reminds us that contractual autonomy remains a foundationally 
important policy factor in our law of contract, and that nothing can detract from this.157  
“Freedom” is a foundational value of the Bill of Rights too,158 and both Davis J and 
Cameron JA have declared that “contractual autonomy is part of freedom”.159  
Cameron JA confirms, however, that contractual autonomy (including the values of 
freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda) is not absolute, and can be defeated 
by other policy factors, including counterveiling constitutional values. 
 
2.3.4.5 Conclusion 
 
It is clear therefore that the Constitution gives the courts more power legitimately to 
find contractual terms to be contrary to public policy, which is a significant 
development for the common law of contract.  In exercising this power, however, the 
courts must strive: 
 
“…to achieve a careful balance between the unacceptable excesses of contractual 
'freedom', and securing a framework within which the ability to contract enhances 
rather than diminishes our self-respect and dignity.”160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156 Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C) 474–475. 
157 See also the words of Cameron JA in Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 8E–F. 
158 See s7(1) and s39(1) of the Constitution. 
159 See the discussion in 2.1 above. 
160 Cameron JA’s concluding remarks in Brisley v Drotsky 36A. 
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2.4 Good faith in the law of contract 
 
2.4.1 All contracts are bonae fidei 
 
According to Roman-Dutch law, which has been received into South African law, all 
contracts are considered to be bonae fidei,161 are entered into in good faith,162 or are 
grounded in the principle of good faith, which underpins our law of contract.163  There 
appears to be a close link between this notion and individual autonomy, the 
traditionally dominant contractual philosophy in South Africa.164  The principle of good 
faith has not had a prominent role in South African contract law, because a less 
individualistic approach would have been necessary in order for fairness and the 
interests of others to be given higher priority.165 
 
It is extremely difficult, however, to understand and articulate what is actually meant 
by the statement that all contracts are bonae fidei.  It appears that in South Africa: 
 
“The principle of good faith provides a moral, or principle-based, jurisprudential 
justification for the existence of the many so-called black-letter rules and doctrines 
that exist in contract law, and which are designed to promote fair dealing and ensure 
the legitimate expectations of contracting parties are met.”166 
 
The principle is understood to be inherent in various technical rules and doctrines, 
providing justification or legitimacy for them.  This understanding suggests that such 
rules and doctrines, together making up our law of contract, are assumed to be 
inherently good or equitable or fair, an understanding with which most South African 
lawyers who are for the most part loyal to the Roman-Dutch origins of our law would 
probably be comfortable. 
 
                                                 
161 Cockrell 1992 SALJ 55; Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn Municipality 1985 (1) SA 
419 (A) 433B; Meskin NO v Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 (4) SA 793 (W) 802A. 
162 Christie Contract 7. Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 867. 
163 Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 301ff; Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of 
Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 133.  Cockrell 1992 SALJ 55 describes good faith 
as “the epitome of a legal standard that embodies communitarian values of altruism, care and concern”. 
164 See the discussion in 2.1 above.  Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 867–868 suggest that the 
presence of consensus, together with the value of good faith, “renders our law of contract inherently 
equitable – the concept of good faith is said to have infused the law of contract with an equitable spirit”. 
165 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 134. 
166 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 142; 
cf Cockrell 1992 SALJ 40. 
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Does this understanding of the principle of good faith have any practical application?   
The principle appears to refer not just to contract law, but to actual contracts 
themselves, all of which are assumed to be “grounded in the principle of good faith”.  
Is it intended to imply by this that all contracts concluded in practice are good or 
equitable or fair?  Likewise, the notion that all contracts are entered into in good 
faith167 implies that parties to contracts always conduct themselves in good faith.  
This of course has no foundation in practice, as a brief perusal of our law reports will 
soon confirm.  If these are correct implications of the principle, then this somewhat 
quaint and antiquated principle appears to serve no useful practical purpose.  It 
seems to exist only to prop up and justify contract law and the process of contracting, 
and to remind us of the need for fair dealing, while providing little assistance for 
redress in the event that dealing is not fair.  It amounts to the importation into our law 
of a principle in the form of a theoretical legal maxim or construction that has only a 
legitimating or explanatory function,168 aimed primarily at self-justification.  With 
reference to the classical model of contract law, Bhana and Pieterse argue that:169 
 
“[I]t fails to ensure substantive consensus between the parties by simply accepting 
that compliance with the rules of contract law (regardless of the context within which 
they operate) will in itself adequately guarantee legitimate consensus and therefore 
good faith.” 
 
This interpretation of good faith, adopted by South African law, seems to operate to 
the exclusion of any approach to good faith that would aim to promote fairness and 
equity in a more pro-active manner, for example through the absence of good faith 
being used as a defence to render an unfair contract unenforceable.  The exclusion 
of such an alternative approach is illustrated in Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v 
De Ornelas,170 in which the majority declared that the exceptio doli generalis is 
unnecessary, as all contracts are in any event based on good faith,171 yet declined to 
apply bona fides in the adjudication of the matter:172 
 
“[I] cannot find any support in Roman-Dutch law for the proposition that in the law of 
contract an equitable exception or defence, similar in effect to the exceptio doli 
generalis, was utilised under the aegis of bona fides.” 
                                                 
167 This notion appears to be an alternative articulation of the same principle that all contracts are bonae 
fidei. 
168 Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 230. 
169 Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 894. My emphasis. 
170 1988 (3) SA 580 (A). 
171 Tladi 2002 De Jure 312. 
172 606D. 
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2.4.2 Theories of good faith 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the further development of South African law in regard 
to good faith, it will be helpful briefly to consider three models for the operation of the 
principle of good faith that have been suggested.173 The approach adopted in South 
Africa that all contracts are bonae fidei accords most closely with the model that 
Brownsword calls “a good faith requirement”.174  In terms of this interpretation good 
faith acts as a controlling principle that requires parties to comply with the standards 
of fair dealing that are already recognised and accepted in a particular contracting 
context (e.g. a sale of land or an employment contract).  These standards accord 
with the reasonable, legitimate expectations of the contracting community in the 
particular market.175 
 
The second model, “a good faith regime”,176 acts on the standards of fair dealing that 
are dictated or prescribed by co-operative ground rules established by law.  Its 
content is derived not from the common standards of the parties in a particular 
contracting community (as with the first model) but from a moral form of contractual 
justice imposed by the legal system which would seemingly allow widely-recognised 
market practices to be overridden.177  The courts, as arbiters of public morality, are 
required to decide whether or not a contract or the process of contracting is in good 
faith.178 
 
The third model, which Bridge calls “visceral justice”,179 gives to judges judicial 
license to make decisions based entirely on their subjective notions of fairness in 
each case before them, all in the name of good faith.180  Clearly, this approach is 
untenable in a legal system which by its very nature depends on rules, principles and 
precedent for the proper administration of justice. 
 
The merits of the first two models will be briefly discussed in relation to South African 
contract law in 2.4.5 below. 
 
                                                 
173 See, for example, Brownsword Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-first Century (2000) 115–120. 
174 Brownsword Contract Law 116. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Bridge “Good Faith in Commercial Contracts” in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) Good Faith in 
Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 139 at 140. 
180 Brownsword Contract Law 116. 
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2.4.3 “A brief turn towards fairness” 
 
In the aftermath of the Bank of Lisbon and Sasfin cases, however, there was 
renewed interest in academic writing and court decisions in the principle of good 
faith.181  The most significant decision was the minority judgment of Olivier JA in 
Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman,182 in which he 
conducted a thorough analysis of the good faith principle in South African law, and 
showed that good faith forms one of the cornerstones of the law of contract in many 
European civil jurisdictions.183  He held that if good faith so required, a court could 
refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract.184  He submitted that the bona fides 
principle forms an element of the umbrella concept of public policy,185 concluding his 
judgment thus:186 
 
“I am convinced that the principles of good faith, grounded in public opinion, continue 
to play an important role in our law of contract, and must do so, like in any system of 
law that is sensitive to the convictions of the community, which is the ultimate creator 
and beneficiary of moral and ethical values of reasonableness, fairness and 
decency.” 
 
Olivier JA’s judgment went against the tide of judicial opinion in regard to the 
principle of good faith,187 and has been described as “a brief turn towards 
fairness”.188  This approach was, however, effectively ended by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the case of Brisley v Drotsky.189  
 
2.4.4 Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 
 
The case of Brisley v Drotsky is of critical importance, because it reflects the current 
judicial attitude towards fairness in contract law, and provides current authority in this 
                                                 
181 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 135. 
182 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA). 
183 326J–327I. 
184 319A. 
185 322E. 
186 326G. This is a translation of the original Afrikaans: “Ek hou dit as my oortuiging na dat die beginsels 
van die goeie trou, gegrond op openbare beleid, steeds in ons kontraktereg ’n belangrike rol speel en 
moet speel, soos in enige regstelsel wat gevoelig is vir die opvattinge van die gemeenskap, wat die 
uiteindelike skepper en gebruiker is, met betrekking tot die morele en sedelike waardes van 
regverdigheid, billikheid en behoorlikheid.” 
187 The judgment was, however, followed in the case of Miller and another NNO  v Dannecker 2001 (1) 
SA 928 (C). 
188 Lewis  2003 SALJ 336. 
189 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA). 
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regard.190  The Supreme Court of Appeal was prepared to make what was intended 
to be a definitive pronouncement on the nature and role of good faith in South African 
contract law,191 which was something akin to Brownsword’s good faith requirement.   
 
In short, the majority dismissed the views of Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman as those of a single judge, and held that good faith 
cannot be accepted as an independent basis for setting aside contractual provisions.  
It was alleged in the case that a non-variation clause in a lease agreement could not 
be enforced because it was unreasonable, unfair and in conflict with the principles of 
good faith.192  The court rejected this argument on the basis that there was no 
general equitable discretion enabling a court to refuse to enforce any contractual 
provision merely on the grounds of it being unreasonable, unconscionable or against 
good faith.193  The court held that good faith is a foundational principle that underlies 
contract law and finds expression in the specific rules and principles of such law.194  
Good faith does not constitute “an independent, or ‘free-floating’, basis for the setting 
aside or non-enforcement of contractual provisions”.195 
 
In Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom,196 it was contended that an exemption clause was 
unenforceable for the reason that it was, inter alia, unreasonable, unfair and in 
conflict with the principles of bona fides or good faith.  Brand JA (on behalf of all the 
members of the court) endorsed the decision in Brisley v Drotsky, stating that 
abstract ideas such as good faith, reasonableness, fairness and justice provide “the 
foundation and justification for the existence of legal rules”, although they are not 
legal rules in themselves, and therefore have indirect application only.197  As Lubbe 
expresses it: “Good faith does not, on the view adopted by the court, operate on the 
black-letter or doctrinal level as an open norm” and “entails no more than that the 
courts in the enunciation of legal doctrine should have regard to undefined and 
undifferentiated equitable considerations”.198 
 
                                                 
190 Lewis  2003 SALJ 330. 
191 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 397. 
192 12G. 
193 12I. 
194 15E. 
195 Ibid.  This is a translation of the original Afrikaans: “ ’n onafhanklike, oftewel ’n ‘free-floating’, basis vir 
die tersydestelling of die nie-toepassing van kontraktuele bepalings.” 
196 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
197 40I. This is a translation of the original Afrikaans: “die vorming en die verandering van regsreels”.  
This approach provides a further excellent example of the “rules-based approach” discussed in 2.2.1 
and 2.2.3 above. 
198 Lubbe 2004 SALJ 397. 
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In both cases, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised public policy as a 
legitimate basis for the setting aside of unfair contract provisions,199 although on the 
facts of the cases before the respective courts decided not to do so. 
 
2.4.5 Conclusion 
 
The traditional approach to good faith, that all contracts are bonae fidei, is the 
foundation for our law of contract, although it has limited practical significance.  
Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom have endorsed this approach 
and enunciated what it means mainly with reference to what it is not, namely that it 
may not be used as an independent basis for refusing to enforce an unfair contract or 
an unfair term of a contract.  This interpretation of good faith appears to resemble 
most closely Brownsword’s “good faith requirement”, and without doubt represents 
the current law. 
 
The possibility that our courts could develop the principle of good faith as a 
mechanism for pro-actively promoting contractual fairness in the determination of 
whether or not a contract or contract term should be enforced, however, should not 
be totally discounted.  In the preface to the fifth edition of his book, Christie 
postulates:200 
 
“[It] will be a mistake to regard the door as forever closed, and to isolate ourselves 
from the many other legal systems in which good faith plays a prominent part.” 
 
The seeds for such an approach were sown by Olivier JA in the Saayman case, 
which could see the incorporation into our law of aspects of Brownsword’s “good faith 
regime” model for good faith.  It is not difficult, for example, to envisage the 
development of standards of fair dealing required by the law, with power given to the 
courts to decide when a contract has or has not been entered into in good faith, 
which could result, for example, in the declaration of a contractual clause as 
unenforceable.  This would be something akin to the courts’ current approach in 
respect of public policy.  It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
rejection of the notion of judges being permitted to exercise “independent, free-
floating” discretion in regard to good faith in cases before them amounts to a 
rejection only of Brownsword’s third model (Bridge’s “visceral justice”).  The “good 
                                                 
199 Brisley v Drotsky 34F and Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 37C–D.  
200 Christie Contract (v). 
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faith regime” model is an entirely different proposition which is still worthy of serious 
consideration.   
 
Further, this approach could easily be given greater impetus by relevant 
constitutional values such as equality and dignity.  Constitutional values have to be 
considered in the on-going development of the principle of good faith, because the 
Constitution demands this.  As Davis J stated in Mort NO v Henry Shields-Chiat:201 
 
“Like the concept of boni mores in our law of delict, the concept of good faith is 
shaped by the legal convictions of the community...  In short, the constitutional State 
which was introduced in 1994 mandates that all law should be congruent with the 
fundamental values of the Constitution.” 
 
In the final analysis, however, it is clear that public policy, fortified by constitutional 
values, has been and will continue to be a far more effective mechanism for 
developing the common law in regard to contractual fairness by means of s8(3)(a) of 
the Constitution.202   
 
“In the result, the Supreme Court of Appeal has rejected the concept of good faith 
and reaffirmed the concept of public policy as an instrument for handling cases of 
contractual unfairness that cannot satisfactorily be handled by existing rules.”203 
 
2.5 Legislative responses to contractual unfairness 
 
Since there has been little progress towards contractual fairness in the common law, 
Parliament has deemed it necessary to intervene on a piecemeal basis to promote 
fairness in consumer-related contexts.  Business relationships between suppliers of 
goods and services and consumers (who are purchasers of goods and services) 
were classically regulated by the common law of contract.  The principles of a free 
market and of active competition are fundamental ideals that have been repeatedly 
emphasised by our courts.204  Increasing recognition of socio-economic differences, 
however, manifest most significantly in imbalances in economic power between 
suppliers on the one hand and consumers on the other hand, has seen the rise of 
                                                 
201 2001 (1) SA 464 (C) 474J and 475B. 
202 Christie Contract 16 is of the view that “public policy is likely to prove the more satisfactory 
instrument”.  See 2.3 above for further discussion in this regard. 
203 Christie Contract 16. 
204 In Taylor and Horne (Pty) Ltd v Dentall (Pty) Ltd 1991 (1) SA 412 (A) 421, the court stated that 
competition is “the lifeblood of commerce”.  
  
 
34
consumer law, primarily through legislation, as a branch of the law of contract worthy 
of special attention.  Thus, the principle of “freedom of contract” has to some extent 
been modified by legislation in a number of areas of law, in order to give greater 
protection to consumers.205  Furthermore, progress towards increased consumer 
protection through legislation has been given greater impetus by the Constitution.206  
The constitutional values of equality and dignity are likely to impact increasingly on 
the traditional common law.207 
 
2.5.1 South African Law Commission208 Project 47: Unreasonable 
Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts 
 
Since there is no general equity jurisdiction in the South African law of contract,209 in 
1983 the South African Law Commission initiated a project to consider whether 
legislation should be passed which would allow courts to remedy contracts or 
contract terms that are unjust or unconscionable.  After a lengthy process of 
discussion and comment from the South African public, in April 1998 the Law 
Commission submitted its Final Report210 to the Minister of Justice, in which it 
comprehensively reviewed comparative law211 as well as respondents’ contributions 
to its previous discussion paper.212  Although there was both significant opposition213 
as well as support for proposed legislation, the final report strongly recommended 
legislation to achieve this objective, to be called the Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms Act.  There have 
been no further developments in regard to this proposed legislation to date, other 
than the incorporation of some of the proposals into a draft Consumer Protection Bill 
                                                 
205 See, for example, The Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976, the Maintenance and Promotion of 
Competition Act 96 of 1979, and the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 7 of 1996.  In 
terms of the latter Act, nine Provincial Consumer Courts were established, with the purpose of providing 
protection to consumers against unfair business practices (which could take the form of unfair contracts) 
and obviating lengthy and expensive litigation in the ordinary courts. 
206 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
207 See Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
208 Now the South African Law Reform Commission, but referred to throughout this study as the South 
African Law Commission, as it then was. 
209 See, for example, Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas and Brisley v Drotsky 16C and 
35C–E. 
210 South African Law Commission Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Final Report; Project 47) (1998). 
211 A review of legislation in regard to contractual fairness in other jurisdictions is most enlightening, but 
beyond the scope of this study. 
212 South African Law Commission Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Discussion Paper 65; Project 47) (1996). 
213 The main bases for opposition to legislation were that unconscionability should be a matter for the 
common law, that uncertainty would result from legislation, and that existing legislation was sufficient 
(pages 33–47 of the Final Report).  The Commission expressed the view that fears provoked by the Bill 
regarding resultant excessive litigation are exaggerated, and that in any event legal uncertainty resulting 
from the proposed Bill is the price that must be paid if greater contractual justice is to be achieved. 
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of 2006214 which will be discussed in 2.5.2 below, and the fate of the Law 
Commission’s proposed legislation is therefore uncertain.215  It is, however, still a 
worthwhile exercise to consider the proposed legislation and some of the comment 
thereon, as read with the Consumer Protection Bill, since it is indicative of the 
direction in which our contract law may be heading.  Further, most of the comment on 
the Law Commission’s proposed legislation is also relevant to the Consumer 
Protection Bill.  What follows therefore is merely a brief overview of the main points in 
the Law Commission’s final report and proposed legislation, with little analysis 
thereof.216 
 
The Law Commission was of the view that it was necessary to give the courts a more 
general power to curb unfairness in contracts, via legislation, in order to fill the gaps 
that exist in the common law, most notably inequality of bargaining power.217  It 
therefore recommended legislation against contractual unfairness, 
unreasonableness, unconscionability or oppressiveness in all contractual phases.218  
Section 1(1) of the proposed draft Bill establishes the fairness criterion, the 
circumstances in which it can be invoked, and the findings that a court can make, 
which altogether conferred upon courts wide-sweeping powers, best illustrated by 
quoting the proposed sub-section:219 
 
“Court may determine whether contractual terms are unreasonable, 
unconscionable and oppressive, and issue appropriate orders 
 
1(1) If a court is of the opinion that 
(a) the way in which a contract between the parties or a term thereof came into 
being; or 
(b) the form or the content of a contract; or 
                                                 
214 Department of Trade and Industry “Draft Consumer Protection Bill” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ 
(accessed 14 March 2006) 
215 It appears that the Law Commission’s proposed legislation may not be implemented, in view of the 
progress of the Consumer Protection Bill, which seems to go some way towards fulfilling the original 
purpose of the Law Commission’s recommendations. 
216 Other less important elements of the proposed legislation, which are not discussed below, include 
the following (section numbers of the proposed Bill are indicated in brackets): the exclusion from the Bill 
of certain contractual acts arising from the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; the Bills of Exchange Act 34 
of 1964; the Companies Act 61 of 1973; and the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (s3); the taking into 
account of the effect of changed circumstances after the conclusion of a contract (s4); the admissibility 
of evidence of what passed between the parties during and after the execution of the contract – 
seemingly an effective proposed abolition of the parol evidence rule (s5). 
217 Christie Contract 13–14.  Christie points out that the common law has developed many principles 
and rules to curb unfairness in the making of contracts, including: quasi-mutual assent, written terms, 
misrepresentation and fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, illegality and unenforceability (which 
includes public policy and good faith). 
218 SALC Final Report 58. 
219 SALC Final Report 213–214. 
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(c) the execution of a contract; or 
(d) the enforcement of a contract, 
is unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive, the court may declare that the 
alleged contract – 
(aa) did not come into existence; or 
(bb) came into existence, existed for a period, and then, before action 
was brought, came to an end; or 
(cc) is in existence at the time the action is brought, and it may then – 
(i) limit the sphere of operation and/or the period of operation of 
the contract; and/or 
(ii) suspend the operation of the contract for a specified period 
or until specified circumstances are present; or 
(iii) make such order as may in the opinion of the court be 
necessary to prevent the effect of the contract being 
unreasonable, unconscionable or oppressive to any of the 
parties.” 
 
The inclusion of “unreasonableness” has attracted considerable criticism, as has the 
term “oppressiveness”, which probably adds nothing further of significance to the 
definition of unconscionability, and both terms should therefore be excluded.220  It has 
also been persuasively argued that the term “good faith” would be preferable to 
“unconscionability”, since good faith is “one of the oldest and most venerable 
principles that exists in our contract law”,221 although the Law Commission believed 
that “the two approaches lead to the same result”.222  The preferred theoretical basis 
for the proposed legislation was unconscionability, a relatively new concept in South 
African law which, if adopted, would have to be defined with reference to other mainly 
Anglo-American jurisdictions in which it is prominent.223 
 
The proposed legislation was further criticised for the wide-sweeping powers it 
conferred upon the courts,224 but the Law Commission was firmly of the view that 
                                                 
220 See, for example, the respondents’ proposals which are summarised in the Law Commission Final 
Report at 138–145, in particular those of the two groups of Supreme Court of Appeal judges and of 
Professors Hutchison and van Heerden at 139–140.  Christie Contract 14, for example, argues that the 
starting point of the common law is that the courts will not interfere with a contract on the grounds that it 
is unreasonable, and that accepting unreasonableness “would lead, not to a mere continuation of this 
process of whittling away the general principle [of freedom of contract], but to its complete 
abandonment”, resulting in “a form of paternalism inconsistent with the parties’ freedom of contract”. 
221 Glover The Doctrine of Duress in the Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment in South Africa 377. 
222 SALC Final Report 22. 
223 For further discussion in this regard, see Graham Glover “The South African Law Commission’s 
Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contract and its Potential Effect on Procedural Unfairness in the 
Common Law” (2004) 18 Speculum Juris 79. 
224 These powers are mostly encapsulated within s1. 
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wide powers were necessary in order to ensure contractual justice, especially when 
considering the wide powers conferred on courts by legislation in other 
jurisdictions.225  The proposed legislation also sought to give courts powers in respect 
of procedural unfairness: “[T]he way in which a contract between the parties or a 
term thereof came into being”.226   
 
Section 2 of the Bill provided for 25 guidelines to assist the courts to determine 
whether or not the criterion of unreasonableness, unconscionableness or 
oppressiveness has been met,227 many of which are relevant to the pre-contractual 
stage.  Furthermore, the courts could have regard to “any other factor which in the 
opinion of the court should be taken into account”,228 thus conferring on the courts 
extremely wide powers.  Again, there was much opposition to the proposed 
guidelines,229 but the Law Commission was of the view that guidelines would provide 
some definition to the fairness criterion, that legal certainty and predictability would 
be enhanced without unduly limiting judicial discretion, and that the guidelines would 
encourage preventative action.230 
 
In response to many respondents’ arguments regarding the inaccessibility of the 
courts to ordinary people, resulting from their being effectively out of financial reach 
of most people,231 the draft Bill provided for the establishment of the office of an 
ombudsperson with wide powers, which are set out in the Bill.232  These included 
powers to prevent the continued use of contract terms that do not meet the Bill’s 
fairness criterion,233 and the power to prepare draft codes of conduct in particular 
fields of trade or commerce.234   Importantly, however, these powers would be limited 
to pre-formulated standard-form contracts only.235  Further, the courts are not able to 
develop the common law in terms of s8(3)(a) of the Constitution until suitable cases 
are brought before them, which in the ordinary course of litigation could take many 
                                                 
225 SALC Final Report 115–122. 
226 Section 1(1)(a). 
227 SALC Final Report 215–218. 
228 Section 2(z). 
229 Christie Contract 13, for example, is of the view that the proposed guidelines “would open almost 
every contract to attack”. 
230 SALC Final Report 170–171.  The Law Commission was of the view that guidelines resulting in 
increased predictability would encourage preventative action via informed self-control by drafters of 
standard-form contracts, action by representative bodies, and negotiations with a view to settling 
disputes. 
231 Christie Contract 13, for example, has consistently argued that “it is the machinery rather than the 
law” in regard to contractual fairness that needs attention, because of prohibitive court costs. 
232 Section 6(2). 
233 Section 6(2)(d). 
234 Section 6(2)(e). 
235 Christie Contract 13 argues that “the proposed limitation of the ombudsperson’s powers to standard-
form contracts would solve only part of the problem”. 
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years.  The ombudsperson, however, “has the potential to put the ordinary person 
and the common law in touch with each other”,236 thereby strengthening the hand of 
the law in practice. 
 
In contemplating briefly the need for legislation to curb contractual unfairness, 
Christie’s views in 2001 are insightful.237  Commenting on the proposed legislation in 
regard to the unfair enforcement of a contract,238 he proposed that any gaps that 
exist in the common law could be filled by developing the common law, for example 
via the approach to good faith suggested by Olivier JA in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman.239  He argued that legislation should not be 
necessary, “unless, of course, the Supreme Court of Appeal fails the test”, for the 
courts “are practised in developing the law seamlessly”,240 and “[t]here is every 
reason to hope that when the opportunity arises the Supreme Court of Appeal will 
apply Olivier JA’s reasoning”.241  One would have thought there was reason for hope, 
but the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have failed Christie’s test insofar as 
good faith is concerned,242 which strengthens the case for legislation to curb 
contractual unfairness. 
 
2.5.2 The Consumer Protection Bill 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry made a policy decision to legislate in regard 
to consumer protection in general, and initiated a review of the consumer legislative 
framework that culminated in the publication of a second discussion draft of the 
Consumer Protection Bill, 2005243 on 15 March 2006.  Much of the Bill is devoted to 
an articulation of eight distinct “Fundamental Consumer Rights”,244 one of which is 
the “Right to Honest Dealing and Fair Agreements”,245 which is of relevance to this 
chapter.  Sections 52 to 54 introduce the notions of unreasonable, unfair, unjust and 
unconscionable transactions, familiar terms from the Law Commission proposals 
                                                 
236 Christie Contract 15. 
237 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 19–20. 
238 Section 1(1)(d). 
239 1997 (4) SA 302 (SCA). 
240 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 20. 
241 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 19. 
242 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA).  It is, 
however, arguable that the Supreme Court of Appeal has been constrained in its ability to develop the 
common law in regard to good faith, in view of the fact that it has not had the opportunity of adjudicating 
suitable test cases.  It should be noted that in these cases the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that 
public policy still has a role to play in regard to contractual fairness. 
243 Consumer Protection Bill, second discussion draft, GN R418, Government Gazette 28629, 15 March 
2006 http://www.thedti.gov.za/ (accessed 14 March 2006). 
244 Sections 7 to 76 of the Bill. 
245 Part F, ss 45 to 60 of the Bill. 
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discussed in 2.5.1 above.  These terms are not properly defined anywhere in the Bill, 
but are merely articulated in these sections with reference to what is prohibited.246  
What follows is a brief summary of the provisions relevant to this chapter, since an 
attempted analysis would appear to be premature.247 
 
“Unreasonable transactions”248 are described with reference to a prohibition on the 
supply of goods or services when the supplier has knowledge that they are 
“materially unsuitable” (irrespective of whether or not the goods are of good quality), 
and when the consumer is unlikely to be able to make the necessary determination of 
material unsuitability. 
 
“Unfair or unjust transactions”249 are described with reference to a prohibition on the 
supply of goods or services at a price or on terms that are unfair or unjust, and with 
reference to the marketing, negotiation, conclusion or administration of an agreement 
to supply goods or services in a manner that is unfair or unjust.  A transaction is 
unfair or unjust if it is “excessively one-sided”, or the terms are “so adverse ... as to 
be inequitable”, or “the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation, or statement of opinion”.250 
 
“Unconscionable conduct”251 is articulated with reference to a prohibition on “physical 
force, coercion, undue influence, pressure or harassment, unfair tactics or any other 
conduct” at any stage before, during or after the conclusion of an agreement.252  The 
Bill goes on to provide that it is unconscionable for a supplier to take advantage of a 
consumer’s “disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to understand the language of an 
agreement, or any other similar factor”.253 
 
Section 55 of the Bill gives to the courts and the National Consumer Tribunal254 wide-
sweeping powers to declare any transaction or agreement, or any aspect or provision 
                                                 
246 An exception is s53(2), in which an attempt is made at giving the term “unfair or unjust” greater 
definition. 
247 The discussion is limited to ss 52–58, since the remainder of Part F of the Bill (“Right to Honest 
Dealing and Fair Agreements”) concerns matters that are not strictly relevant to this chapter, namely 
contractual fairness in general. 
248 Section 52. 
249 Section 53. 
250 Section 53(2). 
251 Section 54. 
252 Section 54(1) includes the stages of marketing, supply, negotiation, conclusion, execution or 
enforcement of an agreement, and demand for, collection of or payment for any goods or services, or 
recovery of goods.  
253 Section 54(2). 
254 The National Consumer Tribunal was established by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
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of it, to be unreasonable, unfair, unjust or unconscionable,255 and to make a number 
of other possible orders.256  In making any order, the court or Tribunal must have 
regard to, inter alia, “the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier 
and the consumer”, their conduct, opportunities for and extent of negotiation, and any 
conditions in the agreement that are not reasonably necessary.257 
 
Section 56 provides that a consumer agreement is unlawful if, inter alia, a court 
concludes that it is unreasonable, unfair, unjust or unconscionable, in which case the 
agreement is unlawful only to the extent ordered by the court.258  An agreement that 
is unlawful is void from date of conclusion, “despite any provision of common law, 
any other legislation, or any provision of an agreement to the contrary”.259 
 
Section 57 prohibits unlawful provisions or conditions in consumer agreements for 
the supply of goods or services, and lists numerous provisions and conditions that 
are unlawful.260  An unlawful provision is void from the date on which it takes effect, 
and a court must sever or alter it, or declare the entire agreement unlawful, and make 
any other appropriate order.261 
 
Section 58 then goes on to provide a separate set of requirements in respect of 
“unfair contract terms”, and lists the factors to which a court must have regard in 
determining whether a term of a contract is unfair or unreasonable.262  If a court finds 
a contract term to be unfair or unreasonable, it may rescind or amend the contract or 
a term of the contract, or make any other appropriate order, “notwithstanding the 
principle that effect must be given to the contractual terms agreed upon by the 
parties”.263  The difference between “unlawful provisions of consumer agreements” 
(s57) and “unfair contract terms” (s58) is not clear, as are also the circumstances in 
which each section is applicable. 
 
                                                 
255 Section 55(1)(a). 
256 Section55(1)(b). 
257 Section 55(2)(a). 
258 Section 56(1)(c). 
259 Section 56(3). 
260 Section 57(2)(a)–(j). 
261 Section 57(4). 
262 Section 58(1).  These factors are: the relative bargaining strengths of the parties; any inducement to 
agree to the term; whether the consumer knew or ought to have known of the existence and extent of 
the term; and whether the goods were manufactured, processed or adapted to the special order of the 
buyer. 
263 Section 58(2). 
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It can therefore be seen that the fairness criterion in the proposed Bill is very broadly 
articulated, and so its precise definition could prove to be problematic.  Further, the 
courts or the National Consumer Tribunal are given wide-ranging powers to invoke 
the fairness criterion and make findings that they deem appropriate.  A notable 
change from the Law Commission’s proposed legislation is that the Consumer 
Protection Bill dispenses with an ombudsperson, choosing to rely rather on the 
National Consumer Tribunal. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that public policy, fortified by constitutional values, is now the best common 
law method for promoting contractual fairness.  Public policy is a doctrine which is 
more acceptable to the courts (in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal), as 
opposed to the much more vague, somewhat controversial and less-developed 
principle of good faith.264  The Supreme Court of Appeal has given unequivocal 
recognition to the acceptance in Sasfin and other decisions that in cases of extreme 
unfairness, an agreement may be contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable, and that public policy is founded upon constitutional values:265 
 
“[T]he courts will invalidate agreements offensive to public policy, and will refuse to 
enforce agreements that seek to achieve objects offensive to public policy. Crucially, 
in this calculus 'public policy' now derives from the founding constitutional values of 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism.” 
 
In a case which is of interest in regard to the micro-lending industry, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held in Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa and another266 that 
a clause in a micro-lending agreement in which the borrower undertakes not to apply 
to a magistrate’s court to be placed under administration is contrary to public policy 
and therefore invalid.  Cachalia AJA stated:267 
 
“That a court may not enforce an agreement because the objective it seeks to 
achieve is contrary to public policy is firmly part of our law.  And in this determination 
‘public policy’ is anchored in the founding constitutional values which include human 
                                                 
264 Good faith is at most an aspect of the public policy enquiry. 
265 Cameron JA in Napier v Barkhuizen 7A–B.  See also Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 33H–J and 
34G–I, and the discussion in 2.3.2 above. 
266 2006 (4) SA 581 (SCA). 
267 Para 11. 
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dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.” 
 
It therefore seems that our common law of contract is well placed, through the 
systematic and incremental development of these principles and values, to achieve 
an appropriate balance between the values of contractual freedom and equity. 
 
“[I]t can be said with some confidence that public policy is a sufficiently flexible and 
tested concept in South Africa to achieve all the results that could be achieved by the 
concept of good faith and to achieve them in a more predictable way.”268 
 
That being the case, is legislation still necessary?  In my view, appropriate legislation 
is for a number of reasons essential in order for the law to be able to make a serious 
contribution towards equity in contract.  First, as has already been pointed out,269 the 
courts are not able to develop the common law in terms of Section 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution until suitable cases are placed before them.  This could take many 
years, partly because only a very small percentage of South Africa’s population can 
afford such litigation, and also because suitable test cases requiring courts to decide 
matters exclusively on the pertinent points at issue are necessary in order for the 
courts to pronounce on those issues and thereby develop the common law.270 
 
Second, although public policy infused by constitutional values appears to be well set 
to be an effective tool to be used by the courts to develop the law in regard to 
contractual fairness, there is no certainty that the courts will in fact do so with the 
necessary vigour.  The courts are notoriously conservative and slow to develop the 
law, preferring to do so carefully and incrementally in accordance with the traditional, 
proven “time-honoured method of developing the common law one step at a time”,271 
and there is much merit in this approach.  However, the development of our contract 
law would seem to be too much at the mercy of our rather conservative judiciary, and 
the constitutional imperative and the South African reality272 provide a serious 
challenge to the adequacy of this traditional approach.  Further, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
268 Christie Contract 17. 
269 See 2.5.1 above. 
270 See, for example, Napier v Barkhuizen 7C, discussed below, in which Cameron JA stated that the 
court may have been able to invalidate a time-bar term in an insurance contract, and thereby develop 
the common law, if evidence had been placed before the court of inequality of bargaining power which 
had the effect of infringing the insured’s constitutional rights to dignity and equality.  See also Afrox 
Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 35C–D. 
271 Christie “The Law of Contract and the Bill of Rights” Bill of Rights Compendium para 3H2. 
272 For example, low levels of education, literacy and numeracy, and widespread ignorance of legal 
rights, to be discussed later in this study. 
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of Appeal is not renowned for judicial activism and may prove to be resistant to pro-
actively developing the law in regard to contractual fairness,273 evidenced by its 
rejection of good faith as an instrument for handling cases of contractual fairness.274  
In these cases, the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have failed Christie’s 
“test”275 in regard to good faith, going against the tide of academic and judicial 
thinking in relation to contractual fairness, “to the dismay of many commentators”.276  
Although it is highly improbable that public policy will suffer the same fate at the 
hands of the Supreme Court of Appeal, this court may prove to be far too reticent and 
slow to develop the law in this regard.  Having expressed “confidence”277 in the 
prospects of public policy, Christie could be disappointed again.  Given these 
constraints on the judiciary, legislation is necessary. 
 
Third, and most important of all, the courts are not accessible to the vast majority of 
the South African population, primarily because they are simply financially out of 
reach.278  This creates an extremely serious problem that cannot be brushed aside, 
because everyone “has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law”.279  Of 
course, there is little that the courts can do about this, and it is a challenge that only 
the legislature can address.  The Law Commission’s proposed ombudsperson would 
go a long way towards improving access to contractual justice for most people.  
Whether or not the National Consumer Tribunal280 is likely to be as effective in this 
regard remains to be seen.  All things considered, however, it is highly desirable that 
an alternative, cheaper mechanism be found for the resolution of consumer disputes 
in order to enhance access to contractual justice, and legislation is necessary in 
order to achieve this.  In the absence of legislation to maintain equity in the law of 
contract, widespread exploitation in the contractual sphere will continue, and South 
African law will not be able to live up to its constitutional ideals.281  The precise form 
                                                 
273 It is noteworthy that nearly all the Supreme Court of Appeal’s progressive pronouncements regarding 
the role of public policy and constitutional values have been made by Cameron JA. 
274 See Brand JA’s summary of Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox Healthcare v Strydom, in the matter of South 
African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) 338H–339C.  Bhana and Pieterse 
2006 SALJ 893 have the following insight in this regard: “Much of the court’s ostensible opposition to the 
constitutional development of the common law appears to arise from fears that such development would 
disturb the equilibrium of interests that common law seeks to achieve and would sacrifice the legal 
certainty associated with the unfettered operation of well-oiled common law rules in favour of ad hoc, 
unprincipled, subjective, abstract and value-based decision-making.” 
275 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4 ed (2001) 20 and 22. 
276 Cameron JA in Napier v Barkhuizen 7B. 
277 Christie Contract 17. 
278 Christie Contract 13. 
279 Section 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
280 Proposed by the Consumer Protection Bill, 2006. 
281 Lewis  2003 SALJ 351. 
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that such legislation should take, however, is another matter altogether, and beyond 
the scope of this study. 
 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court of Appeal has heavily 
emphasised inequality of bargaining power as an important factor in striking down a 
contract on public policy and constitutional grounds.282  In both Afrox Healthcare Ltd v 
Strydom283 and Napier v Barkhuizen,284 there was no evidence to prove inequality of 
bargaining power, and the court in both cases pointed out that its finding may well 
have been different had such evidence been forthcoming, “for it is here that the 
constitutional values of equality and dignity may prove decisive”.285  It is of interest to 
note that perceived inequality of bargaining power, more than anything else, seemed 
to motivate the Law Commission’s Project 47 report proposing legislation to give 
courts wider powers to control contractual unfairness.  The Consumer Protection Bill 
clearly also considers this to be a critical factor:  a transaction is unfair or unjust if it is 
excessively one-sided,286 and in applying the fairness criterion, courts or the National 
Consumer Tribunal may have regard to “the relative strengths of the bargaining 
positions of the supplier and the consumer”.287  There is also no doubt that inequality 
of bargaining power bears directly on the fundamental constitutional right to 
equality.288  Inequality of bargaining power is an important thread in South African 
contract law that is likely to play an increasingly prominent role in the development of 
both the common law and legislation relating to contractual fairness. 
                                                 
282 Napier v Barkhuizen 7C. 
283 35C–D. 
284 7B–D. 
285 Napier v Barkhuizen 8H.  Cameron JA was referring to inequality of bargaining power. 
286 Section 53(2)(a). 
287 Section 55(2)(a)(i). 
288 Section 7(1), s9 and s39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  See also 
Christie Contract 19; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 398; Bhana and Pieterse 2006 SALJ 879–880; Napier v 
Barkhuizen 7C. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Usury Laws in regard to Consumer Credit 
 
 
Outline 
 
The previous chapter examined the extent to which the South African common law of 
contract (with reference to constitutional values) might provide protection to 
contracting parties in general, in the context of contractual fairness.  In this chapter, 
the enquiry will narrow down to focus on usury laws in relation to consumer credit in 
general, with an emphasis on moneylending transactions.  The common law in 
regard to usury will be reviewed first, followed by usury legislation and the in duplum 
rule (common law and legislation).  The next chapter (Chapter 4) will focus 
specifically on the cost of credit in the micro-finance industry in South Africa, via 
regulation since 1992. 
 
3.1 The common law in regard to usury 
 
 
3.1.1 General historical background 
 
For millennia, lawmakers have had to make rules to regulate relations between 
contracting parties in order to combat exploitation and malpractice.1  The matter of 
the charging of interest has attracted a vast amount of comment from theologians, 
economists and jurists alike, in relation to numerous types of contracts, but primarily 
moneylending.2  The issue of the cost of credit is not new to our age, but is the same 
issue that lawmakers have been wrestling with for centuries.  Usury law has a strong 
social, economic and moral basis,3 and it is necessary to take note of the historical 
developments in this regard, because they provide the social, economic and juridical 
background to current legislation.4 
 
Legislation that limits interest rates has existed for nearly 4000 years,5 the first known 
enactments being in the Code of Hammurabi of 1750 BC.6  Interest was prohibited in 
                                                 
1 South African Law Commission Working Paper 46 – Project 67: the Usury Act and Related Matters: 
New Credit Legislation for South Africa (proposed to the South African Law Commission by JM Otto and 
NJ Grové) (1991) 18. 
2 SALC Working Paper 46 at 18. 
3 Otto “Consumer Credit” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA  Vol 5(1) 2 ed (2004) para 2. 
4 SALC Working Paper 46 at 18. 
5 Otto LAWSA Vol 5(1) para 2. 
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the Old Testament of the Bible, save for certain exceptions.7  The teaching of the 
New Testament is less clear, and the old church fathers disagreed as to the 
interpretation of biblical texts.8  For a long time, therefore, the debate was about 
whether or not interest could be charged at all.9  In terms of traditional canon law, 
interest was forbidden, although from the time of Calvin it has been accepted that 
interest is permissible within certain limits.10 
 
3.1.2 The common law 
 
In order to limit the length of this discussion, the historical development of South 
African common law will be confined largely to the interpretation thereof by our 
courts.  The South African cases that discuss the common law position in relation to 
usury all date back more than 95 years.  The case of Dyason v Ruthven11 provides a 
full description of the Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities’ writings in relation to 
usury.  Under Roman Law, there were always maximum rates of interest, which 
changed from time to time.12  The Twelve Tables provided for an interest rate of one 
twelfth of the loan per month (i.e. 100% per annum).13  Later, Justinian laid down that 
business loans would be at 8% per annum, ordinary loans at 6%, loans to illustrious 
persons at 4%, and that in the case of goods bought beyond the sea 12% was 
permitted.14  Compounding of interest was forbidden.15  Whilst the Roman Law 
position is enlightening, it provides limited assistance, since the fixing of interest rates 
was not received into our law. 
 
Roman-Dutch authorities had to contend with the conflict between commercial 
realities and the canon law proscription on the charging of interest, and wrote at 
length about the various rates applicable to loans at different stages and under 
different circumstances.16  The rates referred to are of limited value today, but serve 
to remind us that rules regarding interest rate limits are certainly not the preserve of 
the modern era. 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente (LLD thesis, RAU, 1989) 10. 
7 Otto LAWSA Vol 5(1) para 2. 
8 Ibid. 
9 SALC Working Paper 46 at 18. 
10 Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 73ff. 
11 1860 Searle 282. 
12 Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (1976) 273. 
13 Ibid. 
14 C 4.32.26. 
15 D 12.6.26.1.  
16 Otto “Consumer credit” in Joubert (ed) LAWSA Vol 5(1) (2004) para 2, who refers in turn to van 
Leeuwen CF 1 4 4 5 and 1 4 4 9, van Leeuwen RHR 4 6 6; van der Keessel Praelectiones op Gr 3 10 9 
10; Huber HR  3 16 3, 11, 14 and 15; 3 36; 3 37. 
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It is well established that the common law explicitly and directly provides protection 
against usury, although there is no certum modum usurarum.17  The writer Loenius 
stated: “From the relation of others I have understood, and also from Fiscal De Groot, 
that in our country here we have no certain rate of interest, but that the same is 
regulated according to circumstances of times, places, and persons.”18  Arising from 
this background, our common law decides whether a particular loan is usurious by 
examining the particular circumstances of the loan.  In Dyason v Ruthven, Bell J 
stated that 
 
“… if the circumstances of any case should show that advantage had been taken by a 
creditor of the position of his debtor to extort from him an excessive or exorbitant 
amount of interest, even by previous stipulation, this Court would give relief in such a 
case by modifying the interest to a reasonable rate”.19 
 
The question is, judged from the risks and the current value of money, is the 
stipulation so enormous as to amount to fraud?20  Or, 
 
“… if any stipulation of interest be attacked as liable to reduction, on the ground of 
usury or extortion, this can only be done by offering proof of the usury and extortion in 
the particular case”.21 
 
This statement of the common law, as received into the Cape, was approved and 
fully adopted by Innes CJ in Reuter v Yates:22 
 
“But our law does not in my opinion define any particular rate of interest as being 
necessarily usurious; it does not fix a limit up to which interest is legitimate and 
proper, and beyond which it becomes illegal and excessive.  That must depend upon 
the circumstances of each case.  Usury is a good defence; the difficulty arises in 
deciding when a contract is usurious and when it is not.  And that difficulty is not to be 
solved by a mere reference to the rate of interest agreed upon; it requires a careful 
inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the transaction which is challenged.  
                                                 
17 SALC Working Paper 46 at 19. 
18 Loenius Decesien and Observatien (Casus 21), as quoted by Hodges CJ in Dyason v Ruthven 290. 
19 304. 
20 Per Watermeyer J at 311. 
21 Per Watermeyer J at 312. 
22 1904 TS 855. 
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And the onus in my opinion is upon the person who sets up the defence, to satisfy the 
court upon the facts that it is applicable and sufficient.”23 
 
The court confirmed that in deciding whether a rate of interest is usurious, “the rate of 
interest agreed upon would of course be a most important circumstance to 
consider”.24  Furthermore, the court recognised that “[i]t may possibly be that such an 
exorbitant rate of interest was charged as in itself to afford evidence of such 
inequitable dealing as to afford ground for relief”.25   
 
The courts, however, also recognise that other circumstances besides the interest 
charged are relevant.  The law espoused in Reuter v Yates was applied in the case 
of SA Securities Ltd v Greyling,26 in which a rate of 120% per annum was held, in the 
circumstances, not to be usurious.  Wessels J said: 
 
“Therefore, the mere fact that the amount of interest seems high is not sufficient to 
make the transaction usurious.  What then is there in a transaction which makes it 
usurious?  If it is not the mere amount of interest, what other circumstances are 
there?  … I think the most you can say is that the transaction must show that there 
has been either extortion or oppression, or something which is akin to fraud.”27 
 
Innes CJ in Reuter v Yates went further in articulating the relevant circumstances to 
be taken into account in deciding whether a particular transaction is usurious: 
 
“It comes then to this – in deciding whether the defence of usury has been sustained, 
and whether the lender has taken such an undue advantage of the borrower, has so 
practised extortion and oppression, that his conduct, being akin to fraud, disentitles 
him to relief, the Court will examine all the circumstances of the case.  It will not only 
look at the scale at which interest has been stipulated for, but will have regard to the 
ordinary rate prevalent in similar transactions, to the security offered and the risk run, 
to the length of time for which the loan was given, the amount lent, and the relative 
positions and circumstances of the parties.”28 
 
Finally, if a court concludes that a rate is too high and is therefore usurious, the 
contract is not void, but the court may reduce the rate to one which is reasonable in 
                                                 
23 856. 
24 857. 
25 Per Smith J at 859. 
26 1911 TPD 352 
27 356. 
28 858. 
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the circumstances.29  In Taylor v Hollard,30 Kotze J concluded that where parties 
agree on an excessive rate of interest, such rate may lawfully be reduced, since it is 
not in the public interest to enforce rates of this nature, because “… to countenance 
such proceedings would be contrary to good morals, the interests of our citizens, and 
the policy of our law”.31 
 
From the above case law, our common law in regard to usury can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
(i) There is no such thing as a “common law rate of interest”.32 
(ii) Interest which is proved to be extortionate or usurious may not be claimed 
by a creditor33 (although a court will not lightly interfere with an interest 
rate upon which the parties have agreed).34 
(iii) The Defendant bears the onus of proving its defence of usury.35 
(iv) In order to satisfy that onus, it has to lead evidence to establish extortion 
and oppression akin to fraud.36 
(v) To achieve this, evidence as to the ordinary rate prevalent in similar 
transactions, the size of the loan, the period of the loan, the purpose of 
the loan, the relative positions of the parties, the security and the risk, will 
all be relevant.37 
(vi) A contract declared to be usurious will not be void, but a court has the 
power to declare such a contract partially enforceable to the extent that 
the interest is not usurious.38 
 
The circumstances listed in (v) above are not a numerus clausus of possible relevant 
circumstances to be taken into account in deciding whether or not a transaction is 
usurious. The relative positions and circumstances of the parties, for example, will 
surely allow for consideration as to whether the loan is for business or private 
consumption.  Grové39 lists the following additional factors or circumstances that may 
                                                 
29 Dyason v Ruthven 304; Taylor v Hollard 1885–1888 (2) SAR 78 at 84. 
30 1885–1888 (2) SAR 78 at 84. 
31 85. 
32 Dyason v Ruthven 291, 304, 305, 312; Reuter v Yates 856, 859. 
33 Taylor v Hollard 84, 85; Reuter v Yates  856; Dyason v Ruthven 291. 
34 Dyason v Ruthven 310; Reuter v Yates 856, 859. 
35 See, for example, Reuter v Yates 856. 
36 Dyason v Ruthven 311–312; Reuter v Yates 858; SA Securities Ltd v Greyling 356. 
37 Reuter v Yates 858. 
38 Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 138; Magna Alloys and Research (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
39 Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 140ff. 
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be relevant: how quickly the borrower wants the funds; whether a deposit or security 
is required; whether the debt is repayable in instalments; hidden finance costs; the 
possibility of early repayment; remedies on breach; whether financing is available in 
general for similar cases. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the above common law is still relevant, 
notwithstanding the existence of the Usury Act and exemption notices,40 in view of 
the presumption that a statute alters the common law as little as possible.41 
 
3.2 Usury legislation: an historical overview 
 
It is not surprising that legislatures have regarded the common law as providing 
insufficient protection to consumers.  Otto and Grové42 usefully divide usury 
legislation43 into first-, second- and third-generation consumer credit laws.44   
 
3.2.1 First-generation consumer credit legislation 
 
First-generation consumer legislation pre-dated the Union of South Africa.  It was 
designed to remove uncertainty as to whether interest could be charged at all, at a 
time in South African legal history when no statutory or common law control over 
maximum finance charge rates existed.45  For instance, the Orange Free State 
Lawbook:46 “The trade in money shall be free, and everyone shall have the right to 
demand as much interest for his money as he may think fit.”47  A distinguishing 
feature was that the different colonies dealt with the matter in different ways, and 
there was no question of uniformity.48 
 
Likewise, section 1 of Act 6 of 1858 (Natal) provided that companies or individuals 
may “lend …, at any rate of interest, or premium or discount, that may be arranged or 
agreed between the borrower and lender of capital”.  The Natal Act was amended in 
190849 to provide protection for “natives”, who were entitled to be charged a 
                                                 
40 And subsequently, the National Credit Act and Regulations. 
41 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 177–178. 
42SALC Working Paper 46. 
43 Until 1991, at the time that they wrote. 
44 SALC Working Paper 46 at 22–29. 
45 SALC Working Paper 46 at 22. 
46 OVS Wetboek, 1854–1891. 
47 Ch 98, as translated in the SALC Working Paper 46 at 22. 
48 SALC Working Paper 46 at 24. 
49 Act 41 of 1908. 
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maximum of 15% interest per annum.  Other maximum interest rates were prescribed 
(not only for moneylending contracts), and contracts that exceeded prescribed rates 
were void.50  If a moneylender made a fraudulent misrepresentation, he was guilty of 
an offence.51 
 
The Cape Colony passed a Cape Usury Act in 1908,52 which applied primarily to 
moneylending transactions.  In an interesting early recognition of the broader scope 
of the cost of credit, the term “interest” was widely defined to include “valuable 
consideration for a loan of money, whether such consideration be in cash, in goods, 
in kind or in any other form whatsoever”.53  For the first time, different rates for 
different amounts lent were prescribed, and any person exacting more than the 
maximum prescribed rate was guilty of an offence.54  If a creditor recovered too much 
interest, a court could order him/her to pay back the excessive interest.55 
 
3.2.2 Second-generation consumer credit legislation 
 
Otto and Grové’s second-generation consumer credit legislation was so called 
because it applied for the first time on a national scale,56 with different legislation 
provided for different types of transactions, as will be seen below.  The first Act 
passed by the Parliament of the Union of South Africa was the Usury Act of 1926,57 
which applied only to moneylending transactions.58  This act provided a sliding scale 
of interest rates which depended upon the size of the loan.59 Loans of less than 10 
pounds attracted a maximum of 30% interest per year; at the top of the scale, loans 
exceeding 50 pounds attracted a maximum of 12% interest per year.  Any person 
contravening these provisions was guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not 
exceeding 100 pounds.60  All moneylending transactions had to be in writing and 
                                                 
50 Section 3. 
51 Sections 5 and 8. 
52 Act 23 of 1908. 
53 Section 2. 
54 Section 5. 
55 Section 9. 
56 SALC Working Paper 46 at 24. 
57 Act 37 of 1926.  This Act did not in fact provide complete uniformity throughout the Union.  The Cape 
Usury Act and Chapter 98 of the Orange Free State Law Book were repealed by Section 15(10), but 
Section 1 of Act 6 of 1858 (Natal) was only partially amended by Section 15(2).  The Natal Act was 
subsequently repealed by the Pre-Union Statute Law Revision Act 78 of 1967. 
58 In effect, instalment transactions relating to movables were not statutorily regulated until the passing 
of the Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942, from which date the Usury Act and the Hire-Purchase Act co-
existed without impacting on each other at all, because they applied to different types of contracts. 
59 Section 1(1). 
60 Section 1(2). 
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contain certain prescribed information.61  Provision was made for certain permissible 
expenses other than interest.62  
 
In March 1967, the Minister of Finance appointed a committee under the 
chairmanship of Dr DG Franzsen to investigate and improve the 1926 Usury Act.  
Within a few months of the Franzsen Committee completing its report, the Limitation 
and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act63 was passed, which repealed the 1926 
Usury Act, and later became the Usury Act 73 of 1968.64  The long title of the Act 
described its purpose: 
 
“To provide for the limitation and disclosure of finance charges levied in respect of 
moneylending transactions, credit transactions and leasing transactions and for 
matters incidental thereto; and to repeal the Usury Act, 1926.” 
 
The Usury Act of 1968 did not set fixed rates for transactions falling within its ambit, 
but provided for maximum interest rates in moneylending, leasing and credit 
transactions.  It was characterised by repeated references to notices promulgated by 
the Minister of Trade and Industry.65  Thus, maximum rates for different sizes of 
transactions were not set out in the Act itself, but were all changed fairly frequently 
from time to time by promulgation by the Minister.66  Failure to comply with the Act 
was a criminal offence.67  A moneylender commits the statutory offence of “usury” 
where he “stipulates or demands or receives” finance charges68 at a rate in excess of 
that prescribed by the Act.69 
 
As in the case of most consumer credit laws, the Usury Act restricted many of the 
traditional rights and powers of creditors and increased the remedies available to 
                                                 
61 Section 5(1) 
62 Section 2(1).  These included stamp costs, mortgage costs, rates and taxes, licence fees, insurance 
premiums (in certain cases) and “any costs which have actually been incurred by the lender in the 
recovery of his debt.” 
63 Act 73 of 1968. 
64 The Act was renamed in terms of s9 of the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act 42 of 
1986. 
65 Prior to 1993, the relevant Minister was the Minister of Finance; see the Usury Amendment Act 30 of 
1993, section 1. 
66 The most recent promulgation of interest rates in terms of the Usury Act, for example, provided for a 
maximum interest rate of 20% per annum for loans less than R10 000, and 17% per annum for loans 
greater than R10 000 (GN 1100, Government Gazette 26809, 17 September 2004).  These rates will be 
valid until 1 June 2007, when the relevant provisions of the National Credit Act come into operation. 
67 Section 17. 
68 The concept of “finance charges” – as contained in the Usury Act – does not convey the same 
meaning as that of “interest rate”, but entails more.  According to Grové and Otto Basic Principles of 
Consumer Credit Law (2002) 66, the term “finance charges” theoretically encompasses all charges 
charged by a moneylender where a loan is extended. 
69 Grové and Otto Basic Principles of Consumer Credit Law 2 ed (2002) 97 fn 177. 
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debtors.70  In spite of its consumer protection orientation, however, the Act was 
unfortunately an example of highly complex and verbose legislative drafting. 
 
Otto and Grové point out71 that with the passing of the Sale of Land on Instalments 
Act in 1971,72 a pattern of “second-generation legislation” was established, namely: 
• an act for the financial aspects of moneylending transactions and instalment 
transactions relating to movables;73 
• an act for the contractual aspects of instalment transactions relating to 
movables;74 and 
• an act for the purchase of land on instalments.75 
 
This pattern was to continue to apply to consumer credit law in South Africa until 
2006.76 
 
This legislation was, however, of an ad hoc nature, and there was no evidence of the 
legislature attempting to harmonise these laws with one another.77  Whilst the history 
of the development of consumer credit legislation in South Africa is similar to that of 
other countries, in many respects South African legislation was more fragmented 
than other modern jurisdictions.78 
 
3.2.3 Third-generation consumer credit legislation 
 
Otto and Grové’s third-generation consumer credit legislation represents a 
modernisation of the second-generation legislation referred to above.  It was of less 
relevance to moneylending transactions: the Credit Agreements Act79 repealed the 
Hire-Purchase Act, and regulated the contractual aspects of instalment sale 
transactions; the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act80 was extensively 
revised, in an attempt to bring it into line with the Credit Agreements Act, and to 
                                                 
70 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in Terms of South African Law and Related 
Aspects (LLM thesis, RAU, 2003) 10. 
71 SALC Working Paper 46 at 28. 
72 Act 72 of 1971. 
73 Usury Act 73 of 1968. 
74 The Hire-Purchase Act 36 of 1942, subsequently replaced by the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. 
75 The Sale of Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971, subsequently replaced by the Alienation of Land Act 
68 of 1981. 
76 Until the National Credit Act came into force on 1 June 2006. 
77 SALC Working Paper 46 at 28. 
78 SALC Working Paper 46 at 45. 
79 Act 75 of 1980. 
80 This later became the Usury Act 73 of 1968. 
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make it applicable to instalment sale transactions relating to land;81 the Sale of Land 
on Instalments Act was repealed and replaced by the Alienation of Land Act.82 
 
Otto and Grové contend, however, that “…despite the adoption of the new legislation, 
the tripartite distinction between legislation relating to land, that relating to movables 
and that relating to finance remained largely intact”.83 
 
“Right from the promulgation of these Acts, reconciling their ambits proved 
problematic.  In time, these problems became worse.  Amendments to the legislation 
resulted in the ambits of the various provisions drifting further apart, which greatly 
complicated the practical application of the Acts.”84 
 
3.2.4 The National Credit Act 
 
All consumer credit legislation came under review again, and in 1991 a new “Credit 
Act” was proposed by the South African Law Commission,85  which sought to repeal 
the Usury Act and the Credit Agreements Act, and bring all credit legislation under a 
single Act.  There were no further significant developments until May 2002, however, 
when the Department of Trade and Industry launched a credit law review process, 
specifically in regard to consumer credit law, and in tandem with the review of the 
broader consumer legislative framework referred to in Chapter Two above.86  A 
technical committee was appointed to conduct an extensive review of the consumer 
credit market, and produced a report handed to the Department in October 2003.87  
The research suggested numerous issues for policy and regulatory reform, resulting 
in the Department drafting a consumer credit policy framework88 in August 2004. 
 
                                                 
81 Also of relevance here was the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, which provided for the 
calculation of interest on a debt at a prescribed rate and for payment of interest on certain judgment 
debts.  This Act, as subsequently amended, still has important application today. 
82 Act 68 of 1981. 
83 SALC Working Paper 46 at 29. 
84 Ibid. 
85 South African Law Commission Working Paper 46 – Project 67: the Usury Act and Related Matters: 
New Credit Legislation for South Africa (proposed to the South African Law Commission by JM Otto and 
NJ Grové) (1991), which has been extensively quoted and referred to in this chapter already. 
86 The review of the broader legislative framework resulted in the Consumer Protection Bill, 2006, 
referred to in Chapter Two above. 
87 The Technical Committee, Department of Trade and Industry “Credit Law Review, August 2003: 
Summary of Findings” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/forward.htm (accessed 14 March 2006) 
88 Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit (August 2004)” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 
2006). 
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This consumer credit policy framework recognised that the regulatory framework was 
between 20 and 30 years old and had become outdated, and in the meantime the 
credit market had evolved significantly:89 
 
“There is thus a need to modernise the current consumer credit laws and to 
harmonise them with best practice international jurisdictions.” 
 
The policy framework proposed a more regulated consumer credit market through “a 
single law that treats transactions equivalently”,90 in order to “ensure a consistent 
approach to interest rate regulation, minimising arbitrage and circumvention”.91   
 
The credit law review process culminated in the National Credit Act,92 which was 
signed into law by the President on 15 March 2006, and most of which became 
effective on 1 June and 1 September 2006.93  There are many extremely important 
provisions of the Act that will come into force only on 1 June 2007, for example the 
whole of Chapter 5 of the Act (“Consumer credit agreements”), which includes all 
interest provisions in Part C thereof and which is critical to this study. 
 
The National Credit Act repealed the Usury Act94 and the Credit Agreements Act,95 
seeking to harmonise all credit legislation within a single Act.96  The Act applies to all 
credit transactions and to all credit providers, and provides for a number of consumer 
protection measures in relation to credit law.  Whilst it seeks to adopt a consistent 
approach to all transactions through a common regulatory scheme, it recognises the 
inherent differences between each sub-sector of the consumer credit market.97  
Thus, for example, it attempts to provide for differential treatment to accommodate 
differences in products and in costs associated with smaller transactions.98 
 
In regard to the regulation of the cost of credit, there are lengthy provisions in Part C 
of Chapter 5 of the Act.  In short, section 105 of the Act allows the Minister to 
                                                 
89 Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit (August 2004)” paragraph 2.10. 
90 Paragraph 4.7. 
91 Ibid. 
92 34 of 2005. 
93 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006.   
94 73 of 1968. 
95 75 of 1980. 
96 Section 172(4). 
97 There are great differences, for example, between a pawn transaction, a mortgage bond, and a credit 
card or overdraft facility, which relate primarily to disclosure, the treatment of accounts and contracts. 
98 See, for example, s105(1), which will be thoroughly analysed in Chapter 6 below. 
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prescribe limits on interest rates and fees in all sectors of the consumer credit 
market.  These provisions and resultant regulations promulgated by the Minister in 
regard to small loans will be discussed in detail in 3.3, Chapter Four and Chapter Six 
below. 
 
Thus, for the first time in South Africa’s legislative history, all credit legislation has 
been encapsulated in a single Act, as proposed by the South African Law 
Commission 15 years prior to its enactment. 
 
3.3 The in duplum rule 
 
The so-called “in duplum rule” is a rule that is entrenched in the common law of 
South Africa, and is extremely important in regard to the imposition of limits on the 
cost of credit, and consumer protection.  It is a rule that was developed in response 
to the common law’s inability to provide a workable mechanism for setting limits on 
the interest that can accrue on a debt.  In short, the common law in duplum rule 
provides that interest stops running on a debt when the unpaid interest equals the 
outstanding capital.99   This law has been applied in a long line of reported cases.100  
As clearly stated by Gillespie J in Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v MM Builders 
& Suppliers (Pty) Ltd and Others and Three Similar Cases:101 
 
“[I]t is a principle firmly entrenched in our law that interest, whether it accrues as 
simple or as compound interest, ceases to accumulate upon any amount of capital 
owing, whether the debt arises as a result of a financial loan or out of any contract 
whereby a capital sum is payable together with interest thereon at a determined rate, 
once the accrued interest attains the amount of capital outstanding.”102 
 
                                                 
99 See, for example, Standard Bank of South Africa v Oneanate Investments (in liquidation) 1998 (1) SA 
811 (SCA) 827H. 
100 See, most recently: Stroebel v Stroebel 1973 (2) SA 137 (T); Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v 
MM Builders & Suppliers (Pty) Ltd and Others and Three Similar Cases; Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation); F & I Advisors (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Eerste 
Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 1999 (1) SA 515 (SCA); Georgias and Another v Standard 
Chartered Finance Zimbabwe Ltd 2000 (1) SA 126 (ZS); Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v South African 
Breweries Ltd 2000 (2) SA 647 (W); Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Woulidge 2002 
(1) SA 68 (SCA); Meyer v Catwalk Investments 354 (Pty) Ltd en Andere 2004 (6) SA 107 (T); Verulam 
Medicentre (Pty) Ltd v Ethekweni Municipality 2005 (2) SA 451 (D). 
101 1997 (2) SA 285 (ZH). 
102 303C–E. 
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When, due to payment, unpaid interest drops below the outstanding capital, interest 
again begins to run until it once again equals the amount of the outstanding 
capital.103   
 
Thus, for example, a consumer who borrows R1000 per month at interest of 120% 
per year will have to repay R230 per month over six months.  If as a result of 
retrenchment the borrower is able to repay only R30 per month for six months, she 
will after five months be in arrears with interest payments in the total amount of 
R1000.104 This amount is equal to the outstanding capital of R1000,105 and interest 
will therefore stop running at the end of five months.  When unpaid interest is less 
than the capital outstanding, interest will start to accrue again. 
 
The in duplum rule has its origins in public policy designed to protect borrowers from 
exploitation by lenders.106  In the Appellate Division case of LTA Construction Bpk v 
Administrateur, Transvaal,107 Joubert JA conducted a thorough analysis of the origin 
and purpose of the in duplum rule, reviewing in the process the Roman law, the 
Roman-Dutch law and the South African authorities.  The in duplum rule emerged in 
Roman Law as one of the methods to limit the interest which could be claimed 
because of the greed of moneylenders, providing a measure of protection or relief to 
credit receivers,108 and the rule still exists for similar reasons today. 
 
The National Credit Act,109 which sought, inter alia, to enhance consumer protection, 
effectively codified the in duplum rule for the first time in South Africa’s legislative 
history, and extended the rule further: 
 
“Despite any provision of the common law or a credit agreement to the contrary, the 
amounts contemplated in section 101(1)(b) to (g) that accrue during the time that a 
consumer is in default under the credit agreement may not, in aggregate, exceed the 
                                                 
103 Ibid; LTA Construction Bpk v Administrateur, Transvaal 482C. 
104 The monthly shortfall of R200 (R230 instalment less R30 paid) x 5 months = R1000. 
105 The outstanding capital is the same as the initial loan amount, since monthly payments accrue first to 
interest and then only to capital, and the monthly interest due is always greater than R30 in the first five 
months. 
106 LTA Construction Bpk v Administrateur, Transvaal 482F-G; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 828D–E. 
107 1992 (1) SA 473 (A). 
108 477C. Other methods for limiting of interest referred to in the judgment were: imposing a limit on the 
rate of interest that could be charged, and prohibiting the charging of interest on interest. 
109 Act 34 of 2005. 
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unpaid balance of the principal debt under that credit agreement as at the time that 
the default occurs.”110 
 
Section 103(5) is a succinct articulation of the meaning of the common law in duplum 
rule, which it clearly intends to codify.111  The Act does more than this, however, 
since the common law rule was limited to interest only.  Section 103(5) extends the 
ambit of the in duplum rule to include all types of consideration that a credit 
agreement may require a consumer to pay112 in terms of section 101(1)(b) to (g) of 
the Act, namely: an initiation fee, a service fee, interest, the cost of any credit 
insurance, default administration charges and collection costs.113  The aggregate, or 
total, of all such amounts that accrue “during the time that a consumer is in default 
under the credit agreement”114 may not exceed the unpaid balance of the principal 
debt.  The codification of the rule in terms of section 103(5) will come into force only 
on 1 June 2007.115 
 
In analysing its meaning, and for a fuller exposition of the rule, however, reference 
must be made to the interpretation of the common law in duplum rule as handed 
down by the courts.  Of relevance here is the presumption in South African law of 
interpretation of statutes that statute law does not alter the existing law more than is 
necessary.116    Legislation must be interpreted in the light of the common law, and 
must as far as possible be reconciled with related precepts of the common law.117  
Statutory provisions have sometimes been construed as mere extensions or 
supplements to the common law.118  In regard to the in duplum rule, therefore, the 
common law can be seen to amplify the rule set out in section 103(5), where the 
common law is not in conflict with the Act. 
 
                                                 
110 Section 103(5), which will come into effect on 1 June 2007 in terms of Commencement of the 
National Credit Act, 2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, Government Gazette 28824, 11 
May 2006. 
111 See paragraph 6.17 of the Department of Trade and Industry’s “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy 
Framework for Consumer Credit (August 2004)” 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 2006). 
112 Excluding, of course, the principal debt, referred to in s101(1)(a). 
113 Section 101(1)(b) to (g) respectively. 
114 Section 103(5). 
115 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006.  The whole of Chapter 3 of the National Credit Act, headed “Consumer credit 
agreements” (which includes all interest provisions in Part C thereof), will come into force only on 1 June 
2007. 
116 Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 177–181. 
117 178. 
118 Ibid. 
  
 
59
It is essential to note that all listed fees, costs and interest incurred in the ordinary 
course whilst the consumer is not in default of the credit agreement are not subject to 
the codified rule.  In terms of the common law, the in duplum rule was similarly 
applicable to arrear interest only, and not to accumulated interest.119  Furthermore, it 
was held in the case of Verulam Medicentre (Pty) Ltd v Ethekweni Municipality120 that 
where interest is intended to fulfill a function other than the usual purpose for which 
interest is intended, it is not subject to the in duplum rule.  The Supreme Court of 
Appeal dismissed the subsequent appeal in this matter, for the reason that the 
interest agreed upon by the parties was not interest in the ordinary sense, but was a 
means of formulating fair and proper restitution for what had been paid.121 
 
The common law provides that payments are appropriated first to interest, and then 
to capital,122 and it follows that the same should apply also to the fees and costs now 
subject to the rule.  Further, the practice of capitalisation of interest by bankers does 
not result in the interest losing its character as such for the purposes of the in duplum 
rule, since “[i]f interest were to become capital, the capital amount of the debt would 
always be increasing and the bank would run no risk of a lesser capital amount being 
the subject-matter of the rule”.123  As pointed out by Selikowitz J in Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd:124 
 
“Words like ‘capitalisation’ are used to describe the method of accounting used in 
banking practice. However, neither the description nor the practice itself affects the 
nature of the debit. Interest remains interest and no methods of accounting can 
change that.”125 
 
It is clear from the National Credit Act that a debtor cannot waive his/her right to the 
protection of the in duplum rule by prior agreement.126  Indeed, this principle has 
                                                 
119 See, for example, Sanlam Life Insurance Ltd v South African Breweries Ltd, in which Blieden J stated 
at 655D–E: “[T]he in duplum rule is confined to arrear interest and to arrear interest alone”. 
120 2005 (2) SA 451 (D). 
121 Ethewkini Municipality v Verulam Medicentre (Pty) Ltd (unreported SCA judgment dated 29 
September 2005). 
122 Wessels The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed vol 2 para 2308 (xi) states: “Where a debt 
produces interest, the money paid must be applied in the first instance to the payment of the interest 
and then to the capital.  Even if the payment is made on account of principal and interest, it will by law 
be appropriated first to the interest and then to the capital.” 
123 Standard Bank of South Africa v Oneanate Investments (in liquidation) 828J. 
124 1995 (4) SA 510 (C). 
125 572C–D. 
126 See the opening words of s103(5): “Despite any provision of … a credit agreement to the contrary…” 
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always been firmly entrenched in the common law in regard to the rule.127  It has 
been held, however, that it may be possible for a debtor, when interest has 
accumulated to an amount equalling the capital, to agree with the creditor, to avoid 
litigation, that he (the debtor) would not rely on the in duplum rule.128   In this regard, 
it should be noted that section 103(5) prohibits the waiver of the in duplum rule in the 
initial “credit agreement” only, implying that a subsequent agreement to waive the in 
duplum rule might well be possible.129 
 
The Court has a duty mero motu to raise the illegality of interest claimed in 
contravention of the in duplum rule, if this is clear from the facts, even if the in 
duplum rule was not pleaded.130  This approach has been given added impetus by 
the proscriptive nature of section 103(5).  The Court is, however, not required to 
speculate or piece together a defence on behalf of the defendant from mere 
fragments of evidence.131 
 
It has been held that the in duplum rule can be applied in the real world of commerce 
and economic activity only where it serves considerations of public policy in the 
protection of borrowers against exploitation by lenders.132  Thus, for example, when 
unpaid interest reaches the equal of the unpaid capital during the course of litigation, 
the in duplum rule is not applicable, and a debtor is not protected “pendente lite 
against interest in excess of the double”.133  The rationale for this finding is that a 
debtor is not being exploited when a creditor is being kept out of pocket with the 
assistance of delays inherent in legal proceedings.134  Upon judgment being given, 
interest on the full amount of the judgment debt (including any interest for which 
judgment has been granted) commences to run afresh.135 
  
                                                 
127 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 828C; 
Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v MM Builders & Suppliers (Pty) Ltd and Others and Three Similar 
Cases 321D–322D. 
128 F & I Advisors (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 525I–J. 
129 On the other hand, the words “may not” in section 103(5) suggest strongly that the in duplum  rule is 
peremptory and a waiver will not be permitted.  
130 F & I Advisors (Edms) Bpk en 'n Ander v Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 525H–
526A. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Woulidge 75B–C; LTA Construction Bpk v 
Administrateur, Transvaal 482F-G; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd 
(in liquidation) 828D. 
133 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 834C. 
134 834B–C. 
135 Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v MM Builders & Suppliers (Pty) Ltd and Others and Three 
Similar Cases 303D. 
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“This would then mean that (i) the in duplum rule is suspended pendente lite, where 
the lis is said to begin upon service of the initiating process, and (ii) once judgment 
has been granted, interest may run until it reaches the double of the capital amount 
outstanding in terms of the judgment.”136 
 
Again, this common law interpretation of the rule can be extended to include the fees 
and costs referred to in section 103(5).   
 
The development of the common law in duplum rule was a response to the inability of 
the common law and legislation in regard to usury to provide sufficient protection to 
consumers from the effects of the accumulation of further debt from high interest 
rates.  Whilst it is clear that the in duplum rule is deeply entrenched in the common 
law, the rule has been significantly fortified through clarification and extension via the 
National Credit Act, and it is likely that increased use will be made of the rule as a 
defence when appropriate.   
 
                                                 
136 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 834H.  Thus, if 
judgment is granted for capital (X) and interest (Y), and the total judgment debt is Z, then interest on the 
judgment debt (Z) will stop running when it reaches the amount of the judgment debt (Z). 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Regulation of the Cost of Credit in the 
Micro-finance Industry in South Africa 
 
Outline 
 
In the previous two chapters, the common law of contract was examined with 
reference to constitutional values, followed by usury laws in relation to consumer 
credit in general, with a focus on moneylending transactions.  In this chapter, the 
enquiry will narrow down further to focus squarely on the subject of this study, 
namely the cost of credit in the micro-finance industry in South Africa.  The chapter 
will begin with a discussion of the situation prior to regulation in 1992, followed by a 
review of the regulation of the industry via exemption of micro-loans from the Usury 
Act and the Lurama case.1 The chapter will end with a brief overview of the cost of 
credit in the National Credit Act and Regulations.  
 
4.1 The position until 1992 
 
Until 1992, all money lending transactions were subject to the limits on interest rates 
imposed by the Usury Act.2  At the end of 1992 (when micro-loans were first exempt 
from the Usury Act), the maximum permissible interest rate in terms of the Usury Act 
for loans not exceeding R6 000 was set at 30% per annum, and for loans greater 
than R6 000 was set at 27% per annum.3  The formal banking sector was not in a 
position to provide necessary credit to South Africa’s lower-income groups.4  The 
reasons for this are many, but revolve primarily around the fact that low-income 
earners were not in a position to provide the collateral security necessary to reduce 
risk to credit providers.5  This meant that the vast majority of the population were 
excluded from the formal credit market, and lower income groups were desperate for 
                                                 
1 Lurama Vyftien (Pty) Ltd and 49 Others v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another (case no. 
22125 of 1999) and The Association of Micro Lenders v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another 
(case no. 23453 of 1999) (unreported TPD). 
2 Act 73 of 1968. 
3 Usury Act, 1968, R3273 Government Gazette 14438, 4 December 1992. 
4 Lurama 10. 
5 For further discussion in this regard, see Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer Credit Law 
Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer Credit (August 2004)” 12–15. 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 2006). 
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credit, primarily for housing, small business enterprises and for consumption 
purposes.6  The Usury Act limitations effectively denied credit to this sector of the 
population which it was intended to protect. 
 
These circumstances gave rise to the emergence of the so-called “cash loans 
industry”, which operated largely unlawfully, charging interest rates way in excess of 
the Usury Act limitations.7  Lawful micro-lending practice was not an economically 
viable business at this time, since lenders did not consider it profitable to lend small 
amounts of money to consumers offering little or no security at Usury Act-compliant 
interest rates.8  Otto and Grové provided two reasons for the net return on lenders’ 
capital being small:9 
 
(a) Micro-lenders were not deposit-taking institutions, and therefore had to 
borrow capital from financial institutions at relatively high rates of interest. 
(b) The overheads of the micro-lender were more or less the same for small 
loans as they were for larger loans, which adversely affected profit margins if 
interest rates for all loans were the same. 
 
Millions of low-income consumers were forced to turn to the illegal cash loans 
industry, where they found themselves at the mercy of an unregulated market in 
which they enjoyed no legal protection whatsoever, in spite of the existence of the 
Usury Act.10  For these reasons, it was believed that exemption of micro-lenders from 
the limitations of the Usury Act was essential to enable a large sector of South 
Africa’s population to gain access to credit from lenders who were not operating 
illegally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Lurama 10. 
7 SALC Working Paper 46 at 220. 
8 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in Terms of South African Law and Related Aspects 
13–14. 
9 SALC Working Paper 46 at 220. 
10 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in Terms of South African Law and Related 
Aspects 13–14. 
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4.2 The exemption of micro-loans from the Usury Act 
 
The exemption of micro-loans from the Usury Act was made possible in 1988 by the 
insertion of section 15A into the Act via section 8 of the Usury Amendment Act,11 
which marked the high point of the control of the Usury Act by the Minister of 
Finance.  The text reads: 
 
“The Minister may from time to time by notice in the Gazette exempt the categories of 
moneylending transactions, credit transactions or leasing transactions which he may 
deem fit, from any of or all the provisions of the Act on such conditions and to such 
extent as he may deem fit, and may at any time in like manner revoke or amend any 
such exemption.” 
 
Thus, it became possible for an exemption from the Act to be made on certain 
conditions.  The extent of the discretion of the Minister to make an exemption and to 
impose conditions was limited by the usual rules of administrative action, which 
action would have to take into account the overriding purpose of the Usury Act, as 
set out in its long title, namely to limit finance charges.12 
 
Prior to the exemption of micro-loans from the Act, a number of other exemptions in 
terms of section 15A were effected by the Minister, which are not strictly relevant to 
this study.13 
 
4.2.1 The 1992 Exemption Notice 
 
On 31 December 1992, all loans of up to R6 000 to borrowers who were natural 
persons were exempted by Notice (“the 1992 Exemption Notice”)14 from the 
provisions of the Usury Act.  The loan plus all finance charges had to be paid back 
over a period not exceeding 36 months from the date of payment of the loan amount 
                                                 
11 Act 100 of 1988; the section was later substituted by s6 of the Usury Amendment Act 91 of 1989. 
12 The long title of the Usury Act reads as follows: “To provide for the limitation and disclosure of finance 
charges…” 
13 The following transactions were exempted from the Act between 1988 and 1992: lease transactions 
exceeding R100 000 and involving the sale of a business as a going concern, with no capping of interest 
(GN 2262 of 4 November 1988, as amended by GN 1697 of 1 August 1989); certain categories of loans 
secured by a mortgage bond and for which the state stood as guarantor were exempt from the limitation 
on additional finance charges in terms of Section 4 of the Act (GN 1418 of 27 June 1989, as amended 
by GN 1711 of 4 August 1989); loans relating to the acquisition of housing and loans from pension 
monies for this purpose, with the interest rate limited to an amount set out by notice by the Minister (GN 
R3162 and 3163 of 20 November 1992). 
14 Notice in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act 73 of 1968, GN R3451, Government Gazette 14498, 
31 December 1992. 
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to the borrower.  A few other conditions were provided,15 but such micro-lenders 
were exempt from all other constraints of the Usury Act, and no maximum interest 
rate was imposed.  The effect of the exemption was, inter alia, that microlenders 
were no longer bound by the maximum rates of interest prescribed in terms of 
section 2 of the Usury Act, and therefore there was no limit on the interest rates that 
they could charge. 
 
The 1992 Exemption Notice led to the booming of the micro-lending industry, now 
free from the shackles of the Usury Act.  In reviewing this period of history of the 
industry, Yacoob J in AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Micro-finance Regulatory 
Council and the Department of Trade and Industry16 described the position thus:17 
 
“The micro-finance industry had been legitimated.  It grew exponentially.  Many 
relatively poor people were now able to secure loans from willing lenders; lenders 
could now make limitless profit, who were subject to very little (if any) control.  This 
brought negative consequences.  Unsurprisingly, complaints of abuse arising from 
micro-finance loans were directed by borrowers against lenders with rapidly 
increasing frequency.” 
 
An independent study conducted in 200018 described the micro-lending industry as 
having “exploded” during the eight years since the 1992 Exemption Notice. 
 
As was to be expected, abuses followed, best described by Mynhardt J in the 
Lurama case as follows:19 
 
 “Consumers were exploited.  The high, sometimes exorbitant, rates at which interest 
on short-term loans were charged, created so-called debt traps.  Consumers had to 
enter into fresh loan agreements in order to repay existing loans.  This resulted in 
them becoming more and more indebted to their creditors.” 
 
                                                 
15 The loan amount could not be paid back by the borrower “in terms of a credit card scheme” or from a 
cheque account where it would result in the cheque account becoming overdrawn; a so-called cooling-
off period of three days after the date of conclusion of the transaction was prescribed, during which 
period the lender could not pay the money over to the borrower; before the conclusion of the 
transaction, the lender had to furnish to the borrower in writing “the amounts in rand and cents of the 
loan amount and the sum of the finance charges and the other costs payable in terms of such a 
transaction”. 
16 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC) paras 9-10. 
17 Para 10. 
18 Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” page (iv) to (v) 
http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 (accessed 14 March 2006). 
19 Lurama 12. 
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In 1993, the Department of Trade and Industry embarked upon a process of 
consultation with all the so-called role-players in the industry, which lasted for 
approximately five years.20  The Department wanted to afford better protection to 
consumers whilst at the same time not disregarding the interests of the micro-
lenders.  The result of this consultation was that it was decided that micro-lenders 
and other role-players should have some say alongside government in the manner in 
which the industry was regulated.21 
 
In 1994, when the African National Congress came to power, it almost immediately 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the micro-lending industry, and 
took steps to rectify matters.22  There was particular concern about the high interest 
rates on loans for consumption purposes.23  On 30 June 1994, the then Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Mr Trevor Manuel, announced by way of a notice24 that he 
intended to repeal GN R3451 of 31 December 1992, which exempted micro-lenders 
from the Usury Act, and interested parties were invited to submit written 
representations regarding the intended repeal within 30 days. 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry received inputs from numerous interested 
parties, and draft notices were prepared and made available from time to time for 
discussion at certain workshops,25 where the regulation of the industry and the 
capping of interest rates were amongst the topics that were discussed.26 
 
By June 1999, the mushrooming micro-lending industry had been operating without 
interest rate limits and with minimal regulation and control for six-and-a-half years.  In 
his 1999 Budget Speech, Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel had the following to say 
in this regard: 
 
                                                 
20 Lurama 24. 
21 AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Micro-finance Regulatory Council and the Department of Trade and 
Industry para 11. 
22 Lurama 13.  
23 Lurama 23.  Loans for consumption purposes would include, for example, loans to purchase food and 
clothing and to pay household expenses such as electricity. 
24 Notice of intention to repeal the Notice whereby moneylending transactions not exceeding R6 000 are 
exempted from the Act, GN 1183, Government Gazette 15836, 30 June 1994. 
25 Two such workshops were held on 20 February 1997 and 8 July 1998. 
26 Lurama 25. 
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“Too many people have become hostage to unscrupulous moneylenders.  There is a 
place for the micro-lending industry.  But we will not tolerate the blatant exploitation 
that appears to be taking place at the moment.”27 
 
By the end of 1999 there were more than 850 registered institutions comprising more 
than 3 500 branches, including firms with a wide range of different legal statuses, 
from natural persons to publicly-traded commercial banks.28  There was tremendous 
variation in size and outreach (from lenders with 100 clients and R50 000 in their 
portfolio to lenders with over a million clients and more than three billion rand in their 
outstanding portfolio), as well as important differences in targetted term of loan (from 
five days to three years).29 Interest rates varied greatly, from effective rates of 60% 
per year for long-term loans of up to three years to rates that surpassed 1 000% per 
year for very short-term loans of less than a week.30 
 
4.2.2 The 1999 Exemption Notice  
 
Finally, Government took a positive step towards regulated control.  The succeeding 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Mr Alexander Erwin, decided to issue a revised 
exemption, in addition to repealing the 1992 exemption.  His decision was motivated 
mainly by a desire to sustain the micro-enterprise lending industry,31 as opposed to 
all microlenders.32  On 13 November 1998, the Minister gave notice of his intention to 
publish an exemption, and called for written comment and representations.33  This 
notice, for the first time, referred to an intention to establish a regulatory institution, 
which would set maximum rates for the total charge of credit34 in respect of 
categories of loans.   
 
                                                 
27 COSATU “Submission to the Parliamentary Hearing on Bank Charges, Micro-lending and the Usury 
Act” (presented to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry) COSATU 
http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/1999/bankrate.htm (accessed on 14 March 2006). 
28 Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” page (v) 
http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 (accessed 14 March 2006). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 “Micro-enterprise lending” is described by Mynhardt J with reference to papers before the court in 
Lurama 7 to be “lending of money by ‘micro enterprise lenders’ to consumers ‘to set up or grow small 
businesses’, which both generates a future income and creates employment”.  
32 Lurama 7.  Mynhardt J stated further: “The micro-enterprise lenders face the highest business risks, 
says the Minister, because their clients generally have no formal employment, no bank account and 
often no fixed address.  Their clients also contribute to growth in the country’s economy and to job 
creation.” 
33 Department of Trade and Industry Exemption in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act, 1968, GN 
2726, Government Gazette 19457, 13 November 1998. 
34 The “total charge of credit” was defined extremely broadly to mean “all charges levied on the loan, 
including interest charges and other charges including administration fees, ledger fees, commissions, 
but excluding insurance premiums”. 
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The result was Government Notice 713 of 1 June 1999 (“the 1999 Exemption 
Notice”),35 which repealed the December 1992 Notice and substituted a new 
exemption.  Registered lenders loaning amounts of R10 000 or less, repayable over 
a period not exceeding 36 months, and who complied with a number of conditions, 
were exempt from the Usury Act.  Most importantly for the purposes of this study, 
paragraph 3.3 of Annexure A to the Schedule to the Notice provided that a registered 
moneylender “shall ensure that the annual rate of the total charge of credit stipulated, 
demanded or received by the lender shall not exceed ten times the average prime 
overdraft lending rate from time to time of the four banks, registered under the Banks 
Act, 1990 (Act No. 94 of 1990), from time to time with the largest asset base 
providing cheque services”.36   
 
Further, a number of rules for the purpose of the exemption were published with 
respect to confidentiality, disclosure, a cooling-off period and collection methods,37 
which considerably shifted regulatory control towards consumer protection.  
Importantly, lenders were prohibited from retaining identity documents and bank 
cards as security of debt.38  On 16 July 1999, the Micro-finance Regulatory Council 
(“the MFRC”) was approved as a regulatory institution in terms of the 1999 
Exemption Notice.39  Lenders were required to register with this institution by 15 
September 1999, and a number of consumer safeguards existed within the 
membership requirements of the MFRC.40  The MFRC rules went further, to set out 
procedures for such matters as inspections of lenders’ premises, records, disciplinary 
rules, appeals and lending practices, including methods for calculation of interest.41 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Notice in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act 73 of 1968, GN R713, Government Gazette 20145, 1 
June 1999. 
36 Paragraph 3.3 of Annexure A to the Schedule to GN R713 of 1 June 1999. 
37 Annexure A to the Schedule to GN 713 of 1 June 1999. 
38 Paragraph 6 of Annexure A to the Schedule to the Notice in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act 73 
of 1968, GN R713, Government Gazette 20145, 1 June 1999 
39 Notice in terms of Government Notice (No 713 of 1 June 1999), GN 911, Government Gazette 20307, 
16 July 1999. 
40 In order to satisfy application procedures, micro-lenders had to comply with all accreditation criteria 
set down by Annexure B to the Schedule to GN 713 of 1 June 1999, including: commitment to full 
compliance with the MFRC’s rules; registration with the South African Revenue Services; auditing 
procedures; executive staff of lender not to have criminal records for certain offences. 
41 MFRC “Rules of the MFRC” http://www.mfrc.co.za (accessed 24 March 2006). 
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4.2.3 The Lurama case42 
 
Concerns in the micro-lending industry regarding the provisions of the 1999 
Exemption Notice prompted two court applications43 against the Minister of Trade 
and Industry and the MFRC, one by the Association of Micro-lenders, representing 
1830 micro-lenders, and the other by a group of 50 lenders.  The two matters were 
heard together.  The applications sought to have reviewed and set aside the 1999 
Exemption Notice, alternatively the approval of the MFRC as a regulatory institution 
for purposes of the Notice and certain provisions of the Notice.   
 
The applications were unsuccessful in all but one extremely important respect: the 
court reviewed and set aside the decision of the Minister to publish paragraph 3.3 of 
Annexure A to the Schedule to the 1999 Exemption Notice, which related to the cap 
on interest rates.  The court made its decision on the basis of a finding that the 
applicants had a legitimate expectation to be consulted regarding the proposed 
interest rate caps, but were not consulted.44  The effect of the Lurama decision was 
that paragraph 3.3 was struck from the Notice, and that all micro-lenders who were 
registered with the MFRC and who complied with all conditions of the Notice could 
lend at any rate, with effect from 11 November 1999, the date of the judgment. 
 
It is noteworthy that both applicants in the Lurama case (representing a total of 1 880 
micro-lenders) charged interest on loans at 30% per month (360% per year), at the 
time.45  Paragraph 3.3 sought to restrict interest to what amounted to approximately 
13,75% per month at that time, and an investigation by an auditor of the financial 
statements of 47 of the members of the Association of Micro-lenders found that at 
this rate of interest, 81% of those investigated would not be able to continue to do 
business profitably.46 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Lurama Vyftien (Pty) Ltd and 49 Others v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another (Case No. 
22125 of 1999) and The Association of Micro Lenders v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another 
(Case No. 23453 of 1999) (unreported TPD). 
43 Ibid. 
44 Lurama 39. 
45 Lurama 7. 
46 Lurama 34. 
  
 
70
4.2.4 The 2005 Exemption Notice  
 
On 8 August 2005, the 1999 Exemption Notice was repealed,47 and a new Notice 
(“the 2005 Exemption Notice”) was promulgated.48  In short, the Notice provided for 
enhanced consumer protection in a number of respects via stricter rules relating to 
lending activities,49 expanded obligations of lenders (particularly in regard to 
“reckless lending”)50 and the establishment of a National Loans Register.51  Most 
important for the purpose of this study, however, is that no interest rate cap was 
promulgated. 
 
4.3 The National Credit Act and Regulations 
 
As explained in 3.2.4 above, a credit law review process was set in motion in May 
2002, resulting in the drafting by the Department of Trade and Industry of a 
consumer credit policy framework52 in August 2004.  This process culminated in the 
National Credit Act,53 most of which became effective on 1 June and 1 September 
2006.54  As mentioned in Chapter Three above, there are many extremely important 
provisions of the Act that will come into force only on 1 June 2007 (the whole of 
Chapter 5 of the Act, for example, which includes all interest provisions in Part C 
thereof and which is critical to this study).  The National Credit Act replaced the 
Usury Act, the 2005 Exemption Notice and the Credit Agreements Act.55 
 
Section 105 of the Act allows the Minister to prescribe limits on interest rates and 
fees in all sectors of the consumer credit market.  On 20 February 2006, Draft 
National Credit Regulations56 were published for comment, and National Credit 
Regulations were promulgated on 31 May 2006.57  All regulations in which the 
Minister prescribes limits on the cost of credit will come into effect on 1 June 2007, 
                                                 
47 Notice to repeal Notice 713 of 1 June 1999, GN 1406, Government Gazette 27889, 8 August 2005. 
48 Notice in terms of Section 15A of the Usury Act, 1968, GN 1407, Government Gazette 27889, 8 
August 2005. 
49 Part 2 of Annexure A to the Schedule to GN 1407. 
50 Part 3 of Annexure A to the Schedule to GN 1407. 
51 Part 5 of Annexure A to the Schedule to GN 1407. 
52 Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit (August 2004)” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 
2006). 
53 34 of 2005. 
54 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006.   
55 75 of 1980. 
56 Draft National Credit Regulations, GN R307, Government Gazette 28531, 20 February 2006. 
57 National Credit Act (34/2005): Regulations, R489 Government Gazette 28864, 31 May 2006. 
  
 
71
because that is when the enabling provisions in Chapter 5 of the Act become 
operative.58  Section 5 of Schedule 3 to the Act, which concerns transitional 
provisions, provides that until such time as the Minister prescribes a maximum rate of 
interest in terms of section 105 of the Act,59 the Usury Act maximum annual finance 
charge rate applicable immediately prior to the coming into force of the Act60 will 
continue to remain in force.61  This means that until 1 June 2007, when section 105 
comes into force, the Usury Act maximum rates as at 31 May 2006 will remain in 
force.  Likewise, the 2005 Exemption Notice will remain in force until 31 May 2007,62 
with the effect that until 1 June 2007 there will continue to be no limit on the interest 
rates that registered micro-lenders may charge. 
 
Regulation 42(1) provides for a maximum interest rate on “short-term credit 
transactions”63 of 5% per month,64 and a maximum interest rate on “unsecured credit 
transactions”65 that is linked to the South African Reserve Bank Repurchase Rate.66  
The maximum interest rate on unsecured credit transactions currently amounts to 
38,7% per annum, based on the current Repurchase Rate of 8,5% per annum.67 
 
In addition, Regulation 42(2) provides for a maximum initiation fee on every loan of 
R150 plus 10% of the amount of the agreement in excess of R1 000, but never to 
exceed R1 000.  Further, Regulation 44 provides for a maximum monthly service fee 
of R50.  Although micro-loans will be cheaper for most consumers, the cost of credit 
of smaller loans will be as expensive and in some cases more expensive than the 
                                                 
58 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006. 
59 That is, until 1 June 2007. 
60 On 1 June 2006. 
61 The Usury Act maximum on 31 May 2006, which will therefore remain in force until 31 May 2007, is 
20% per annum for loans greater than R10000, and 17% per annum for loans less than R10000 (Usury 
Act 73 of 1968 Annual Finance Charge Rate, GN 1100, Government Gazette 26809, 17 September 
2004).  This provision accords with s11 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957, which provides that “[w]hen 
a law repeals wholly or partially any former law and substitutes provisions for the law so repealed, the 
repealed law shall remain in force until the substituted provisions come into operation”. 
62 Reg 73. 
63 A “short-term credit transaction” is defined in Regulation 39(2) as “a credit transaction in respect of a 
deferred amount at inception of the agreement not exceeding R8 000; and in terms of which the whole 
amount is repayable within a period not exceeding 6 months”. 
64 That is, 60% per annum. 
65 An “unsecured credit transaction” is defined in Regulation 39(3) as a “credit transaction in respect of 
which the debt is not supported by any pledge or other right in property or suretyship or any other form 
of personal security”.  This interest rate limit will therefore cover all loans, large and small, that are 
repaid over a period exceeding four months and are not secured. 
66 Regulation 42 provides that the maximum interest rate is established by applying the formula: 
(Repurchase Rate x 2.2) + 20% per year. 
67 South African Reserve Bank home page http://www.reservebank.co.za/ (accessed 1 December 
2006).  
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current typical 30% per month.  The full implications of the new cost of credit will be 
comprehensively analysed in Chapter Six below. 
  
Whereas in the past the cost of credit in the micro-lending industry was lawfully 
determined only by the interest rate applied to loans, the National Credit Act and 
Regulations now provide for interest, an initiation fee and a service fee,68 and 
imposes very specific limits on these costs.   The cost of credit in the micro-lending 
industry for the purposes of this study therefore includes all financial costs69 to the 
borrower of loaning amounts of money without providing security.70 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Thus, since the Lurama decision, there has been no regulated limit on the interest 
rates that registered micro-lenders may lawfully charge.  Until 1 June 2007, when 
section 105 of the National Credit Act and the National Credit Regulations come into 
effect, there will continue to be no such limit.  In effect, there has been and will 
continue to be no such limit for a total of nearly 14 years, between 31 December 
199271 and 1 June 2007 (excluding the period of less than six months between 1 
June 199972 and 11 November 199973), during which period micro-lenders have 
lawfully charged exorbitant interest rates. 
                                                 
68 Regulations 42 and 44. 
69 In the case of micro-loans: interest, the initiation fee and the service fee. 
70 Usually loans of R8 000 or less, being the maximum amount for a short-term credit transaction, as 
defined in Regulation 39(2). 
71 The 1992 Exemption Notice. 
72 The 1999 Exemption Notice. 
73 The Lurama decision. 
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Chapter Five 
 
The Socio-economic Impact of No Limits on the 
Cost of Credit 
 
 “The rich rule over the poor, and the borrower is the lender’s slave.”1 
 
Outline 
 
The failure to cap interest rates in the micro-lending industry for a period of nearly 14 
years since 1992, demonstrated in the previous chapter, has had (and continues to 
have) far-reaching consequences for recipients of micro-loans.  This chapter will 
illustrate the devastating socio-economic impact of the absence of limits on the cost 
of credit in this sector for individuals and poor communities.  The common law 
illegality of exorbitant interest rates will then be reviewed, with reference to Chapters 
Two and Three.  Although regulated limits on the cost of credit are imminent,2 it will 
be shown that it is likely that extremely high rates of interest in excess of the 
regulated limits will continue to be charged by micro-lenders, albeit unlawfully, as a 
result of the legacy of the last 14 years.  In the next chapter, the consequences of the 
National Credit Act limits on the cost of credit will be examined. 
 
5.1 Two credit markets and the perpetuation of poverty 
 
Although there is some variation in interest rates, registered micro-lenders exempt 
from the Usury Act have, for the most part, charged interest on short-term loans at 
30% per month, or 360% per year.3  In terms of the Usury Act, the maximum 
permissible interest rate for credit transactions of less than R10 000 has been 20% 
per annum since 17 September 2004.4  Therefore, the cost of credit in the registered 
                                                 
1 Proverbs 22:7, New International Version of the Holy Bible. 
2 The National Credit Regulations, which provide for limits on the cost of credit, will come into force on 1 
June 2007. 
3 Both applicants in the Lurama case, one of which was the Association of Micro-Lenders (representing 
a total of 1 830 micro-lenders) charged interest on short-term loans at 30% per month (Lurama 7).  
Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 
(accessed 14 March 2006) 48 reports that 30% per month is the interest charge agreed upon by the 
Association of Micro-lenders.  See also “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit (August 2004)” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 
2006) at para 2.4, and Dr Penelope Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in 
South Africa” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/forward.htm (accessed 14 March 2006) at para 8.  
4 GN 1100, Government Gazette 26809, 17 September 2004.  This rate will be valid until 1 June 2007, 
when the relevant provisions of the National Credit Act come into operation.  The Usury Act maximum 
interest rate has since 1988 fluctuated between its highest level of 36% per annum in 1998 and the 
current 20% per annum, which is its lowest level during this period. 
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micro-lending industry has for over two years been and still remains some 18 times 
higher than the cost of credit in the formal banking sector.5   
 
Who is paying these higher prices for credit?  The Department of Trade and 
Industry’s August 2004 consumer credit policy framework,6 referred to in Chapters 
Three and Four above, was the result of a lengthy and thorough credit law review 
process, which began in 2002 and involving extensive research by private 
consultants into numerous aspects of consumer credit in South Africa.  In this policy 
framework,7 the Department described “two economies” or “two credit markets” in 
South Africa: firstly, a market for middle- and high-income consumers (about 15% of 
the population), with easy access to credit (some 72% of total credit extension) from 
a range of mainstream credit providers, including banks, at preferential cost limited 
by the Usury Act; secondly, a market for low-income consumers (about 67% of the 
population) with limited access to credit (6% of total credit extension) in the form of 
micro-loans and other credit8 at high cost.9  This disparity is demonstrated in Table A 
below. 
 
Table A: Comparison of the cost of credit for the two credit markets –  
middle- / high-income vs low-income consumers10 
 
 Proportion of 
total 
population 
Percentage 
(%) of total 
credit 
extension 
(rand amount 
per year) 
Common 
source of 
loans 
Interest rate 
on any loan 
up to  
R10 000 
Amount of 
interest 
generated per 
month on a loan 
of R1 000 
Middle-/ 
high-
income 
consumers 
 
15% 
 
72% 
(approximately 
R261 billion) 
 
Banking 
sector 
 
Maximum 
20% per 
annum 
 
R16,67 
Low-
income 
consumers 
 
 
67% 
 
6% 
(approximately 
R21 billion) 
 
Registered 
micro-lenders
Unlimited 
(usually 
360% per 
annum) 
 
R300 
 
It is therefore the poorest 67% of the population who are paying the much higher 
prices for credit.  The cost of credit for poor people, who are denied credit by the 
                                                 
5 With the Usury Act limit at its highest level of 36% per annum in 1998, it can be said that the cost of 
credit in the registered micro-lending sector has for the past 14 years remained between 10 and 18 
times higher than the cost of credit in the formal banking sector. 
6 Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer Credit Law Reform: Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit (August 2004)” http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/policyjune2005.pdf (accessed 14 March 
2006). 
7 DTI “Policy framework” paras 2.1–2.6. 
8 Other credit includes store cards, credit agreements and loans backed by provident or pension fund 
guarantees. 
9 Typically 30% per month, in the case of short-term loans from micro-lenders. 
10 All figures are obtained from Chapters 2 and 3 of the DTI “Policy Framework”. 
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banks and forced to borrow money from micro-lenders, is proportionately higher – 
some eighteen times higher – than that of the wealthiest 15% of the population.   
 
It is easily evident from this analysis that while higher-income groups can generate 
capital wealth through relatively cheap credit, lower-income groups will most certainly 
become poorer as a result of having to pay such high interest rates for cash loans, 
and that poverty will be perpetuated as a result.  The problem, unfortunately, does 
not stop there.  Low-income consumers and small and micro-enterprises have 
historically been denied access to bank savings facilities, and South Africa 
traditionally has low savings levels.11  An inability to save increases dependence on 
short-term credit, especially in the case of emergencies.12  Further, the savings 
account is not an attractive proposition for low-income persons, because an 
extremely poor or non-existent return on savings is offered by banks, especially in 
the case of small amounts and entry-level saving.13 
 
Finally, it was found that the most important distinguishing feature between these so-
called “banked” and “unbanked” sectors of the population was the availability or 
otherwise of collateral security, in particular immovable property, which substantially 
reduces the risk to credit providers and increases the availability of reasonably priced 
credit.14  This fact serves to deepen the divide that exists between the wealthy and 
the poor, and reinforced the Department’s concern about the historical relationship 
between poverty and poor access to resources,15 be those immovable property or 
reasonably-priced credit, and the Department sought to address this concern. 
 
5.2 Impact on individual consumers 
 
What impact does this high cost of credit have on individual consumers?  One way to 
demonstrate this impact is by way of examples of various loan sizes, repayment 
periods and consumer incomes.  The assumed figures upon which this analysis is 
based are explained in the footnotes to Table B below. 
                                                 
11 DTI “Policy Framework” para 3.18.  Approximately 40% of South African adults do not have access to 
any formal financial services (including savings, transmission, credit and insurance facilities), while in 
excess of 50% are excluded from savings accounts (para 3.21). 
12 DTI “Policy Framework” para 3.19. 
13 DTI “Policy Framework” para 3.21.  According to a Department of Trade and Industry survey of five 
major banks as well as Post Bank, when fees are taken into account, entry-level savings accounts offer 
negative returns to low-income consumers, some being of a significant magnitude (–20%). 
14 DTI “Policy Framework” paras 3.4–3.11. 
15 DTI “Policy Framework” para 2.2. 
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Table B: Sample survey of variable loan sizes and repayment periods viewed 
against monthly income (an interest rate of 30% per month or 360% per year – 
the most common rate16 – is assumed in each case)17 
 
 A B C D E F G H 
 Amount 
of loan18 
Period of 
repayment19
Instalment 
per 
month20 
Monthly 
wage/ 
pension of 
borrower
21 
Percentage 
(%) of  
income 
available 
for all other 
expenses 
(after loan 
repayment) 
Total 
interest 
paid during 
loan period 
22  
Percentage 
(%) of total 
income 
utilised to 
pay interest 
charges 
during loan 
period 
Percentage 
(%) of total 
amount 
repaid 
which is 
utilised to 
pay interest 
charges 
1 R200 1 month R260 R82023 68% R60 7% 23% 
2 R500 1 month R650 R820 26% R150 18% 23% 
3 R1000 1 month R1300 R2000 35% R300 15% 23% 
4 R1000 6 months R378,39 R2000 81% R1270,37 11% 56% 
5 R1000 12 months R313,45 R2500 87% R2761,45 9% 73% 
6 R1638 12 months R513,44 R2500 79% R4523,25 15% 73% 
7 R1638 24 months R492,31 R3000 84% R10177,37 14% 86% 
8 R1638 36 months R491,44 R3500 86% R16053,80 13% 91% 
9 R2500 24 months R751,38 R3000 75% R15533,22 22% 86% 
10 R3000 36 months R900,07 R4000 77% R29402,56 20% 91% 
11 R500024 6 months R1891,97 R4000 53% R6351,83 26% 56% 
12 R5000 12 months R1567,27 R4000 61% R13807,24 29% 73% 
13 R5000 24 months R1502,77 R4000 62% R31066,45 32% 86% 
 
                                                 
16 The basis for the assumption of interest at 30% per month is explained in 5.1 above. 
17 Simple interest is assumed: that is interest on the capital only, not compound interest, which includes 
interest on interest.  It is possible that compound interest is charged on arrears, but this is not clear. 
18 R1 638 was the average size loan for the year ended May 2006 (Micro-finance Regulatory Council 
“Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter” http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=91 (accessed 
13 October 2006).  For this reason the various assumed loan amounts used in the examples average 
out in the vicinity of R1 638. 
19 A spread of repayment periods is assumed in the examples, from the common one month loan,, 
through various “term loans” to the maximum 36-month loan permitted by the Usury Act exemption. 
20 The monthly instalment is calculated by adopting the following formula: FV = PV(1+it)  
(FV = future value; PV = present value; i = interest rate; t = time). 
21 According to the MFRC Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Indebtedness dated 17 June 2003, 
Appendix para 5.1 (unpublished) the income profile of micro-lenders’ clients is as follows: 
• 12% of borrowers have an income of between R1 000 and R2 000 per month; 
• 28% of borrowers have an income of between R2 000 and R3 000 per month; 
• 22% of borrowers have an income of between R3 000 and R4 000 per month. 
The bulk of the client base earns between R2 000 and R4 000 per month, and it is for this reason that 
figures in this vicinity have been assumed for the incomes of borrowers in Column D of Table B. 
22 This amount is the sum total of interest payable for each of the months of the repayment period.  
Interest for each month is calculated by multiplying the balance outstanding at the end of the previous 
month by 30%.  For an example of a loan amortisation table (Example 7 in Table B), see Appendix A.  
Interest can also be calculated as follows: instalment per month x number of months, less loan amount. 
23 R820 is the current monthly old-age state pension. 
24 A similar table to my Table B appears on the Department of Trade and Industry website in which 
consumers are warned of the total instalments and total interest payable for a loan of R5 000 re-payable 
over 6, 12 or 24 months.  Hence, these figures are repeated in Items 10, 11 and 12, respectively, of 
Table B, with particular reference to columns C and F (Department of Trade and Industry “Consumer 
Alert” http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrd/YouhavetheRighttoCreditOptions.htm) (accessed 17 October 2006). 
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The following deductions can be made from Table B: 
 
(a) Very low-income earners (e.g. pensioners) borrowing even relatively small 
amounts are particularly vulnerable: the borrowers in Examples 2 and 3 will 
have available only 26% and 35%, respectively, of their income to pay for all 
their other expenses (Column E).  Being already poor, they will as a result of 
having taken out this loan have only a small percentage of their original 
meagre income to live on. 
 
(b) Between 7% and 32% of consumers’ personal income in the thirteen 
examples has to be used merely to service this debt – that is to say, to pay 
the interest on the debt (Column G).  This is a disproportionately high amount, 
having the direct result that less money will be available to pay for all other 
necessary living expenses.  These figures relate to a single loan only; 
additional debt owed by the consumer will raise this amount further. 
 
(c) In the case of loans repaid over a period of 12 months or more, over 73% of 
the total repayments made are paid towards interest on the debt, as opposed 
to the original loan amount (Column H). 
 
(d) Attached as Appendix A is a micro-lending loan amortisation schedule in 
respect of Example 7 in Table B, which is probably the most representative 
example available (including average loan size, average loan repayment 
period and average wage of borrower, based upon the data referred to in the 
footnotes to Table B).  In the early months of repayment, nearly the entire 
monthly instalment is utilised towards servicing the debt, whilst there is hardly 
any reduction in the capital amount of the loan.  For example: 
• In the first three months, a total of R1 473,30 is paid towards interest, 
and only R3,82 is paid towards the capital debt of R1 638. 
• In the first 12 months, a total of R5 840,31 is paid towards interest, 
and only R67,41 is paid towards the capital debt. 
It is only in the final six to 12 months that the borrower will begin to reduce the 
outstanding capital by any significant amount.  The borrower will end up 
paying a total amount of R10 177,37 for interest alone, more than six times 
the initial loan of only R1 638. 
 
(e) Again, in Example 9 of Table B, the borrower will end up paying a total of over 
seven times the original capital debt (capital and interest repaid).  In Example 
10, the borrower will pay nearly 11 times the original capital debt. 
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5.3 Different types of loans and their impact 
 
5.3.1 30-day loans and the debt spiral 
 
“Cash loans” in micro-lending industry parlance mean very short-term loans, usually 
30-day loans,25 but they sometimes have repayment periods of up to four months, for 
which an “industry standard” interest rate of 30% per month is widespread.26  
Frequently, loan repayment periods are less than 30 days, when repayment is 
required “at the end of the month” (sometimes as little as seven days), but the 
interest of 30% remains the same,27 which results in effective interest rates in excess 
of 100% per month being charged in some instances. 
 
In her March 2003 report, prepared at the request of the Department of Trade and 
Industry as part of its credit law review process,28 Dr Penelope Hawkins shows how 
30-day loans are expected to work in order to ensure that a consumer can be free of 
debt within six months:29 
  
“If an individual with an income of R1 000 borrows R300 in month one, he must repay 
R390 by month end.  If the following month he borrows R250, he needs to repay 
R351.  If this trend continues, the client is likely to move out of debt within six months.  
This appears to be the rule of thumb – out of debt within six months makes a wise 
(and not over-indebted) borrower.” 
 
To get out of debt within six months, a series of six 30-day loans is necessary in this 
example, and each loan will invariably be utilised to pay back part of the previous 
loan.     
 
The example above assumes that the borrower is able to fund the repayment in part 
from another source every month (e.g. in Month 2 in the example, the shortfall of 
R140, being the difference between R390 and R250, will have to be funded from 
elsewhere).  It is difficult to foresee, however, what this source would be, given that 
the individual had to borrow R300 just one month before for another purpose, and 
this repayment model therefore appears to be unsustainable.  The more common 
scenario, explained by Dr Hawkins, is that repeated loans have to be taken out to 
fund in full the repayment of previous loans, demonstrated in the examples below. 
                                                 
25 See Example 1 of Table B for an example of such a loan. 
26 Dr Penelope Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in South Africa” 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/forward.htm (accessed 14 March 2006) para 4.7.2.  
27 Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in South Africa” para 4.7.1. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Table C: Illustration of the 30-day loan and resultant debt spiral 
 
 Month 
 
Loan amount Interest at 
30% per 
month 
Repayment 
amount 
Income 
Example A 1 R300 
 
R90 R390 R820 (old- 
age pension) 
 2 R390 
 
R117 R507  
 3 R507 
 
R152 R659  
 4 R659 
 
R197 R856  
Example B 1 R500 R150 
 
R650 R1 000 
(wage) 
 
 
2 R650 R195 R845  
 3 
 
R845 R253 R1 098  
 
In Example A, by Month 3, the pensioner’s loan repayment (R659) amounts to 80% 
of her monthly pension of R820.  By Month 4, the loan repayment (R856) exceeds 
her pension, being already more than double the loan repayment at the end of Month 
1 (R390).  In Example B, by Month 3, the loan repayment (R1 098) has already 
exceeded the worker’s wage of R1 000.  This is obviously not workable or 
sustainable, and such a borrower is quickly caught in a debt spiral and ends up in a 
debt trap from which there can be no escape.  In effect, the debtor will remain 
permanently indebted.  S/he will have to continue to pay monthly instalments, which 
are usually determined by whatever s/he can afford, on an indefinite basis, paying 
only a part of the interest due, and never being able to pay off the capital debt. 
 
The unfortunate reality is that the practice of borrowing money to repay other debt is 
occurring on a wide scale in South Africa.  Dr Hawkins reports that 30-day lenders 
acknowledge that some 80% of their clientele are repeat borrowers.30  In a 2000 
interest rate study commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry,31 Ebony 
Consulting International concluded that one half of employees on the government 
payroll system were repaying loans, and that 15% of these are trapped in a debt 
spiral, which occurs “when a borrower is forced to borrow to help pay back his loans, 
hence driving him deeper into debt”.32  Further, a rural survey carried out in the 
Northern Province showed that 25% of borrowers from micro-lenders borrowed to 
make payments on another loan.33  In its report on the impact of credit and 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 
(accessed 14 March 2006). 
32 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” (v). 
33 Ibid. 
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indebtedness of clients,34 the Micro-finance Regulatory Council concluded that the 
high cost of servicing micro-loans “implies that poorer individuals will remain in a debt 
trap under the best of circumstances, and further deepen that debt trap under the 
worst of circumstances”.35 
 
5.3.2 Term loans and over-indebtedness 
 
The dangers of over-indebtedness are not limited to 30-day loans.  Problems with 
“term loans” of six to 36 months have already been highlighted, with reference to 
Table B above, from which it is noteworthy that the longer the term of the loan, the 
higher the percentage of the total amount re-paid utilised to pay interest charges.36  
Ebony Consulting International describes the interplay between term and 30-day 
loans:37 
 
“[T]he major debt problem appears to be stemming from the term lenders, who are 
taking salary deductions at the source, before the employee even sees his/her 
paycheck. Some term lenders often write irresponsible loans to salaried employees, 
leaving them with unacceptable net take-home portions of the salaries that are then 
forcing the clients to take short-term debt at even higher interest rates. This is a 
greater cause of long-term indebtedness than short-term loans from the 30-day cash 
lenders.” 
 
Table D: Outstanding loan book38 and annual turnover by loan term39 
 
Term of loan Percentage of outstanding 
loan book 
Percentage of annual 
turnover 
1 month 
 
8% 53% 
1–6 months 
 
7% 11% 
6–12 months 
 
16% 18% 
12–36 months 
 
64% 17% 
> 36 months 
 
5% 1% 
 
Sixty-four percent of the total rand amount of loans outstanding in 2000 (R3,4 billion 
of a total of R5,3 billion) was in respect of term loans of 12 to 36 months, and 
surprisingly only 8% was in respect of one-month loans.  However, in the case of 
                                                 
34 MFRC “Report on Impact of Credit and Indebtedness of Clients” (unpublished). 
35 MFRC “Report on Impact of Credit and Indebtedness of Clients” 60. 
36 Between 56% and 91% in the case of loan terms of six to 36 months (Column H of Table B above). 
37 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” (v). 
38 “Outstanding loan book” means the total rand value of loans outstanding. 
39 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 30–31. 
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annual turnover, 53% of total turnover was attributable to one-month loans, and 17% 
to term loans of 12 to 36 months, probably largely because of the higher (or quicker) 
turnover of one-month loans, by their very nature.40  Total turnover in the industry 
was R9,7 billion – nearly double the amount for loans outstanding.41  These figures 
serve to confirm that both cash loans and term loans contribute considerably to the 
micro-lending market.  
 
5.4 Consumption finance 
 
The full impact of the high cost of credit cannot be fully understood until one has 
considered what the proceeds of micro-loans are spent on.  Before addressing this 
question directly, however, it is enlightening to consider the nature of expenditure by 
South Africans in different income categories in general – that is, from all sources of 
income, disregarding for the moment any borrowing of funds. 
Table E: Expenditure in South Africa from all sources of income42 
 
 <R6481 
(annual 
income) 
R6481–
R11090 
R11091– 
R19440 
R19441– 
R41484 
>R41484 
Food and 
beverages 
51% 49% 43% 31% 14% 
Clothing 
 
3% 5% 6% 5% 3% 
Housing 
 
8% 7% 8% 11% 19% 
Furniture 
 
1% 2% 3% 3% 2% 
Fuel and 
power 
7% 7% 9% 11% 18% 
Transport 
 
3% 3% 4% 5% 11% 
Health and 
medicine 
2% 2% 1% 2% 4% 
Education 
 
2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 
Personal 
care 
6% 5% 4% 4% 3%  
Other  
 
17% 18% 20% 25% 23% 
Total 
 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The most striking feature of these figures is that South Africans with total annual 
incomes of less that R19 440 spent at least 43% of their income on food and 
                                                 
40 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 31. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ebony Consulting International “Analysis on the Application of Borrowed Funds” Final Report to the 
Micro-finance Regulatory Council, dated April 2003 (unpublished) 14, based upon Statistics South 
Africa’s Income and Expenditure Survey of 2000. 
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beverages (51% in the case of the lowest-income group).43  According to Ebony 
Consulting International, who provided these statistics in their report, it is generally 
accepted that households that spend more than 60% of their income on food, 
beverages, clothing and housing are considered vulnerable.44  All those earning less 
than R11 090 in the lowest two income groups are therefore considered vulnerable 
as they contribute 62% and 61% of their expenditure, respectively, to these items.  
 
“This means that consumption expenditure for the most basic household goods is an 
extremely significant constraint on the poorer households in South Africa. 
Furthermore, this implies that the demand for debt at the lower end of income 
distribution is highly inelastic, and will consequently remain pervasive in the medium 
term.”45 
 
Turning then to micro-loans, it is therefore no surprise to find that the vast majority of 
loans disbursed were for consumption purposes, as is evident from Table F below. 
 
Table F: Loan usage46 
 
 Consumption 
 
Housing Furniture Education Business47 Other 
Based on 
number of 
loans 
 
43% 
 
13% 
 
8% 
 
12% 
 
3% 
 
21% 
Based on 
rand value 
disbursement 
 
44% 
 
13% 
 
8% 
 
12% 
 
3% 
 
20% 
 
 
The fact that most of the proceeds of micro-loans are being used to sustain daily 
needs rather than to pay for assets or durable commodities makes these already 
vulnerable people even more vulnerable.48  People who borrow to pay for necessities 
can be regarded as involuntary borrowers, being forced to pay extremely high 
interest rates to fund the most basic necessities of life, let alone other fundamental 
expenses such as education and housing.  Effectively, such people are borrowing to 
supplement their income, on a month-to-month basis, and micro-loans are regarded 
                                                 
43 Those with annual incomes of between R19 441 – R41 484 spent 31% of their income on food and 
beverages.  This category most closely resembles the incomes of most borrowers of small loans, who 
earn between R2 000 and R4 000 per month (see the footnote to Column D, Table B above). 
44 Ebony “Analysis on the Application of Borrowed Funds” 14. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ebony “Analysis on the Application of Borrowed Funds” 36 (statistics supplied by the Micro-finance 
Regulatory Council). 
47 It is interesting to note that only 3% of micro-loans were used for business purposes, given that the 
promotion of small business was a driving force behind the exemption of micro-loans from the Usury 
Act. 
48 MFRC “Report on Impact of Credit and Indebtedness of Clients” 60. 
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by many poor people as a ready source of disposable income49 or income 
substitution,50 which is necessary in order to survive. 
 
The terrible plight of such consumers is most graphically depicted in a Black Sash 
submission to the Department of Trade and Industry:51 
 
“Our advice offices continually hear stories which demonstrate the multi-faceted 
nature of poverty.  Our client profile displays a range of persons with poverty-specific 
constraints which are directly linked with hunger, unemployment, homelessness, and 
a lack of access to basic services. One of the risks of this fragile profile is their 
vulnerability to crisis (such as involvement in a road accident, or the injury to or loss 
of a breadwinner).  These types of crises place vulnerable sectors into situations of 
financial strain from which they are often never able to recover. This often results in 
large debt to moneylenders etc. 
      [T]he reason for the increasing indebtedness – in the case of consumptive 
borrowers – is because they have no choice. Their financial decisions are controlled 
by the cost of providing for themselves and their families.” 
 
Black Sash clients who exhibit a continual struggle to survive caused this 
organisation to conduct extensive research into the practice of moneylending to the 
poor.  This research confirmed that the majority who took out loans used the money 
to purchase basic necessities such as food, rent, education, transport, funerals and 
electricity.52 
 
“[S]uch use of micro-loans causes millions of South African consumers to find 
themselves trapped in an ever-worsening debt spiral...  [T]he micro-lending industry, 
while it should be alleviating poverty, in fact worsens the decline of borrowers’ living 
standards.”53 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry’s policy framework54 describes credit as “a 
double-edged sword”: 
 
“Whilst credit allows access to products or services that cannot be acquired out of a 
single month’s income, it can also be a dangerous instrument that can lead to high 
levels of debt and indebtedness. 
                                                 
49 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in terms of South African Law and Related Aspects 
(LLM thesis, RAU, 2003) 57. 
50 Black Sash “Submission on Interest Rate Study to the Department of Trade and Industry”, dated  July 
2000 (unpublished) 5. 
51 Black Sash “Submission on Interest Rate Study” 1, 5. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in terms of South African Law and Related Aspects 
56–57. 
54 DTI “Policy Framework” paras 1.8, 1.10. 
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      It is quite easy for credit to lead to financial hardship and destroy a household’s 
wealth.  Taking on extra loans in order to pay back existing loans can lead people into 
a debt spiral out of which it may be difficult to escape.  Over-indebtedness has a 
negative impact on families and has in some extreme cases even led to family 
suicides.  Over-indebtedness further has an impact upon the workplace, can lead to 
de-motivation, absenteeism and even a propensity to commit theft.” 
 
This is indeed a troubling state of affairs in a country with a Constitution55 which 
places a high value on such rights as education and basic socio-economic rights.56 
 
5.5 Consumer ignorance and illiteracy 
 
In paying such high rates of interest, so much of consumers’ income is lost to interest 
that one would think that it would make little logical sense to borrow money upon this 
basis.  Consumers benefit from being able to make a desired purchase with the initial 
proceeds of loans, but in the longer term they are able to purchase much less 
because they are spending so much of their income on interest to service these 
loans.  However, a poor person in a crisis, be it to buy school clothing or to pay for 
medicine or food, will frequently see no alternative but to turn to a micro-lender, 
ignorant of the terrible consequences of doing so.  Interestingly, research has 
repeatedly shown57 that interest rates are not the main concern to the borrower, 
especially in the case of very short-term loans. Rather, the borrower’s main concern 
is getting access to credit and the usefulness of the money for the period that the 
borrower has it.  Put simply, many consumers are not able to see beyond the 
benefits of immediate cash in hand, or do not want to see beyond these benefits.  A 
Credit Law Review research report puts it simply, without attempting to give reasons: 
“The reality is that consumers cannot assess the real cost of credit.”58 
 
Why should this be so?  The Black Sash report referred to in 5.4 above suggests that 
the reason is that, faced with hunger, homelessness or ill health, a desperate 
consumer will have no choice but to take out a high-interest loan, the high cost being 
a small price to pay for the satisfaction of basic needs. 
 
But what of those who are borrowing money for less pressing or less desperate 
reasons?  Ebony Consulting International59 concludes that the base cause of over-
                                                 
55 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
56 Sections 27 and 29 of the Constitution. 
57 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” (iv). 
58 Hofmeyer, Herbstein and Gihwala Inc. “Report for the Credit Law Review” para 6.12 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/forward.htm (accessed 14 March 2006). 
59 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” (vi). 
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indebtedness is (i) aggressive lending and (ii) uninformed or naïve clients.  The latter 
cause appears to be an understatement of a much bigger and more drastic problem: 
ignorance born of extremely high levels of illiteracy and innumeracy in South Africa. 
 
Table G: Literacy and basic education levels of South Africans aged 15 and 
over60 
 
Level of education 
 
1996 general population 
census 
2001 general population 
census 
Full general education 
(Grade 9 and above) 
 
13,1 million (50%) 15,8 million (52%) 
Less than full general 
education  
(less than Grade 9) 
13,2 million (50%) 14,6 million (48%) 
Less than Grade 7 
 
8,5 million (32%) 9,6 million (32%) 
No schooling 
 
4,2 million (16%) 4,7 million (16%) 
 
Thus, in 2001, some 16% of the adult population had no schooling at all, and 32% of 
the adult population had less than a Grade 7 level of education and were therefore 
functionally illiterate.61  During the five-year period to 2001, the percentage of both 
categories of adults remained the same, although the raw numbers increased. 
 
Of particular interest to the Eastern Cape Province is that 22,8% of the population of 
the province aged 20 years and older had no schooling at all in 2001 – fewer only 
than the Limpopo and Mpumalanga Provinces (the national average was 17,9%).62  
The Eastern Cape Province was also the only province whose unschooled population 
showed a percentage increase in the five-year period from 1996 (from 20,9% in 1996 
to 22,8% in 2001).63  In 2001, the Eastern Cape Province was also the province with 
the third-largest number of people aged 20 years or older with no schooling (743 700 
people) and with less than Grade 7-level education (643 921 people).64  Aitchison 
and Harley conclude their survey of the literacy and basic education statistics for 
adults by emphasising the urgent need for literacy and adult basic education 
                                                 
60 John Aitchison and Anne Harley “South African Illiteracy Statistics and the Case of the Magically-
growing Number of Literacy and ABET Learners” (September 2004) 3 
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/cae/caepubs.htm (accessed 18 September 2006).  More recent statistics are not 
available. 
61 People with less than Grade 7 are generally regarded as being functionally illiterate (Aitchison and 
Harley “South African Illiteracy Statistics” 3).  There are no statistics available for innumeracy or 
functional innumeracy, but it follows that one can deduce innumeracy and functional innumeracy levels 
from basic education levels, as is done in the case of illiteracy, since arithmetic (numeracy) skills form 
part of basic education, just as literacy skills do. 
62 Aitchison and Harley “South African Illiteracy Statistics” 6. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Aitchison and Harley “South African Illiteracy Statistics” 7. 
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intervention, and single out the Eastern Cape Province above all other provinces for 
special attention in this regard.65 
 
The dire consequences for borrowers of micro-loans resulting from these low levels 
of literacy and basic education cannot be underestimated.  Illiteracy will have the 
direct result of potential borrowers not being able to read contracts presented to them 
(assuming that they are written in a language that the borrower can understand).  
Should the terms of the contract be read or explained to the borrower, little or no 
basic education will still result in a low level of understanding of the nature of such 
terms.  Most importantly, such borrowers will have little or no arithmetic ability, and 
will not be able to understand the concept of interest: what interest means, how it is 
calculated, and how quickly a debt attracting a large amount of interest will grow.   
 
All of this (poor education, literacy and numeracy levels) invariably adds up to a high 
level of ignorance of the consequences of entering into micro-lending agreements, 
and is very likely to be an important reason why so many consumers ill-advisedly 
borrow money at such high rates of interest.  Until the promulgation of the National 
Credit Regulations in 2006, the Minister of Trade and Industry failed to limit interest 
rates in order to control the negative impact of high rates, and to protect consumers 
who are unable, due to ignorance, to protect themselves. 
 
5.6 Impact on poor communities  
 
5.6.1 The size of the micro-lending industry 
 
For the 12 months ending May 2006, the total rand value of loans disbursed in the 
registered micro-finance sector was R28,7 billion – a R6,7 billion or 30% increase on 
the R22 billion reported for the year ended May 2005.66  Micro-finance Regulatory 
Council research67 shows that micro-loans contribute 36% to micro-loan borrowers’ 
total financial commitments, second only to retail debt, which contributes 38%.  
Micro-lenders are clearly therefore major players in the credit market.   
 
In addition, there is a large unregistered micro-lending sector, the size of which is 
difficult to quantify.68  In their April 2000 research, Ebony Consulting International 
                                                 
65 Aitchison and Harley “South African Illiteracy Statistics” 10. 
66 Micro-finance Regulatory Council “Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter” 
http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=91 (accessed 13 October 2006). 
67 MFRC “Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Indebtedness” (Appendix para 5.2). 
68 These lenders include semi-formal moneylenders lending money as their main livelihood, 
pawnbrokers, and informal moneylenders such as mashonisas (township moneylenders), stokvels and 
burial societies. 
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estimated the total value of loans written per year (registered and unregistered 
sectors) at R23,35 billion, with the registered sector at R15,45 billion and the 
unregistered sector at R7,9 billion.69  Assuming the same estimated proportions (66% 
registered and 34% unregistered), and given the most recent figure for total 
disbursements in the registered sector (R28,7 billion),70 then current disbursements 
in the unregistered sector could well be in the region of R14,8 billion, and total annual 
disbursements in the industry (registered and unregistered) some R43,5 billion. 
 
5.6.2 Growth of the industry 
 
It is not merely the size of the micro-lending industry that is significant, but its growth 
rate.  From its inception in 1992, the industry has shown growth which has been 
steady and at times rapid.  Growth figures in recent years bear this out. 
 
Table H1: Growth of the micro-finance industry71 
Quarter/year 
 
Number of loans 
disbursed 
Total value of loans 
disbursed in the micro-
lending industry (R billion) 
Jun–Aug 2002 2 710 569 2,98 
Sep–Nov 2002 2 941 914 3,39 
Dec 2002–Feb 2003 2 902 390 3,38 
Mar–May 2003 2 914 687 3,26 
The year June 2002 –
May 2003 
11 469 560 R13 billion 
Jun–Aug 2003 2 896 419 3,61 
Sep–Nov 2003 3 108 297 4,35 
Dec 2003–Feb 2004 3 076 596 4,40 
Mar–May 2004 3 264 961 4,41 
The year June 2003 –
May 2004 
12 346 273 R16,7 billion 
Jun–Aug 2004 3 533 402 4,91 
Sep–Nov 2004 3 600 293 5,47 
Dec 2004–Feb 2005 3 589 927 5,81 
Mar–May 2005 3 647 664 5,76 
The year June 2004 –
May 2005 
14 371 286 R21,9 billion 
Jun–Aug 2005 3 794 851 6,29 
Sep–Nov 2005 4 450 720 7,53 
Dec 2005–Feb 2006 4 432 737 7,63 
Mar–May 2006 4 418 186 7,25 
The year June 2005 –
May 2006 
17 096 494 R28,7 billion 
 
Table H2: Annual growth rate of the micro-finance industry72 
 Rand increase in 
disbursements on the 
Percentage increase in 
disbursements on the 
                                                 
69 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 35.  Note that the total value of loans written per year for any period 
reflects a much higher figure than total disbursements for that period. 
70 Micro-finance Regulatory Council “Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter”. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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previous year (R billion) previous year (%) 
The year June 2003 – May 
2004 
R3,7 billion 28,46% 
The year June 2004 – May 
2005 
R5,2 billion 31,13% 
The year June 2005 – May 
2006 
R6,75 billion 30,8% 
 
In the three years between June 2003 and May 2006, industry disbursements more 
than doubled in amount (from R13 billion to R28,7 billion), and the industry grew by 
an average of over 30% per year.  In the six years since 2000 when disbursements 
were R5,3 billion,73 total disbursements increased more than five-fold.  Nearly every 
quarter since 2002 has shown an increase in both the number of loans disbursed and 
the total value of loans disbursed.   
 
Table J: Size of industry by type of lending entity74 
 Number of 
registered 
lenders 
Number of 
branches 
Percentage of 
total 
disbursements 
in the industry 
Percentage of 
total number of 
loans disbursed 
in the industry 
Banks 
 
8 3 439 41% 26,07% 
Public 
companies 
5 16 0,3% 
 
0,83% 
Private 
companies 
290 3 763 40% 33,56% 
Close 
corporations 
1 927 2 865 16% 35,74% 
Trusts 
 
17 138 1% 2,68% 
Co-operatives 
 
27 47 1% 0,48% 
S21 companies 
 
19 51 1% 0,64% 
Industry totals 
 
2 346 10 319 100% 100% 
 
There are now 2 346 lenders operating from 10 319 branch offices.  The vast 
majority of lenders are close corporations, although it is the banks and private 
companies that together account for 81% of the total disbursements in the industry. 
 
The spectacular growth of the industry is directly attributable to its exemption from 
the Usury Act, fuelled by the fact that “lenders could now make limitless profit”, 
because the industry was “free from almost all of the constraints of the Usury Act and 
unbounded by any finance charge limit at all!”75  
 
                                                 
73 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 25. 
74 Micro-finance Regulatory Council “Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter”. 
75 Yacoob J in AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Micro-finance Regulatory Council and the Department 
of Trade and Industry para 9 and 10. 
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5.6.3 Borrowers’ income profiles and levels of indebtedness 
 
According to Micro-finance Regulatory Council research, the majority of borrowers of 
micro-loans are from lower-income groups, with 63% of borrowers earning less than 
R4 000 per month.76  This finding is confirmed in the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s description of “two credit markets” in South Africa:77 one market for low-
income consumers (about 67% of the population) with limited access to credit at high 
cost, and the other market for middle- and high-income consumers (about 15% of the 
population) with easy access to credit at low cost.  There is therefore no doubt that 
the vast majority of borrowers of micro-loans are from poorer communities. 
 
A further disturbing trend is that levels of indebtedness are increasing, and the 
greatest increases occurred in the poorest households, in particular in the R5 000 to 
R25 000 annual income range, with record increases in excess of 200% in most 
cases (see the right-hand column of Table K below).78   
 
Table K: Change in numbers of indebted households by income group79 
Annual 
income 
category 
(R1K = 
R1000) 
No. of 
indebted 
households 
in 1995 
Percentage of 
indebted 
households in 
1995 
No. of indebted 
households in 
2000 
Percentage 
of indebted 
households 
in 2000 
Percentage 
change in 
percentage of 
indebted 
households 
(1995 to 2000) 
<R5K 
 
56 344 7 271 151 12 62% 
R5K–R10K 
 
105 555 6  449 949 18 216% 
R10K–R15K 
 
99 289 8 355 520 26 236% 
R15K–R20K 
 
90 706 10 261 743 31 198% 
R20K–R25K 
 
75 398 12 226 563 37 208% 
R25K–R30K 
 
71 268 16 157 106 37 134% 
R30K–R40K 
 
122 912 18 242 899 41 128% 
 
Between 1995 and 2000, total debt (especially consumption debt) increased 
markedly in the lowest-income categories, whilst total debt actually decreased in 
most other income categories, as demonstrated in Table L below.80 
                                                 
76 MFRC “Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Indebtedness” (Appendix para 5.1). 
77 DTI “Policy framework” paras 2.1–2.6.  See 5.1 above for more discussion in this regard. 
78 Statistics South Africa’s Income and Expenditure Surveys for 1995 and 2000, recorded in a report by 
the Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 1995 and 2000”, 
prepared for the Micro-finance Regulatory Council, dated June 2003 (unreported).  More recent 
statistics are not available. 
79 Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 1995 and 2000” 6. 
80 Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 1995 and 2000” 5 –9. 
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Table L: Total debt and consumption debt by income category 
 
Annual income 
(R1K = R1 000) 
Total debt in 
1995 
Total debt in 
2000 
Consumption 
debt in 1995 
Consumption 
debt in 2000 
<R5K 
 
8% 38% 4% 14% 
R5K–R10K 
 
9% 15% 5% 10% 
R10K–R15K 
 
13% 17% 8% 11% 
R15K–R20K 
 
26% 16% 9% 10% 
R20K–R25K 
 
43% 20% 12% 9% 
R25K–R30K 
 
38% 39% 11% 10% 
R30K–R40K 
 
31% 37% 12% 9% 
 
 
In the lowest-income category (households earning less than R5 000 per year), total 
debt increased nearly five-fold in the five years between 1995 and 2000 (from 8% to 
38%), while consumption debt more than trebled (from 4% to 14%).  There were 
increases in the next two income categories (R5 000 to R15 000 per year), but these 
were less pronounced.  Perhaps the most alarming available statistic in regard to 
indebtedness is that the poorest households carry the heaviest debt servicing 
burden:  60,2% of regular disposable income of households in the poorest income 
category (less than R5 000 per year) was used to service debt in 2000.81 
 
Furthermore, given that a large percentage of consumers of micro-loans service 
these loans from the proceeds of social grants,82 it follows that large amounts of such 
proceeds per year are paid to micro-lenders in the form of interest on micro-loans, 
and are thereby lost to the social security system.  Many other vulnerable groups 
besides those receiving old-age pensions and disability grants are particularly 
susceptible to the negative impact of high interest rates.  In particular, HIV/AIDS is 
expected to increase household indebtedness in South Africa with increased 
borrowing through the AIDS cycle, since people living with HIV/AIDS have greater 
economic needs in the form of access to medicine, doctors, nutritional food and safe 
places to live.83  The Micro-finance Regulatory Council believed this to be an area of 
                                                 
81 Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 1995 and 2000” 7–8. 
82 In particular: old-age pensions and disability grants, currently both at R820 per month.   According to 
Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in South Africa” para 7.2, debtors with 
fixed incomes (e.g. salaries or social grants) provide a more viable and lower-risk market for lenders, 
who are able to recover monthly repayments through direct deductions from salaries or bank debit 
orders. 
83 ECI Africa “Industry strategy to address HIV/AIDS – a strategy document submitted to the MFRC 
(June 2005)” http://www.mfrc.co.za/files/mfrc_hiv_aids_report_final.pdf (accessed 18 March 2006). 
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particular concern, and commissioned research specific to micro-lending and 
HIV/AIDS.84  The financial burden resulting from the illness, unemployment, and 
deaths of those infected with HIV/AIDS will lead to an increased likelihood that they 
will borrow money and an increased risk that they will become over-indebted.85  
HIV/AIDS-affected households will have to contend not only with the disease, but 
with the economic and financial impact of the illness.86  People living with HIV/AIDS 
are thus extremely vulnerable to the negative impact of high interest rates charged by 
micro lenders, and this group of vulnerable people is likely to grow significantly as a 
result of the HIV/AIDS crisis.   
 
5.6.4 Summary of findings 
 
The negative impact of high interest rates on poor communities is best illustrated by 
analysing the figures in 5.6.1 above.  As indicated, the total rand value of loans 
disbursed in the registered micro-finance sector was R28,7 billion for the 12 months 
ended May 2006, and total annual disbursements in the registered and unregistered 
sectors are likely to be well in excess of R40 billion.  These figures of course 
represent only the capital amount of the loans disbursed, and not the interest that 
accrues on these loans.  Such interest will become due every month for between one 
and 36 months after each loan is disbursed (depending on the duration of the loan) 
and will be paid when due, or will be paid months or sometimes even years later if 
the borrower falls into arrears with payments.  The cost of the initial loan is therefore 
often borne (and the impact felt) for years after the initial transaction.   
 
There are no available statistics in regard to interest that accrues on loans in the 
industry, but there can be no doubt that such interest is considerable.  Interest will 
usually far exceed the amount of the initial loan, except in the case of 30-day and 
other very short-term loans.87  According to the figures in Table B above, in the case 
of term loans, with interest at 30% per month, the total amount of interest due on 
loans repayable over 12 months will be nearly three times the initial loan amount.88  
The total amount of interest due on loans repayable over 36 months will be nearly 10 
times the initial loan amount.89 
 
                                                 
84 ECI Africa “Industry strategy to address HIV/AIDS – a strategy document submitted to the MFRC 
(June 2005)”. 
85 ECI Africa “Industry strategy to address HIV/AIDS – a strategy document submitted to the MFRC 
(June 2005)” 5–7, especially Figure 2. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Examples 1 and 2 of Table B, columns A and F. 
88 See Examples 4, 5 and 11 of Table B, columns A and F. 
89 See Examples 7 and 9 of Table B, columns A and F. 
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It therefore follows that every year tens of billions of rands in the form of interest on 
micro-loans is being drained out of the hands of poor communities into the hands of 
micro-lending enterprises, whose wealth is being enhanced directly at the expense of 
these communities.  This money is not being recycled back into poor communities, 
but rather is lost to them.  High interest rates on micro-loans have therefore resulted 
directly in the exacerbation of poverty in South Africa, and the money lost to poorer 
communities is increasing as levels of indebtedness of the lowest-income groups 
increase.90  It is highly unlikely that this could have been understood or intended by 
Government when micro-loans were first exempted from interest rate limits, since 
Government repeatedly claims that poverty alleviation is a high priority.  
 
5.7 Common law illegality of high interest-bearing loans 
 
Although the exemption of micro-loans from the Usury Act provides no limit on the 
rates of interest that may be charged by registered micro-lenders that comply in 
every respect with the conditions of the exemption and therefore trade lawfully,91 
excessive interest levels permitted by the exemption that are charged by such micro-
lenders may still be challenged on the basis of the common law.92  The residual 
common law is still applicable, in view of the presumption that a statute alters the 
common law as little as possible, and the courts will interpret an act as ousting the 
common law only if this appears clearly from the intention of the legislature.93  There 
is nothing in the statutory history in regard to usury that indicates such an intention; 
rather, the converse is the case.94  Such court action would be possible only on a 
case-by-case basis; it could not attack the regulatory framework, and it could 
therefore not provide the basis for a class action. 
 
Three such grounds for challenging high interest rates exist, namely: the application 
of the in duplum rule; a finding that interest rate provisions are contrary to public 
policy; and a contravention of common law usury law.  These three potential bases 
for a court challenge have already been discussed at length in Chapters Two and 
Three above, and will therefore be outlined very briefly here in relation to micro-
lending. 
 
                                                 
90 See the percentage increases in Tables K and L above. 
91 The 1999 Exemption Notice referred to in 4.2.2 above did provide for a maximum interest rate, which 
was subsequently reviewed and set aside in the Lurama decision. 
92 These arguments are most relevant to current unlimited interest rates, but may still be relevant in 
respect of the new limits on the cost of credit in the National Credit Regulations, which will come into 
force on 1 June 2007 and which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
93 Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 177–178. 
94 See the Usury Act 37 of 1926 and the Usury Act 73 of 1968, discussed in 3.2.2 above. 
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5.7.1 The in duplum rule95 
 
The common law in duplum rule provides that interest stops running on a debt when 
the unpaid interest equals the outstanding capital.96  Section 103(5) of the National 
Credit Act,97 which will come into force on 1 June 2007,98 has effectively codified the 
in duplum rule.  Table B (read with Appendix A) above best illustrates the potential 
relevance of the in duplum rule.  In Item 7 of Table B,99 for example, if the borrower, 
as a result of unforeseen circumstances, is able from commencement of repayments 
to pay instalments of only R350 per month rather than the required R492,31 per 
month, s/he will after 12 months be in arrears with interest payments in the total 
amount of R1 707,72.100  This amount exceeds the outstanding capital101 of R1 
638,102 and interest will stop running after less than 12 months has passed, when 
outstanding interest amounts to R1 638.  When unpaid interest is less than the 
capital outstanding, interest will commence to run again.  Given the speed with which 
unpaid interest can accumulate (resulting from high interest rates), and subsequent 
likely default by borrowers, the in duplum rule is therefore a highly relevant 
mechanism for limiting the cost of credit. 
 
5.7.2 Interest provisions contrary to public policy 
 
The in duplum rule is cold comfort for a borrower who is charged 30% interest per 
month and who diligently pays each instalment due, or whose arrears interest never 
reaches the amount of the initial loan.  Agreements which are “clearly inimical to the 
interests of the community, whether they are contrary to law or morality, or run 
counter to social and economic expedience, will ..., on the grounds of public policy, 
not be enforced.”103  Public policy is now informed by constitutional values:104 
 
“It is not difficult to envisage situations in which contracts that offend these 
fundamentals of our new social compact will be struck down as offensive to public 
                                                 
95 For a thorough explanation of the in duplum rule, see 3.3 above. 
96 See, for example, Standard Bank of South Africa v Oneanate Investments (in liquidation) 1998 (1) SA 
811 (SCA) 827H.   
97 Act 34 of 2005. 
98 Commencement of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, 
Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006. 
99 A loan of R1 638, repayable over 24 months in equal instalments of R492,31 each. 
100 Monthly shortfall of R142,31 x 12 months = R1 707,72. 
101 Or “unpaid balance of the principal debt”, per s103(5) of the National Credit Act. 
102 The outstanding capital is the same as the initial loan amount, since monthly payments accrue first to 
interest and then only to capital, and the monthly interest due is always greater than R350 in the first 12 
months. 
103 Smalberger JA in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 8C–D.  For a fuller discussion of the 
principle of public policy, see 2.3 above. 
104 Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 34H–35B.  See also Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 
(4) SA 1 (SCA) 7A–B. 
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policy. They will be struck down because the Constitution requires it, and the values it 
enshrines will guide the courts in doing so.” 
 
The development of a thorough argument in support of the contention that micro-
lending contracts that attract interest rates of 360% per annum are contrary to public 
policy is beyond the ambit of this study, and in any event the specific circumstances 
of the particular case before the court would of course have to be carefully 
considered.  Such an argument would have to be considered within the context of 
small loans, small incomes and the purpose of the industry made possible by the 
Usury Act exemption, namely to provide credit for lower-income groups who do not 
qualify for credit from the banking sector.  It would also most certainly draw on much 
of the evidence of the negative socio-economic impact of high interest loans that is 
set out in this chapter.   
 
The court would have to consider questions such as the following: can public policy 
countenance the fact that the majority of South Africa’s population who find 
themselves in the lowest-income groups must pay 18 times as much as higher-
income groups for credit, even within the context of the difficulties that lenders 
experience with recovery of payments due on micro-loans?105  Or that after payment 
of a monthly instalment, a pensioner will have only 26% of her pension left to cover 
all other necessary living expenses?106  Or that a borrower may end up paying nearly 
11 times the initial loan amount?107  Or that the loan repayments after three months 
and three consecutive 30-day loans exceed the initial loan amount?108 
 
It would seem not, especially if the loan was disbursed for consumption purposes (as 
are 43% of all micro-loans)109 and the borrower is already considered vulnerable prior 
to taking out the loan, because she spends more than 60% of her income on food, 
beverages, clothing and housing.110  The view that an interest rate of 360% per 
annum offends against public policy and the public interest is strengthened by the 
scale of the industry111 and the fact that so many people are affected by such 
exorbitant interest rates.112  Circumstances particular to the borrower and the lender 
will also likely be relevant, such as illiteracy and any other significant disadvantage or 
disability, for example if the borrower is HIV-positive and has to pay large medical 
                                                 
105 See 5.1 above. 
106 See Note (a) to Table B above. 
107 See Note (e) to Table B above. 
108 See example 2 in Table C above. 
109 See Table F above. 
110 Ebony “Analysis on the Application of Borrowed Funds” 14. 
111 See 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 above. 
112 According to paragraphs 2.1–2.6 of DTI “Policy Framework”, 67% of South Africa’s population are 
paying very high interest rates. 
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expenses on an ongoing basis.  The court will have to carefully weigh up and assess 
all these and other factors and circumstances peculiar to the case before it. 
 
5.7.3 Common law usury law113 
 
In terms of common law usury law, the onus is on the debtor seeking to have an 
interest rate declared usurious to prove that the interest rate amounts to “extortion 
and oppression akin to fraud”.114  To achieve this, evidence as to the ordinary rate 
prevalent in similar transactions, the size of the loan, the period of the loan, the 
purpose of the loan, the relative positions of the parties, the security and the risk, will 
all be relevant.115  Many of these factors are also relevant to a possible contravention 
of public policy, referred to above.  Equally, many other factors not listed by the 
courts in regard to usurious loans that are relevant to a possible contravention of 
public policy may also be relevant to the question of whether or not the interest rate 
is usurious.116  A contract declared to be usurious will not be set aside, but a court 
may declare such a contract partially enforceable, to the extent that the interest is not 
usurious.117   
 
A debtor seeking to have an interest provision declared invalid could plead that the 
rate of interest is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable, and go on to 
plead in the alternative that such rate is usurious, in that it amounts to “extortion and 
oppression akin to fraud”.  It is also possible that the extortionate and oppressive 
(and therefore usurious) rate of interest could be pleaded as one of many other 
factors which render an interest provision contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable. 
 
5.8 The unregistered sector and the legacy of no interest 
rate limits 
 
Prior to the exemption of micro-lenders from the Usury Act in 1992, there was 
already a significant “cash loans industry” which operated unlawfully and with no 
                                                 
113 For a fuller discussion of common law usury law, see 3.1 above. 
114 Dyason v Ruthven 311–312; Reuter v Yates 858; SA Securities Ltd v Greyling 356. 
115 Reuter v Yates 858.  Grové (Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 140ff) lists the 
following additional factors or circumstances that may be relevant: how quickly the borrower wants the 
funds; whether a deposit or security is required; whether the debt is repayable in instalments; hidden 
finance costs; the possibility of early repayment; remedies on breach; whether financing is available in 
general for similar cases. 
116 There is no numerus clausus of possible relevant circumstances to be taken into account in deciding 
whether or not a transaction is usurious (Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 
140ff).  
117 Grové Gemeenregtelike en Statutere Beheer oor Woekerrente 138; Magna Alloys and Research 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A); LAWSA para 52. 
 96
regulation, and which charged high interest rates in contravention of the Usury Act, 
and to which millions of borrowers turned for credit.118   The emergence of this 
informal industry was one of the main reasons for the exemption of micro-loans and 
the birth of a legitimate micro-finance industry.  After 1992, this informal sector 
continued to flourish, and many micro-lenders in this sector chose not to register with 
the Micro-finance Regulatory Council after its establishment in 1999.119  These 
unregistered micro-lenders continued to operate informally and unlawfully,120 
charging interest rates comparable with or in excess of those charged by the 
registered sector, and still do so today.  Since they did not register with the Micro-
finance Regulatory Council (or latterly with the National Credit Regulator),121 they are 
not exempt from the Usury Act, which provides that any contravention of the Act is an 
offence.122  However, they do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Micro-finance 
Regulatory Council, which in any event has its work cut out controlling the registered 
micro-lending sector.  They are therefore able to trade unlawfully in an uncontrolled 
environment, with little policing of their actions.  The size of this unregistered sector, 
although difficult to quantify, is significant, estimated by Ebony Consulting 
International in 2000 to be more than one half the size of the registered sector.123 
 
With the capping of interest rates by the National Credit Regulations, with effect from 
1 June 2007,124 it will be even less attractive for lenders in this informal sector to 
register with the National Credit Regulator,125 and there seems to be little doubt that 
these informal lenders will continue to trade unlawfully.  However, the problem of the 
unregistered sector could become much bigger.  It seems to be very likely that many 
lenders that have been registered with the Micro-finance Regulatory Council will 
choose not to register with the National Credit Regulator, but rather to join the 
informal sector and continue to lend at the rates to which they have been 
accustomed for the past 14 years or more, which will in future be unlawful.  Any 
lender not thus registered will be contravening the National Credit Act,126 and a court 
will be able to declare a loan from an unregistered micro-lender to be unlawful and 
therefore void, order the micro-lender to refund all instalments paid, and cancel the 
lender’s rights to claim back the amount loaned, or declare such amount forfeited to 
                                                 
118 Kern The Regulation of the Micro-lending Industry in Terms of South African Law and Related 
Aspects 13–14. 
119 Government Notice 713 of 1 June 1999. 
120 A common practice of many unregistered micro-lenders, amongst others, is to retain the borrower’s 
identity document or bank card as security for the loan (Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study”28). 
121 Established by s12 of the National Credit Act. 
122 Section 17.  Failure to comply with interest rate limits prescribed by the Act will constitute an offence. 
123 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 35. 
124 Commencement of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, 
Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006. 
125 In the current situation of no capping of interest rates, it would seem that informal lenders choose not 
to register with the Micro-finance Regulatory Council so as not to be constrained by their administrative 
requirements. 
126 Section 89 of the National Credit Act. 
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the State.127  The latter remedy is new and likely to weaken the position of 
unregistered lenders, but it remains to be seen whether or not this will effectively 
deter micro-lenders from lending without being registered.  Very importantly, a micro-
lender who practices as such without registering will not commit an offence in terms 
of the National Credit Act, whereas the Usury Act provided that any person who 
contravenes any provision of the Act commits an offence.128 
 
Why should such a lender choose not to register?  In terms of the new credit limits in 
the National Credit Regulations, all loans larger than R500 will be cheaper than the 
current typical 30% per month.129  Most micro-lenders will therefore be able to earn 
much less than they are currently able to earn with interest rates at 30% per month.   
 
In the Lurama case,130 it was contended by the applicants that most micro-lenders 
would not be able to continue to do business profitably should they be restricted to 
charging interest at approximately 13,75% per month.131  The financial statements of 
47 members of the Association of Micro-lenders (one of the Applicants in the matter) 
were investigated by an auditor, who concluded that at 13,75% per month, only 19% 
of these micro-lenders were likely to survive in business, and the remaining 81% 
would have to shut down.132 
 
When one considers the rate of growth of the industry in the last three years, being 
over 30% per year,133 the success of which has been founded upon the high profit 
margin made possible by high interest rates, it appears to be unlikely that the new 
Regulations will be successful in enforcing the new interest rate limits and thereby 
stemming this tide of growth.  Further, since levels of indebtedness in lower-income 
groups are steadily increasing,134 it seems clear that the high demand for credit from 
poor communities will prevail, ensuring the continued growth of the industry. 
 
                                                 
127 Section 89(5).  For a fuller discussion in this regard, see 6.2.6 below. 
128 Section 17. 
129 The cost of credit on all loans will decrease the larger the loan: a loan of R500 will cost a maximum 
of 31% per month (Chapter Six, Table P, Example 2 below), and a loan of R10 000 will cost about 4% 
per month (Chapter Six, Table Q, Example 6 below).  Most loans of less than R500 will be more 
expensive than the current typical 30% per month. 
130 Lurama Vyftien (Pty) Ltd and 49 Others v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another (Case No. 
22125 of 1999) and The Association of Micro-lenders v The Minister of Trade and Industry and Another 
(Case No. 23453 of 1999) (unreported TPD). 
131 13,75% per month was the maximum permissible rate in terms of paragraph 3.3 of Annexure A to the 
Schedule to the 1999 Exemption Notice at that time, since it was linked to the banks’ prime overdraft 
lending rate.  Paragraph 3.3 was subsequently reviewed and set aside in this case for the reason that 
the Applicants had a right to be heard before the 1999 Exemption Notice was published, and the 
Applicants were not properly heard. 
132 Lurama 34. 
133 Based upon annual growth of 28,46%, 31,13% and 30,8% in the last three years (see Table H 
above). 
134 See Tables K and L above. 
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Should this segment of the currently registered sector be “driven underground” by 
failing to register with the National Credit Regulator and continuing to trade unlawfully 
and in contravention of the new interest rate caps, this development will be 
attributable at least in part135 to the legacy of the last 14 years: namely, the failure of 
the relevant Minister to limit interest rates when micro-loans were first exempted from 
the Usury Act in 1992.136  The financial success of the industry has been built upon 
the firm foundation of the income to be earned from high interest rates, the benefits 
of which currently registered lenders are unlikely to be willing to forego.  The 
temptation to join the ranks of the unregistered sector, which has by all accounts 
been trading profitably alongside the registered sector for so long, will be very strong 
indeed.  The net result might well be that the unregistered sector, lending at 
customary exorbitant rates, will grow significantly at the expense of the registered 
sector, and borrowers will suffer the consequences.   
 
In short: the failure to cap interest rates since 1992137 is likely to have the direct result 
in the era of the National Credit Regulations of a much bigger unregistered sector, 
charging customary exorbitant interest rates, relative to the registered sector.  This 
would not have been the case had interest rates been limited effectively from the 
outset in 1992, or even later.  Registered micro-lenders would at that stage have had 
to adjust their expectations of profits to realistic levels dictated by the interest rate 
limits, without the free reign given to them by the failure to limit interest rates. 
 
For these reasons, the legacy of the 14 years of no interest limits is likely to live on, 
and borrowers from mostly poorer communities will have to carry the cost.  The 
negative socio-economic impact of legitimate, excessive interest rates charged 
during the 14 years from 1992 until 31 May 2007, the subject of this chapter, will 
likely still be felt to a significant degree after the National Credit Regulations become 
law on 1 June 2007, which result will be due in part to the failure to limit interest rates 
since 1992.  
                                                 
135 Such a development will, of course, also be attributable to the advent of limits on the cost of credit in 
the National Credit Regulations.  This negative consequence of the capping of interest rates will be 
discussed in Chapter Six below. 
136 Besides, of course, the attempt of the 1999 Exemption Notice to limit the interest rate, which survived 
less than six months before such limit was set aside in the Lurama case. 
137 Notwithstanding the attempt to do so in 1999. 
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Chapter Six 
 
An Analysis of the National Credit Act and 
Regulations 
 
“To promote a fair and non-discriminatory marketplace for access to consumer credit 
and for that purpose to provide for the general regulation of consumer credit...” 
“[T]o prohibit certain unfair credit and credit marketing practices...”1 
 
Outline 
 
The National Credit Act2 has introduced a new era of consumer credit regulation and 
practice, bringing about wholesale changes to the consumer credit industry.  This 
chapter will commence with a brief overview of the provisions of the Act that do not 
relate to the cost of credit, with particular reference to certain consumer protection 
measures that are of greater relevance to this study.   
 
The bulk of the chapter will focus squarely on the cost of credit provisions: the 
legislative framework for the cost of credit, the prescribed limits on the cost of credit, 
and a thorough analysis of the new cost of credit.  The full implications of the 
maximum prescribed interest rates, initiation fee and service fee will be separately 
considered.  The combined impact of these credit costs will then be demonstrated 
and comprehensively analysed, and their socio-economic impact reviewed.  
Suggested amendments to the National Credit Regulations3 will then be proposed, 
together with a suggested approach to setting appropriate levels for interest rates 
relative to other fees, viewed within the context of the total cost of credit as a whole, 
with reference to an example.  Finally, the likely growth of the unregistered sector 
resulting from the credit cost limits and administrative burdens of the Act will be 
briefly explained. 
 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion of potential legal challenges to the high 
cost of credit on smaller loans, including the possible review of certain provisions of 
the Regulations. 
                                                 
1 Extract from the preamble to the National Credit Act. 
2 Act 34 of 2005.  
3 National Credit Act (34/2005): Regulations, R489 Government Gazette 28864, 31 May 2006. 
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6.1 A brief overview of the National Credit Act 
 
The National Credit Act is an extremely complex and lengthy piece of legislation 
which seeks to include within its ambit and to regulate in a concise manner all 
conceivable sectors of the consumer credit market.  A review of the entire Act is of 
course way beyond the scope of this study.  Rather, a brief overview of the Act is 
given in order to situate the cost of credit provisions within the context of the Act as a 
whole, with particular reference to certain consumer protection provisions which are 
of relevance to this study. 
 
6.1.1 Background to the Act 
 
The August 2004 policy framework of the Department of Trade and Industry4 was the 
culmination of extensive research conducted since 2002 as part of the credit law 
review process, and was the policy document that directly informed the substance of 
the National Credit Act.  The document re-iterated the critical role of credit in the 
economy:5 
 
“Credit enables people to have use of a product or service, at a cost represented by 
an interest rate, prior to their having paid for that product or service or, where an item 
cannot be afforded from a single month’s salary, to spread payments over a number 
of months.” 
 
In succinctly describing credit as a “double-edged sword”,6 however, this document 
highlights the “considerable imbalance of power between consumers and credit 
providers”,7 attributing this to poor consumer education levels and knowledge of 
consumer rights and inability to enforce such rights through negotiation or legal 
action.8  Because of its complex nature: 
 
“[C]redit cannot therefore be seen as a universal basic service to which access 
should be extended in the same way as access to water, healthcare and electricity.  
There is a greater need to balance access to credit with protection for consumers, 
especially the vulnerable.”9 
                                                 
4 DTI “Policy Framework”. 
5 Para 1.6. 
6 Para 1.8.  See also 5.4 above. 
7 Para 1.9. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Para 1.12. 
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At the inauguration of the National Credit Regulator on 30 August 2006, the Minister 
of Trade and Industry, Mr Mandisi Mpahlwa, said:10 
 
“[T]he National Credit Act regulatory framework is designed to unlock the economic 
potential of all South African consumers by increasing access to credit, while 
recognising the dangers associated with over-indebtedness and the injudicious use of 
credit.  The new framework therefore aims to support the development of a consumer 
credit market that would be of benefit to all consumers, whilst simultaneously 
providing protection against over-indebtedness and assisting consumers who over-
extend themselves.” 
 
Credit policy must also balance consumer protection measures with the regulatory 
burden it imposes on credit providers.11  For these reasons, the policy framework 
concludes, there is a need for a more detailed and sometimes highly prescriptive 
legislative and regulatory approach to consumer credit than is necessary in the 
regulation of other sections of the financial market.12 
 
The result of these objectives is succinctly summarised by Professor Otto:13 
 
“It is a well-known fact that many poor South Africans have been enticed in recent 
years to enter into credit agreements that they could ill afford.  The Act goes a long 
way to curb this.  This is not done without creating administrative burdens for 
creditors.  Consumer protection comes at a price, and the National Credit Act is no 
exception.  One can expect it to be a rather expensive exercise for credit providers 
and the State’s coffers alike.  Only time will tell: ‘was die kool die sous werd?’ ”14 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 “New era for South African credit consumers” http://www.ncr.org.za/press_release/New%20era.pdf 
(accessed 9 November 2006). 
11 Para 1.15.  The document acknowledges that excessively onerous and costly compliance 
requirements will increase the cost and risk for credit providers, and ultimately lead to higher cost of 
credit for consumers and lower returns for providers. 
12 Para 1.11. 
13 Otto The National Credit Act Explained (2006) 6. 
14 Jooste “That NNCA – who is going to pay for it?” (2006) 6 Without Prejudice 21 demonstrates the 
excessive cost of the implementation of the Act to be borne by both Government and credit providers. 
Sishuba “Consumer Credit Bill” (2006) Leadership 33 at 35 points out that the effects of the cost burden 
levied on credit providers could be passed on to the consumer. 
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6.1.2 Purpose of the Act         
 
The purpose of the National Credit Act is contained in section 3, the full text of which 
is quoted below.  Some brief discussion regarding certain aspects of the Act which 
are related but not directly relevant to this study is contained in the footnotes to 
section 3. 
 
“Purpose of Act 
 
    3. The purposes of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans, promote a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, 
effective and accessible credit market and industry, and to protect consumers, by – 
(a) promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South 
Africans and in particular to those who have historically been unable to access 
credit under sustainable market conditions; 
(b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit 
providers;15 
(c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by – 
(i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness and 
fulfillment of financial obligations by consumers; and 
(ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by credit providers and contractual 
default by consumers;16 
(d) promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers;17 
(e) addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers 
and credit providers by – 
 (i) providing consumers with education about credit and consumer rights;18 
                                                 
15 One of the overriding objectives of the Act is to provide a single law that treats all credit transactions 
and credit providers “equivalently” (DTI “Policy Framework” para 4.7–4.8).  The Act, when fully 
operative, will repeal the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, and will have 
a far wider field of application than its predecessors.  It will apply to all credit, with no limit on the amount 
of credit involved, unlike its predecessors. 
16 Over-indebtedness and reckless credit are discussed in 6.1.4 below. 
17 Numerous rights of consumers are emphasised in the Act (with corresponding duties on the part of 
credit providers according to law), but very few rights of credit providers appear in the Act.  The Act has 
been criticised for its pre-occupation with consumer rights at the expense of the rights of credit 
providers.  Consumer rights include: the right to apply for credit (s60); protection against discrimination 
in respect of credit (s61); the right to reasons for credit being refused (s62); the right to information in 
official language (s63); the right to information in plain and understandable language (s64); the right to 
receive documents (s65); protection of consumer credit rights (s66).  Other rights include: rights 
regarding information held by credit bureaux (ss70–72); protection against certain marketing practices 
(ss74–76); the right to confidentiality and privacy (s68); the right to early settlement (s125) and pre-
payments (s126). 
18 The National Credit Regulator is responsible for implementing education and information measures to 
develop public awareness of the provisions of the Act [s16(1)(a)]. 
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(ii) providing consumers with adequate disclosure19 of standardised information20 
in order to make informed choices;21 and 
(iii) providing consumers with protection from deception, and from unfair or 
fraudulent conduct by credit providers22 and credit bureaux; 
(f) improving consumer credit information and reporting and regulation of credit 
bureaux;23 
(g) addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing 
mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of 
satisfaction by the consumer of all responsible financial obligations;24 
(h) providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of 
disputes arising from credit agreements; and 
(i) providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, 
enforcement and judgment which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all 
responsible consumer obligations under credit agreements.” 
 
The Act therefore has the ambitious and extremely difficult objective of promoting a 
competitive, efficient and effective credit industry and market which is at the same 
time fair, transparent, responsible and accessible.  The overriding theme of the Act is 
consumer protection, evident in many of the nine objectives making up the remainder 
of section 3.  There is no direct reference in section 3 to the intention to place limits 
on the cost of credit, although this is one of the most important practical results of the 
Act in regard to consumer protection.  Indirect references to this objective can be 
found in paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (g) of section 3, but the specific measures 
regarding the cost of credit are introduced elsewhere in the Act and the Regulations. 
                                                 
19 Section 92(1) provides that a credit provider must give to a consumer a pre-agreement statement and 
quotation in the prescribed form prior to entering into a “small” credit agreement, namely a credit 
agreement of no more than R15 000 [s9 as read with National Credit Act (34/2005): Determination of 
Thresholds, GN713, 2006, Government Gazette 28893, 1 June 2006].  The quotation is binding upon 
the credit grantor for five business days, being in the nature of an option created by statute with the 
prospective consumer as the option holder. (Otto The National Credit Act Explained 40). 
20 Section 93(1) provides that a credit provider must deliver to a consumer, without charge, a copy of a 
document that records their credit agreement which, in the case of a small credit agreement, must be in 
the prescribed form.  Notably, the Act does not provide that a credit agreement not reduced to writing 
will be void, neither is this an offence – this appears to be an omission in the Act. 
21 The DTI “Policy Framework”, Chapter 5, identified the need to help consumers to make informed 
choices: “Due to weak disclosure of the full cost of credit and the financial complexities of some 
products, it is difficult for consumers to understand the risks and make informed choices.  Standard 
information in a simple, comparable form is essential if consumers are to make informed choices.” 
22 Section 90(2)(a) provides that a provision of a credit agreement is unlawful if its general purpose or 
effect is to, inter alia, deceive the consumer or subject the consumer to fraudulent conduct. 
23 Part B of Chapter 4 of the Act contains detailed provisions in regard to the management of consumer 
credit information via a national register of credit agreements and the regulation of credit bureaux.  
Importantly, s73 empowers the Minister to prescribe requirements for the verification, review and 
removal of consumer credit information by registered credit bureaux.  The Minister did so by way of 
Draft National Credit Regulations, GN1388, 2006 Government Gazette 29246, 21 September 2006, for 
public comment by 27 October 2006, and the final prescribed requirements are currently awaited.  The 
detailed and exacting management and control of consumer credit information is an example of the 
exhaustive regulation of the industry in the name of consumer protection. 
24 Over-indebtedness is discussed in 6.1.4 below. 
  
 
104
6.1.3 New consumer credit institutions 
 
Much of the responsibility for implementing the purposes of the Act lies with the 
National Credit Regulator, established by section 12 of the Act on 1 June 2006 to 
oversee the entire consumer credit industry, including all the functions and 
responsibilities of the former Micro-finance Regulatory Council in the micro-lending 
context.  The National Credit Regulator is an independent juristic person25 governed 
by a Board,26 with a Chief Executive Officer27 who may appoint inspectors and 
investigators.28  The Regulator has an enormous number of responsibilities set out in 
great detail in sections 13 to 18 of the Act, and it remains to be seen whether or not it 
will have the necessary capacity to perform all these functions.29 
 
The National Consumer Tribunal was established by the Act on 1 September 2006.30  
It is a juristic person with jurisdiction throughout South Africa, comprising a 
chairperson and at least 10 other members.31  It is a tribunal of record32 which 
conducts its proceedings in public in an informal, inquisitorial manner, applying 
principles of natural justice,33 with the function of adjudicating on any matter brought 
before it in terms of the Act.34  The Act provides rules of practice, procedure, 
evidence and a list of possible orders in relation to the Tribunal.35   
 
Consumer debt is enforced by the courts, but only after the consumer has been 
notified of his default, advised to seek advice and a certain period has elapsed.36  
Other disputes may be settled by initiating a complaint to the National Credit 
                                                 
25 Section 12(1)(b). 
26 Section 19. 
27 Section 23. 
28 Section 25. 
29 These responsibilities include: the promotion and development of an accessible credit market 
[s13(a)]; monitoring and reporting annually certain market trends to the Minister [s13(c)]; conducting 
research and proposing policies to the Minister regarding the consumer credit industry [s13(d)]; 
regulating the industry by registering credit providers, credit bureaux and debt counsellors, and 
suspending or cancelling registration (s14); enforcing the Act in numerous ways listed in s15(a)–(j); 
promoting public awareness of consumer credit matters in various ways listed in s16(1)(a)–(g); engaging 
with provincial regulatory authorities (s17); advising the Minister, and recommending and reporting to 
the Minister on various aspects of consumer credit practice, policy and legislation (s18). 
30 Commencement of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, 
Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006. 
31 Section 26(2). 
32 Section 26(1). 
33 Section 142(1). 
34 Section 27.  The powers of the Tribunal are mentioned throughout the Act and are too many to list 
here. 
35 Sections 142–152. 
36 Sections 129–133.  These lengthy pre-litigation requirements have been criticised by Visagie 
“Collecting your debt against the odds?” (June 2006) De Rebus 20 at 21.  
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Regulator,37 initiating an application to the National Consumer Tribunal in various 
circumstances,38 or referring a matter to an appropriate “ombud”, consumer court, or 
alternative dispute resolution agent.39  Sections 134 to 138 provide procedures and 
guidelines in this regard, including provision for a consent order that can be made an 
order of a court or of the National Consumer Tribunal upon consent of the parties.40  
Complaints can furthermore be informally investigated and resolved by the National 
Credit Regulator,41 or referred to the National Consumer Tribunal.42   
 
In a synopsis of the Act, Professor Otto concludes:43 
 
“All in all, the muscle of the National Credit Regulator, the far-reaching powers of the 
National Consumer Tribunal and the courts, the almost paternalistic protective 
inclination of the legislature, and the extensive network of dispute-solving account for 
consumer legislation that is going to have a huge impact on the enormous credit 
industry in South Africa.” 
 
6.1.4 Over-indebtedness and reckless credit 
 
It is clear from Chapter Five of this study that over-indebtedness is frequently a 
disastrous consequence of the high cost of credit, and is therefore a critical aspect of 
this study that is worthy of specific attention.  Levenstein summarises succinctly this 
state of affairs:44 
 
“Unfortunately, in South Africa, too many people with too little money have been 
given too much credit.  This ultimately leads to over-indebtedness which results in a 
never-ending circle of frustration for the consumer who can never repay his debts.” 
 
One of the most important objectives of the Act is to combat over-indebtedness and 
reckless credit granting,45 and the Act contains lengthy, detailed, far-reaching and 
extremely important provisions in this regard.46  A very brief overview is given below. 
 
                                                 
37 Section 136. 
38 Section 137. 
39 Section 134. 
40 Section 135 read with s 138. 
41 Sections 139–140. 
42 Section 141. 
43 Otto The National Credit Act Explained 12. 
44 Levenstein “Setting new parameters for reckless lending” (2006) 6 Without Prejudice 50. 
45 Section 3(c), (g) and (i). 
46 Sections 78–88, all of which will come into effect on 1 June 2007. 
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A consumer is over-indebted if the preponderance of available information indicates 
that the consumer is unable to satisfy all obligations under a credit agreement in a 
timely manner, having regard to the consumer’s financial means, prospects and 
obligations, and history of debt repayment.47  In any court proceedings, a court may 
declare a consumer to be over-indebted48 or refer a consumer to a debt counsellor 
for a recommendation in this regard.49  A consumer may also apply in person to a 
debt counsellor to be declared over-indebted.50  In either event if, after an evaluation 
the debt counsellor finds that the consumer is over-indebted, the counsellor can 
recommend to the Magistrate’s Court that one or more credit agreements be 
declared reckless,51 or that the consumer’s debts be re-arranged.52  If the counsellor 
finds that the consumer is not over-indebted but is experiencing problems in paying 
debts punctually, then the counsellor can facilitate a voluntary agreement between 
credit provider and consumer on a “plan of debt re-arrangement”, which can be filed 
as a consent order with the Tribunal or a court.53 
 
A credit provider must not enter into a reckless credit agreement with a consumer.54  
Before entering into a credit agreement, a credit provider must first take reasonable 
steps to assess the consumer’s general understanding of the risks and costs of the 
proposed credit, the consumer’s debt repayment history and existing financial 
means, prospects and obligations.55  The consumer must fully and truthfully provide 
the requested information.56  A credit agreement is reckless if: 
• at the time it was concluded the credit provider failed to conduct the 
necessary assessment, irrespective of what the outcome of such assessment 
might have been;57 or  
• the credit provider entered into the agreement despite the fact that 
information available to the credit provider showed that the consumer did not 
generally understand the consumer’s risk and the costs or obligations under 
                                                 
47 Section 79(1). 
48 Section 85(b). 
49 Section 85(a). 
50 Section 86(1). 
51 Section 86(7)(c)(i) read with s80. 
52 Section 86(7)(c)(ii). 
53 Section 86(7)(b). 
54 Section 81(3). 
55 Section 81(2).  In general, a credit provider may adopt its own assessment mechanisms to this end, 
provided they are fair and objective [s82(1)].  It has been suggested that in due course “best practice 
standards” will be established in each industry for conducting necessary assessments (Levenstein 2006 
Without Prejudice 50). 
56 Section 81(1).  Failure by the consumer to do so could serve as a complete defence against an 
allegation of reckless credit [s81(4)]. 
57 Section 80(1)(a).  Otto The National Credit Act Explained 66 concludes that this section is penal in 
nature, designed “to prevent credit providers from taking shortcuts by simply accepting an apparently 
creditworthy debtor on face value”. 
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the proposed credit agreement, or the conclusion of the agreement would 
cause the consumer to become over-indebted.58 
 
In any proceedings that concern credit agreements, a court may declare that a credit 
agreement is reckless.59  In this event, it may make an order setting aside all or part 
of the consumer’s rights and obligations under the agreement, or suspending the 
force and effect of the agreement for a determined period.60  Such a court is further 
required to find whether or not the consumer was over-indebted at the time of 
conclusion of the agreement.61  If such finding is affirmative, it may order the 
suspension of the force and effect of the agreement and restructuring of the 
consumer’s obligations under any other credit agreements.62  During the period of 
suspension, the consumer is not required to pay anything in terms of the credit 
agreement, no interest or fee may be debited to the consumer, and the credit 
provider’s rights in terms of the agreement are unenforceable.63  After such 
suspension ends, all the parties’ rights and obligations are revived and become 
enforceable again, save that interest or fees that accrued during the period of 
suspension may not be charged to the consumer,64 which is a drastic remedy indeed. 
 
The negative consequences for credit providers of contracting with over-indebted 
consumers or concluding reckless credit agreements, some of which are penal in 
nature, are substantial enough to ensure that credit providers will be careful to 
reduce the risk of bad debt.65  The above provisions are therefore likely to reduce 
over-indebtedness and reckless credit granting, at least in the formal sector.66  A 
negative consequence for consumers, however, could be that credit grantors are 
likely to be significantly more reticent about granting credit in the future, and fewer 
people will be able to access credit.67 
                                                 
58 Section 80(1)(b).  This definition of “reckless credit” has been criticised for applying to the credit 
provider only, and not to the consumer [Heath Executive Consultants Submissions on the National 
Credit Bill (undated) 9 (unpublished)]. 
59 Section 83(1). 
60 Section 83(2). 
61 Section 83(3)(a). 
62 Section 83(3)(b). 
63 Section 84(1). 
64 Section 84(2). 
65 Law Review Project Comment on the National Credit Bill (July 2005) 27 (unpublished). 
66 The positive results of these consumer protection measures will to a great extent unfortunately be 
negated by the excessive cost of credit on smaller loans in terms of the Act, which will be demonstrated 
in detail later in this chapter. 
67 Law Review Project Comment on the National Credit Bill 28 described this as an apparent 
contradiction in the Bill: “The Portfolio Committee and the government must decide whether a 
substantial reduction to the access to credit for the consumers it wants to benefit is justified by a 
corresponding reduction in over-indebtedness and reckless credit.” 
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6.2 The legislative framework for the prescribed limits on 
the cost of credit 
 
6.2.1 The enabling provisions 
 
The cost of credit is dealt with in sections 100 to 106 of the National Credit Act, which 
together comprise Part C68 of Chapter 569 of the Act.  The whole of Part C of the Act 
will come into effect on 1 June 2007.70  Section 105(1) provides that the Minister71 
may prescribe “a method for calculating” a maximum rate of interest and the 
maximum fees contemplated in the Act,72 and that different levels of interest and fees 
be applicable to each sub-sector of the consumer credit market.73  The different sub-
sectors of the consumer credit market as well as the different maximums for credit 
agreements within each sub-sector are to be determined by the Minister.74 
 
Importantly, the Minister is not obliged to cap interest rates and, until this was 
effected in the Draft National Credit Regulations in February 2006, there was concern 
that the Minister would continue to fail to do so in regard to micro-loans, just as the 
responsible Ministers had failed to do since 1992 (besides the short-lived limits of the 
1999 Exemption Notice). 
 
The Minister is required to consider, amongst others, the following factors when 
prescribing maximum rates of interest and fees: 
(a) The need to make credit available to historically disadvantaged persons, low-
income persons and communities, and remote, isolated or low-density 
populations and communities.75 
(b) Conditions prevailing in the credit market, including the cost of credit and the 
optimal functioning of the consumer credit market.76 
(c) The social impact on low income consumers.77 
                                                 
68 Headed “Consumer’s liability, interest, charges and fees”. 
69 Headed “Consumer Credit Agreements”. 
70 Commencement of the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, 
Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006.  Part C includes all relevant cost of credit provisions in terms 
of which the Minister may prescribe limits.  All the law discussed in 6.2 to 6.4 hereof will therefore come 
into effect on 1 June 2007.  
71 Section 1 of the Act defines the Minister as the member of Cabinet responsible for consumer credit.  
This Minister is currently the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
72 The most important fees in regard to money loans are the initiation fee and the service fee. 
73 Section 105(1). 
74 Section 105(3)(a). 
75 Section 105(2)(a) as read with s13(a). 
76 Section 105(2)(b). 
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The first and third of these factors are concerned with accessibility and fairness of 
credit extension, respectively (primarily the interests of consumers), while the second 
factor is concerned with competitiveness and efficiency of the credit market (primarily 
the interest of credit providers).78  These three factors will therefore always be of 
utmost importance when establishing appropriate levels for the cost of credit and 
when analysing such cost, and will therefore be referred to in 6.4.6 and 6.5 below. 
 
By 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry had already proposed the 
“standardisation of charges across all service providers into three categories, being 
loan origination fees, monthly service fees and interest”.79  Section 101(1) provides a 
closed list of the type of payments that a consumer may be required to make, 
namely: the principal debt,80 an initiation fee, a service fee, interest, cost of credit 
insurance, default administration charges and collection costs.  No money or other 
consideration other than the types of payments listed may be required by a credit 
provider.  Conspicuously absent from this list is bond registration costs, which were 
included in the definition of “principal debt” in s1 of the Usury Act.  The nature of 
these costs will first be discussed in general terms before the limits prescribed by the 
National Credit Regulations are explained and analysed in 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
 
6.2.2 Interest 
 
Interest may not exceed the applicable maximum prescribed rate, must be calculated 
in the prescribed manner, and must be expressed in percentage terms at an annual 
rate.81  In general, interest may be calculated daily and may be added to the deferred 
amount (the principal debt) monthly.82  Interest is calculated as follows:83 
 
      Deferred amount for the day x interest rate 
 Rand amount of interest for a day = ___________________________________ 
       Number of days in the year 
 
                                                                                                                                            
77 Section 105(2)(c).  This factor requires the Minister to consider, amongst others, all the issues raised 
in Chapter Five of this study above. 
78 cf s3. 
79 DTI “Policy Framework” para 4.9. 
80 Section 101(1)(a).  The principle debt in the case of a money loan is the amount deferred in terms of 
the agreement; that is, the initial loan amount. 
81 Section 101(1)(d). 
82 Reg 40(1), which provides for other dates that interest may be added to the deferred amount, in 
certain circumstances.  Precise methods for the calculation of interest on different categories of credit 
transactions are given in the remainder of reg 40. 
83 Reg 40(2)(a). 
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Central to this calculation is the deferred amount, which includes the initiation fee, the 
service fee, unpaid interest, credit insurance, default administration charges and 
collection costs.84  In effect, the deferred amount is increased with monthly 
capitalisation of any unpaid interest or fees, and interest is paid on unpaid interest 
and fees.  A variable interest rate is permissible during the term of a credit agreement 
only if the variation is by fixed relationship to a reference rate stipulated in such 
agreement,85 and a credit provider must not unilaterally increase interest rates or 
service fees.86 
 
The common law in duplum rule is codified in s103(5), and goes further to clarify and 
extend the common law.87  Although this provision has been discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five above, it is so important that it is worthy of further emphasis here.  The 
common law in duplum rule should have played a more prominent role in the era of 
no interest caps on small loans, but its precise meaning has often been regarded as 
rather obscure, understood only on the reading of selected case law, and its 
application has therefore been limited.88  It is likely that the legislated in duplum rule 
will become an increasingly important mechanism for limiting the cost of credit.  Any 
uncertainty about its meaning has been removed by its clear articulation in the Act.  
Its profile has been raised by its codification, which is likely to ensure that it will be 
more widely used than in the past.  This is somewhat ironic, given that this increased 
use will occur in the new era in which the cost of credit for small loans will be limited. 
 
6.2.3 The initiation fee 
 
An initiation fee,89 not to exceed the amount prescribed by the Minister and relative to 
the principal debt,90 may be charged if the application for credit results in a credit 
agreement.91  The initiation fee is defined as a fee in respect of the costs of initiating 
a credit agreement,92 “intended to allow for the recovery of reasonable costs of 
                                                 
84 Reg 39(1). 
85 Section 103(4). 
86 Section 104(1).  The remainder of s104 sets out the circumstances in which interest rates and fees 
may be changed during the term of a credit agreement. 
87 Section 103(5).  Not just interest, but all elements of the cost of credit will now be relevant to the 
enquiry.  See 3.3 above for detailed discussion of s103(5). 
88 Hofmeyer, Herbstein and Gihwala Inc “Report for the Credit Law Review” 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/forward.htm (accessed 14 March 2006) para 6.13. 
89 Section 101(1)(b).  The initiation fee will be introduced into South African consumer credit law for the 
first time. 
90 Section 101(1)(b)(i). 
91 Section 101(1)(b)(ii). 
92 Section 1, definition of “initiation fee”. 
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originating a transaction”.93  It is unclear exactly what costs the fee is intended to 
cover, but examples that have been given by the Department of Trade and Industry 
include the cost of undertaking credit checks, photocopying costs, mortgage bond 
registration costs and evaluation costs in respect of the purchase of immovable 
property.94 
 
The initiation fee is a one-off payment, paid by the consumer on conclusion of the 
credit agreement or charged to the consumer.95  It appears to be likely that an 
initiation fee so charged could be regarded as a short-term credit transaction, 
attracting interest at 60% per annum.96  The fee is levied on the date of approval of 
the credit application, or later by agreement.97  No initiation fee may be charged if a 
new credit agreement is entered into between the same two parties that replaces an 
earlier agreement in whole or in part.98 
 
6.2.4 The service fee 
 
A service fee may be charged,99 not to exceed the amount prescribed by the Minister 
relative to the principal debt.100  The service fee is defined as a fee that may be 
charged periodically by a credit provider in connection with the routine administration 
cost of maintaining a credit agreement.101  It will usually be payable monthly, but 
could be payable annually or on a transaction basis.102   
 
6.2.5 Other fees, costs and charges 
 
A credit provider may require a consumer to maintain during the term of the credit 
agreement credit life insurance in an amount not exceeding the total outstanding 
amount of the agreement.103  Credit life insurance “includes cover payable in the 
                                                 
93 Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing” 
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=7375 (accessed 25 October 2006). 
94 Ibid.  The mortgage bond and evaluation costs would of course not be relevant to a money loan. 
95 Section 1, definition of “initiation fee”. 
96 Reg 39(2) read with reg 42(1).  See further the discussion regarding short-term credit transactions 
below, as well as comments made at “Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee meeting 16 August 2006 
on National Credit Regulations and National Credit Regulator: briefing”  
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8080 (accessed 24 October 2006). 
97 Reg 42(1). 
98 Reg 43(2) read with s101(2). 
99 Section 101(1)(c).  The service fee will be introduced into South African consumer credit law for the 
first time. 
100 Section 101(1)(c)(iii). 
101 Section 1, definition of “service fee”. 
102 Section 101(1)(c)(i) and (ii), read with reg 41(2), 41(3) and 41(4). 
103 Section 106(1)(a), read with s101(1)(e). 
  
 
112
event of a consumer’s death, disability, terminal illness, unemployment or other 
insurable risk that is likely to impair a consumer’s ability to earn an income or meet 
the obligations under a credit agreement”.104 
 
If the consumer defaults on payment, default administration charges may be imposed 
only in respect of each letter necessarily written.105  Likewise, collection costs may be 
imposed, such costs not to exceed the costs permissible in terms of the relevant 
Act,106 for example the Magistrates’ Courts Act.107  Subject to the codified in duplum 
rule,108 the interest rate applied to an amount in default may not exceed the rate 
charged on the principal debt.109 
 
6.2.6 Contraventions of the Act 
 
No money or consideration other than the interest, charges and fees referred to in 
6.2.2 to 6.2.5 above110 may be charged to a consumer in terms of a credit 
agreement.111  Further, a credit provider may not charge interest, fees or other 
charges in excess of the amount permitted by the Act.112  Notably, a contravention of 
these provisions does not constitute an offence.  The Act provides only a relatively 
short list of offences that attract criminal penalties.113  By contrast, the Usury Act 
provided that any person who contravenes any provision of the Act commits an 
offence.114  Thus, it was a criminal offence to charge interest higher than the Usury 
Act maximum.   
 
When a credit agreement provides for charges that are not permitted, or when the 
amount of interest, fees or other charges exceeds the maximum amount permissible, 
the necessary relief will be provided by section 90 of the Act, read with section 89.  It 
is most helpful to begin with section 89, which informs section 90.  Section 89 lists a 
number of credit agreements that are unlawful.  Amongst others, any credit 
                                                 
104 Section 1, definition of credit life insurance. 
105 Section 101(1)(f) read with reg 46 and Part C of Chapter 6 of the Act.  This payment may not exceed 
the amount payable in respect of a registered letter of demand in an undefended action in terms of the 
Magistrate’s Court Act, 1944 as well as reasonable delivery costs of such letter. 
106 Section 101(1)(g) read with reg 47 and Part C of Chapter 6 of the Act. 
107 Act 32 of 1944. 
108 Section 103(5). 
109 Section 103(1). 
110 Which are listed in s101(a)–(g) 
111 Section 101(1) read with 100(1)(a). 
112 Section 100(1)(b) and (c). 
113 Sections 156–160.  These include breaches of confidence, hindering the administration of the Act, 
failure to attend when summoned to a hearing, failure to answer truthfully or fully at a hearing, and 
offences relating to the National Credit Regulator and Tribunal. 
114 Section 17. 
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agreement is unlawful if at the time of the agreement the credit grantor was not 
registered with the National Credit Regulator and the Act requires that such credit 
grantor be registered,115 or was subject to a notice from the National Credit Regulator 
to stop trading.116  A credit agreement entered into while the credit grantor was not 
registered will, however, not be unlawful if application for registration is made within 
30 days after the credit agreement was concluded.117  Section 89(5) provides that if a 
credit agreement is found to be unlawful, a court must order that: 
(a) the credit agreement is void from date of its conclusion;118 
(b) the credit provider must refund to the consumer any monies paid by the 
consumer, with interest;119 
(c) the credit provider’s rights to recover monies paid or goods delivered to the 
consumer are cancelled unless the court is of the view that this would unjustly 
enrich the consumer, in which event such rights will be forfeited to the 
state.120 
 
Thus, a court will be able to declare a loan from an unregistered micro-lender to be 
void, and order the micro-lender to refund all instalments paid.  Furthermore, the 
court must order that the loan amount advanced to the consumer be retained by the 
borrower or forfeited to the State, and it is thereby lost to the unregistered micro-
lender altogether.  Whichever order the court makes, the credit provider will lose 
his/her performance, while performance is restored to the consumer.121  The latter 
provision is a drastic remedy and a departure from the common law.  It is not 
currently available in the case of unregistered micro-lenders, and is a significant new 
consumer protection measure. 
 
Section 90 lists numerous provisions of credit agreements that are unlawful and not 
permitted.122  This list is broadly framed and far-reaching, and many of the provisions 
will probably be open to a wide range of interpretations, which is likely to lead to 
uncertainty.  For example, the first unlawful provision listed is one whose general 
                                                 
115 Section 89(1)(d).  Section 40(1) provides that a person must apply to the National Credit Regulator to 
be registered as a credit provider if that person provides credit in at least 100 credit agreements or the 
total principal debt on all outstanding debts exceeds the amount of R500 000, an amount prescribed by 
the Minister [National Credit Act (34/2005): Determination of Thresholds, GN713, 2006, Government 
Gazette 28893, 1 June 2006]. 
116 Section 89(1)(e). 
117 Section 89(4)(a).  This provision will make it fairly easy for a credit provider to validate a credit 
agreement that could otherwise be declared to be void. 
118 Section 89(5)(a). 
119 Section 89(5)(b). 
120 Section 89(5)(c). 
121 Otto The National Credit Act Explained 43. 
122 Section 90(2)(a)–(o).  There are too many such provisions to list them all here.  Section 90 deals with 
unlawful provisions of credit agreements as opposed to unlawful credit agreements (s89). 
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purpose or effect is to defeat the purposes or policies of the Act, or to “deceive” the 
consumer.123  Further, a provision is unlawful if it directly or indirectly purports to 
avoid a credit provider’s obligation or duty in terms of the Act,124 to set aside or 
override the effect of any provision of the Act,125 or to authorise the credit provider to 
do anything that is unlawful in terms of the Act or to fail to do anything that is required 
in terms of the Act.126  Thus, if a money loan agreement provides for charges that are 
not permitted, or if the amount of interest, fees or other charges exceeds the 
maximum amounts permissible, the offending provisions will be unlawful.  A provision 
is also unlawful that allows for the deposit with the credit provider of an identity 
document, credit or debit card or other similar device, or for access by the credit 
provider to a borrower’s personal information code on his/her bank account.127 
 
An unlawful provision is void from the date of conclusion of the agreement.128  
Whenever a court has a matter before it which concerns a credit agreement that 
contains an unlawful provision, the court must sever the unlawful provision from the 
credit agreement, or alter the provision to the extent required in order to render it 
lawful, or may even declare the whole credit agreement unlawful.129  In addition, the 
court may “make any order that is just and reasonable in the circumstances to give 
effect to the principles of s89(5) with respect to that unlawful provision, or entire 
agreement, as the case may be”.130  The precise meaning of the words “... give effect 
to the principles of s89(5) ...” is not clear.  It would seem, however, that section 90(4) 
will entitle a court to make orders in respect of the offending provision (or agreement) 
similar to those contemplated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) on page 15 above.131 
 
Thus, for example, if a loan agreement provides for interest or fees in excess of the 
maximum amounts permissible, a court will be able to declare the offending 
provisions to be void, and order the micro-lender to refund all unlawful interest or 
fees paid.  Again, the court may order that the funds advanced to the consumer be 
retained by the borrower or forfeited to the State, a new remedy that will considerably 
strengthen the hand of the consumer. 
                                                 
123 Section 90(2)(a). 
124 Section 90(2)(b)(ii). 
125 Section 90(2)(b)(iii). 
126 Section 90(2)(b)(iv). 
127 Section 90(2)(l). 
128 Section 90(3). 
129 Section 90(4).  The latter drastic remedy represents a total departure from the common law, 
described by Otto as a “phenomenal discretion resting with a court” (Otto The National Credit Act 
Explained 46). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Section 89(5). 
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6.3 The prescribed limits on the cost of credit 
 
The prescribed limits on the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations, 
published on 31 May 2006,132 will come into effect on 1 June 2007.133  The 
Regulations introduce and distinguish two categories of credit agreements that are 
fundamental to this study: short-term credit transactions and unsecured credit 
transactions.134  These two categories include within their ambit money loans which 
are comparable with micro-loans currently exempt from the Usury Act, clearly in an 
attempt to consider “[c]onditions prevailing in the credit market, including the cost of 
credit and the optimal functioning of the consumer credit market”.135  The effective 
cost of credit is the result of an attempt to balance fairness with the need for a 
competitive market,136 “to make credit as cheap as possible and at the same time 
allow lenders to make a living”.137 
 
The Act introduces three major categories of credit agreements, and provides that 
every credit agreement will fall under one of these three categories, namely: credit 
facilities,138 credit transactions,139 and credit guarantees.140  Other sub-categories of 
credit agreements include mortgage agreements,141 developmental credit 
agreements,142 incidental credit agreements,143 and short-term and secured credit 
transactions referred to above.  Credit agreements are further categorised into small, 
intermediate and large credit agreements.144  These categories are distinguished by 
threshold amounts prescribed by the Minister.  The lower threshold amount 
distinguishing small from intermediate credit agreements is R15 000, meaning that all 
loans of no more than R15 000 (which are relevant to this study) are categorised as 
small credit agreements for purposes of the Act.145 
                                                 
132 National Credit Act (34/2005): Regulations, R489 Government Gazette 28864, 31 May 2006. 
133 The whole of Chapter 5 of the Act, which concerns Consumer Credit Agreements (including all 
relevant cost of credit provisions in terms of which the Minister may prescribe limits, contained in Part C 
thereof), will come into effect on 1 June 2007 in terms of Commencement of the National Credit Act, 
2005 (Act No. 34 of 2005) Proclamation R22, 2006, Government Gazette 28824, 11 May 2006. 
134 Reg 39.   
135 Section 105(2)(b). 
136 DTI “Policy framework” ch 4. 
137 See the remarks of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
138 Section 8(3).  Credit facilities include credit card accounts and cheque accounts. 
139 Section 8(4).  Short-term and secured credit transactions fall under this category of credit 
agreements. 
140 Section 8(5). 
141 Section 1.  Definition of “mortgage agreement”. 
142 Section 10. 
143 Section 1.  Definition of “incidental credit agreement”. 
144 Section 9. 
145 National Credit Act (34/2005): Determination of Thresholds, GN713, 2006, Government Gazette 
28893, 1 June 2006. 
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6.3.1 Different categories of loans and their interest rate limits 
 
A short-term credit transaction is defined as “a credit transaction in respect of a 
deferred amount at inception of the agreement not exceeding R8 000, and in terms of 
which the whole amount is repayable within a period not exceeding 6 months”.146  
This category is clearly intended to provide mainly for the 30-day loans common 
under the Usury Act exemption, which sometimes have repayment periods of up to 4 
months.147  There is no requirement that short-term credit transactions be 
unsecured.148  The maximum interest rate on short-term credit transactions is 5% per 
month,149 or 60% per annum.150   
 
An unsecured credit transaction is defined as “a credit transaction in respect of which 
the debt is not supported by any pledge or other right in property or suretyship or any 
other form of personal security”.151  There is no limit as to the amount loaned or the 
repayment period, and it appears that this category of loan is intended to provide for 
loans in excess of R8 000, repayable over a period of more than 6 months.  The 
hallmark of this category of loan is that there is no security for the debt whatsoever.  
Thus any unsecured loan, large or small, which is more than R8 000 and / or which is 
repayable over a period of more than 6 months will fall into this category.152  The 
maximum interest rate on unsecured credit transactions is linked to the South African 
Reserve Bank Repurchase Rate, and is calculated by applying the following formula: 
(Repurchase Rate x 2.2) + 20% per year.153  The maximum interest rate on 
unsecured credit transactions would therefore currently be 38,7% per annum, based 
                                                 
146 Reg 39(2), which goes on to describe a short term credit transaction as:  
• involving the disbursement of an amount of money to the consumer, to be used at the sole 
discretion of the consumer;  
• including pawn transactions;  
• not including credit transactions conditional upon the deferred amount being paid by the credit 
provider to a relative of the credit provider, or to a person other than the consumer (unless this 
condition is introduced by the consumer).   
The limits on this category of loans are reminiscent of the limits on loans exempt from the Usury Act, 
namely loans less than R10 000 repayable over a period of less than 36 months (which encompass both 
so-called “30-day loans” and “term loans”). 
147 See ph 5.3.1 above.  It is interesting to note that Reg 36 of the Draft National Credit Regulations, 
published on 20 February 2006, provided for much lower limits on “short-term loans”, namely a principal 
amount not exceeding R5 000, the whole amount of which is repayable within 4 months. 
148 It is of course a requirement that an “unsecured credit transaction” be unsecured. 
149 Reg 42(1), Table A. 
150 Again, it is interesting to note that reg 42 of the Draft National Credit Regulations, published on 20 
February 2006, provided for a lower maximum interest rate on “short-term loans” of 4% per month, or 
48% per annum. 
151 Reg 39(3). 
152 Any unsecured loan not exceeding R8 000 which is repayable within 4 months will qualify as both an 
unsecured credit transaction and a short term credit transaction. 
153 Reg 42(1), Table A. 
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on the current Repurchase Rate of 8,5% per annum.154  This is considerably less 
than the maximum interest rate on short term credit transactions. 
 
By contrast, a secured bank loan falls under the category of credit agreement termed 
a “credit transaction”,155 whilst a credit card or cheque account falls under the 
category “credit facility”.156  The maximum interest rates on both secured loans and 
credit facilities (including credit card and cheque accounts) is also linked to the South 
African Reserve Bank Repurchase Rate, and is currently 28,7% per annum.157  In 
comparing interest rates only, the maximum interest rate on a secured bank loan will 
therefore be 10% lower than that of an unsecured loan, and less than one half of that 
of a short term credit transaction.158  Further, the maximum secured bank loan will be 
much higher than the current Usury Act maximum of 20% per annum for loans up to 
R10 000, and 17% per annum for loans greater than R10 000.159 
 
6.3.2 The cost of the initiation fee 
 
In terms of regulation 42(2), Table B, the maximum initiation fee for both short term 
and unsecured credit transactions is R150 per credit agreement, plus 10% of the 
amount of the agreement in excess of R1 000, but never to exceed R1 000.160  
However, regulation 43(3) provides that the initiation fee may never exceed 15% of 
the principal debt.  This provision would at first blush appear to contradict regulation 
42(2) in respect of loans of less than R1 000.161  This apparent contradiction would 
have been cured had regulation 42(2) stated that the maximum initiation fees set out 
                                                 
154 South African Reserve Bank home page http://www.reservebank.co.za/ (accessed 1 December 
2006).  The repurchase rate increased on three occasions since June 2006 from a low of 7% per 
annum.  Thus, when the Regulations were promulgated on 31 May 2006, the maximum interest rate on 
unsecured credit transactions would have been 35,4% per year: (Repurchase Rate of 7% x 2.2) + 20% 
= 35,4%.  In the current economic climate of increasing interest rates, the maximum interest rate on 
unsecured credit transactions is likely to increase further in the near future.   
155 Section 8(4)(d).  For purposes of maximum interest rates and fees in regs 42(1) and 43(1), a secured 
loan falls under the category “other credit agreements”. 
156 Section 8(3). 
157 Reg 42(1), Table A.  This rate is calculated by applying the following formula: [Repurchase rate 
(currently 8,5% per annum) x 2.2] + 10% per year.  
158 The comparison of only the interest rates of the three categories of loans discussed does not provide 
a true reflection of the relative cost of credit of these three categories of loans.  A proper comparison is 
achieved only once the initiation and service fees have been added. 
159 GN 1100, Government Gazette 26809, 17 September 2004. 
160 Reg 42(2).  The same maximum initiation fee is provided for credit facilities and other credit 
agreements, which include credit card and cheque accounts and secured bank loans.  It is interesting to 
note, as in the case of maximum interest rates, that reg 42 of the Draft National Credit Regulations, 
published on 20 February 2006, provided lower limits for initiation fees of R150 per credit agreement, 
plus 5% (as opposed to the final regulated 10%) of the amount of the credit agreement in excess of 
R1000, but never to exceed R500 (in the case of unsecured credit transactions) and R350 (in the case 
of “short-term loans”) – as opposed to the final regulated R1 000. 
161 This apparent contradiction would have been cured had regulation 42(2) stated that the maximum 
initiation fees set out therein are subject to the limit imposed by regulation 43(3).  The Regulations 
should therefore be amended accordingly. 
  
 
118
therein are subject to the limit imposed by regulation 43(3).  The Regulations should 
therefore be amended accordingly.  The Act, however, states that the initiation fee 
“may not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt”.162  It therefore 
seems to be clear that regulation 43(3) must limit the maximum initiation fees 
permitted by regulation 42(2) on loans less than R1 000.  Examples of the calculation 
of initiation fees for different size loans are given in Table M below in order to 
demonstrate the effect of the regulation 42(2) and regulation 43(3) limits. 
 
Table M: Initiation fees for different size loans 
 
Loan amount 
 
Initiation fee Initiation fee as 
a percentage of 
loan amount 
Method of calculation 
R200 
 
R30 15% 15% of R200 [reg 43(3)] 
R500 
 
R75 15% 15% of R500 
R1 000 
 
R150 15% 15% of R1000, or 
R150 maximum [reg 42(2)] 
R2 000 
 
R250 12,5% R150 + R100 (10% of R1000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1000) [reg 42(2)] 
R5 000 
 
R550 11% R150 + R400 (10% of R4000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1000)  
R8 000 
 
R850 10,6% R150 + R700 (10% of R7000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1000) 
R9 500 
 
R1 000 10,5% R150 + R850 (10% of R8500, which is the 
amount in excess of R1000) 
Loans greater 
than R9 500 
R1 000 Less than 
10,5% 
The maximum limit [reg 42(2)] 
 
The cost of the initiation fee will therefore be a maximum of 15% of the loan amount 
on loans up to R1 000, and between 15% and 10,5% of the loan amount on loans 
between R1 000 and R9 500.   
 
6.3.3 The cost of the service fee 
 
Regulation 44 provides that “[t]he maximum monthly service fee, prescribed in terms 
of section 105(1) of the Act, is R50”.163  If the service fee is paid annually, the 
maximum permissible fee is R600.164  Where a once-off fee is paid on a transaction 
basis or for a loan period which is not exactly one month or one year, the total 
service fee may not exceed a pro rata share of the monthly or annual limit.165   
                                                 
162 Section 101(1)(b)(i).  My underlining. 
163 Reg 44. 
164 Reg 44(1). 
165 Reg 44(1) and (2). 
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The same maximum service fee is applicable “across the board” to all categories of 
credit agreements,166 including both short term and unsecured credit transactions, 
irrespective of their size.  The “flat rate” of R50 is not varied according to the size of a 
loan as occurs in the case of the initiation fee, and the same monthly service fee of 
R50, for example, may therefore be charged on a loan of R500, R5 000 or R50 000.    
The effect of the application of the service fee on different size loans is far-reaching, 
and will be demonstrated when analysing the cost of credit according to the 
Regulations in 6.4.3 below. 
 
It appears that the service fee was standardised in order to simplify the application of 
the Act, justifiable on the basis that every loan, no matter what the size, needs to be 
administered.167  There is, however, evidence that shows that administration costs in 
fact do increase with bigger loans, which would call into question the correctness of 
having the same size service fee for all loans.168   
 
The standardised fee is also a result of the Department of Trade and Industry’s 
overriding pre-occupation with the need for a single piece of legislation that treats all 
consumer credit transactions and all credit providers “equivalently”.169  This concern 
is expressed in one of the purposes of the Act that is necessary to promote 
consumer protection, namely to ensure “consistent treatment of different credit 
products and different credit providers”.170  Once the full impact of the standardised 
service fee is appreciated,171 it will be seen that this section 3(b) objective has been 
achieved at the expense of the “consistent treatment” of consumers.  Not only will 
consumers be treated inconsistently, but such treatment will be so unfair as to 
discriminate against borrowers of very small loans who are almost invariably from the 
poorest communities.  The purpose of the standardisation of fees in the name of 
consumer protection is therefore strange, for it is clearly pre-occupied with the equal 
treatment of credit providers as opposed to consumers. 
 
 
                                                 
166 The service fee of R50 per month is thus also applicable to credit facilities and other credit 
agreements, including credit card and cheque accounts and secured bank loans. 
167 See the comments of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
168 See, for example, Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in South Africa” para 
7.5. 
169 DTI “Policy Framework” para 4.7. 
170 Section 3(b).  Conspicuous by its absence from being mentioned in s3(b) is the consumer. 
171 See 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 below. 
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6.3.4 Maximum limits and probable market costs 
 
The prescribed interest rates, initiation fees and service fees are maximum amounts 
only, and the wish of the Department of Trade and Industry is that competitive market 
forces should determine the amount of fees that are charged in the money lending 
market.172  The Department “hoped that the industry would not jump to the maximum 
rates”, but “admitted that there was a risk of the industry charging the maximum rates 
permissible”.173  Moneylenders are currently accustomed to charging much more for 
credit, and many will be hard pressed to remain in business once constrained by the 
new limits which will come into force on 1 June 2007.174  There therefore seems to be 
very little reason for most lenders to settle for any amount less than the maximum 
interest and fees permitted, except perhaps for bigger lenders such as banks which 
are able to afford to be competitive.175  However, the Department intends to “monitor 
the market extremely carefully, and will not hesitate to change the Regulations 
should the market go for the maximum rates”.176  It remains to be seen whether or 
not the Department will in fact do so. 
 
Another danger foreseen by the Department is that credit providers will re-price 
existing products, resulting in consumers paying higher prices for existing 
products.177 
 
“We’ll be monitoring prices in the market very closely.  It is within our powers to adjust 
the maximum rates permissible quickly, if the need arises.  Strictly applied and 
monitored standardised disclosure of credit terms will allow consumers to compare, 
whereas right now they can’t.”178 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
173 See the comments of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
174 In the Lurama case it was contended by the applicants that most micro-lenders would not be able to 
continue to do business profitably should they be restricted to charging interest at approximately 13,75% 
per month. 
175 For this reason, it is assumed in all the calculations in this chapter that the maximum interest rates 
and fees will be charged. 
176 See the comments of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
177 Business Report 23 February 2006 “State proposes cap on microlenders’ loan rates” 
http://www.businessday.co.za/home.aspx?Page=BD4P1236&amp;MenuItem=BD4P1236 (accessed 23 
February 2006). 
178 Ms Astrid Ludin, Deputy Director-General for Consumer and Corporate Regulation at the Department 
of Trade and Industry, quoted in Business Report 23 February 2006 “State proposes cap on 
microlenders’ loan rates”. 
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6.3.5 Periodic review of the cost of credit 
 
Regulation 45 provides that the National Credit Regulator must review interest rates 
and costs at intervals of no more than three years, and advise the Minister of 
proposed changes.  When making such recommendations, the Regulator must 
consider: 
(a) Ruling interest rates and fees. 
(b) The cost of providing credit. 
(c) The choice available to consumers in particular categories of credit 
agreements between different products and different credit providers. 
(d) The impact upon access to finance for historically disadvantaged persons, 
low income persons and communities, and remote, isolated or low density 
populations and communities.179 
 
It is interesting to compare these required considerations on periodic review of 
interest rates and costs by the Regulator with the factors that the Minister is required 
to consider when prescribing maximum rates of interest and fees.180  The majority of 
the issues to be considered by the Regulator when making recommendations to the 
Minister181 are concerned with “[c]onditions prevailing in the credit market, including 
the cost of credit and the optimal functioning of the consumer credit market”.182  The 
majority of factors to be considered by the Minister when making regulations, on the 
other hand, are concerned with accessibility and fairness of credit extension to low 
income183 and otherwise vulnerable184 consumers.  It appears therefore that the onus 
is primarily on the Minister to ensure fairness and accessibility of credit to poor 
communities when acting on the recommendations of the Regulator, and it is hoped 
that the Minister will in future consistently do so. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Reg 45 read with s13(a) of the Act. 
180 Section 105(2), discussed in 6.2.1 above.  These factors will be equally relevant to future regulation 
by the Minister as they were when prescribed limits were first promulgated by the Minister in 2006. 
181 (a), (b) and (c) above. 
182 Section 105(2)(b). 
183 Section 105(2)(c). 
184 Section 105(2)(a). 
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6.4 An analysis of the new cost of credit 
 
6.4.1 A comparison between the current and envisaged cost of credit 
 
It is a useful starting point to compare the nature and cost of current micro-loans 
exempt from the Usury Act with money loans envisaged in the National Credit Act, 
which reveals both improvements and shortcomings in the new credit limits.  The 
Usury Act exemption currently provides for a single category of “micro-loans” (usually 
unsecured, but not by definition), limited by a maximum loan amount of R10 000 and 
a maximum repayment period of 36 months, charged out at typically 360% per year.  
Industry practice makes possible a loose distinction between smaller “30-day 
loans”,185 sometimes repayable over up to 4 months, and bigger “term loans” of a 
maximum of R10 000, repayable over up to the maximum 36 months.186   
 
The National Credit Act, on the other hand, provides for: 
• “Short term” loans (whether secured or unsecured) repayable over 6 months 
(comparable to the current 30-day loans), but up to a maximum of R8 000 
(which is comparable with the current maximum for any loan exempt from the 
Usury Act), which can be charged out at a maximum of 60% per year and are 
subject to an initiation fee (maximum 15% of loan amount) and a service fee 
(maximum R50 per month). 
• “Unsecured” loans which have no limit as to size or repayment period (and 
are therefore not comparable by definition with loans currently exempt from 
the Usury Act), which can be charged out at a current maximum 38,7% per 
year and are subject to an initiation fee (maximum 15% of loan amount) and a 
service fee (maximum R50 per month). 
 
What can be deduced from this comparison?  There will be significant changes to the 
cost of credit and the manner of its calculation, and important positive and negative 
consequences for consumer protection in general.  Four important points will be 
considered.   
 
(a) Most importantly, there will be a considerable reduction in industry interest 
rates from the current typical 360% per year to 60% or 38,7% per year, 
representing a decrease of some 83% to 89%.  This decrease is significant, 
                                                 
185 The average size of 30-day loans was R500 per month in 2000 (Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26). 
186 See 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 above. 
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and will provide welcome relief to borrowers.  The implications of this 
reduction, however, cannot be considered in isolation, and will be thoroughly 
analysed in the context of the total cost of credit in 6.4.5 below.187 
 
(b) The introduction of the initiation fee and the service fee for the first time into 
South African consumer credit law will markedly increase the cost of credit in 
the industry above the new interest limits.188 
 
(c) The maximum size of short-term loans (which will accommodate the market 
for 30-day loans) is R8 000, which is considerably higher than the prevailing 
average 30-day loan of R500,189 and is therefore inconsistent with current 
practice.  Ebony Consulting International’s interest rate study reports that the 
average size loan is low “as it takes into very strict consideration the capacity 
of the borrower to repay at the end of the month”.190  Consumers could be 
tempted to take out much larger (up to R8 000) 30-day or very short-term 
loans that they can ill afford to do, at a high interest rate of 60% per year.  
The cost implications of such loans will be demonstrated in Table P below.191   
 
Further, consumers could be drawn into agreeing to repay large monthly 
instalments within 6 months on bigger short-term loans of up to R8 000 at 
60% per year.  The wiser choice for the consumer would be to take out an 
unsecured loan, repayable by way of much smaller instalments over a longer 
period, and subject to a lower maximum interest rate.  This problem is 
compounded by the fact that many lenders could choose to charge only the 
higher 60% per year on every loan, which will be much more profitable for 
them, by simply not offering loans in excess of R8 000 repayable over more 
than 6 months, which of course the law does not oblige them to do.  The 
solution to all these difficulties lies clearly in reducing the maximum size of 
short-term loans considerably.192 
 
                                                 
187 This apparent huge reduction is much diminished, however, when one adds the cost of the additional 
initiation and service fees. 
188 See 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 below. 
189 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26. 
190 Ibid.  Whether or not this is the reason for the average size loan being low, this is a helpful statistic, 
and there is no doubt that bigger 30-day loans will be extremely difficult for low income earners to repay. 
191 Table P, example 6 shows that the cost of a one month loan of R5 000 will be 18% per month of the 
initial loan amount, or R878 per month. 
192 Reg 36 of the Draft National Credit Regulations, published on 20 February 2006, provided for a much 
lower limit on the principal amount in the case of short-term loans of R5 000 (the whole amount of which 
was repayable within 4 months).  The maximum size of short-term loans could usefully be much lower 
than even this R5 000 limit. 
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(d) Finally, in respect of bigger loans, there has been a change in emphasis from 
limiting the total size of more expensive loans (currently R10 000) to the 
requirement that they be unsecured.  Lack of security is not a requirement 
under the current Usury Act exemption, although in practice such exempt 
loans are almost invariably unsecured.  Equally, there will be no limits at all 
on the size of loans that qualify as unsecured credit transactions and attract 
interest of up to 38,7% per year.  Rather, this will appropriately be left to 
market forces, since the larger the unsecured loan, the greater will be the risk 
to lenders of not recovering the loan amount.  The overall effect of this is that, 
whilst unsecured loans of less than R10 000 will be cheaper than the current 
typical 30% per month, all unsecured loans larger than R10 000 will cost 
about twice the Usury Act limit of 20% per year, which is the current 
maximum interest rate for such loans.193 
 
6.4.2 The implications of the initiation fee 
 
The initiation fee will add considerably to the cost of credit.  It is limited to a maximum 
of 15% of the loan amount, which does ensure that initiation fees on small loans will 
not be way out of proportion to loan amounts.194  Yet it will nonetheless be extremely 
onerous for consumers to find the necessary cash to pay the initiation fee up front at 
a time when they are taking out a loan precisely because they are in need of cash.   
 
Many lenders of different income levels will thus be unable to afford to pay the 
initiation fee on taking out a loan, particularly in the case of the very poor, and 
especially those who are borrowing money for consumption purposes.195  The Act 
clearly anticipated this possibility, providing that the initiation fee may be paid either 
on conclusion of the credit agreement or may be charged to the consumer.196  These 
people will thus be forced to allow the initiation fee to be capitalised and re-paid in 
the same number of instalments as the initial loan, subject to the same interest rate 
as the initial loan.197  The result will be that the effective monthly cost of credit will 
increase.198  The following conclusions can be drawn from the examples used in 
                                                 
193 See examples 6, 7 and 8 in Table Q below. 
194 Service fees, by contrast, are limited to a minimum percentage.  See Table M above. 
195 43% of loans were utilised for consumption purposes in 2003 (see Table F in Chapter Five above). 
196 Section 1.  Definition of initiation fee. 
197 See the comments of Dr Nkem-Abonta in Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) 
“National Credit Regulations: briefing”.  It is also possible that the initiation fee could be regarded as a 
separate short term or unsecured loan, attracting interest at the prescribed rate and subject to the 
standard service fee of R50 per month permitted by the Act.  This possibility is not excluded by the Act. 
198 The extent of this increase will be shown when analysing the total cost of credit in Tables P and Q. 
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these tables: on short-term loans, the initiation fee will contribute between 28%199 
and 105%200 to the total cost of credit, whereas on unsecured credit transactions, the 
initiation fee will contribute between 4%201 and 22%202 – much less than short-term 
loans.  In general, initiation fees are smallest relative to the total cost of credit in the 
case of the larger loans, where they appear to function optimally, and bigger in the 
case of smaller loans, where they are out of proportion to the total cost of credit. 
 
As stated earlier,203 it is unclear exactly what costs the initiation fee is intended to 
cover and for what reason the initiation fee has been introduced at all.  The purpose 
of the initiation fee appears to be to cover disbursements incurred by the credit 
grantor, rather than to allow the credit grantor to earn a fee that can be pocketed in 
the form of profit.204  This being so, it is strange that it is called a “fee”, which is a 
term widely associated with compensation for services delivered, as opposed to 
disbursements incurred.  Second, disbursements such as credit checks, mortgage 
bond costs and evaluation costs would surely be more accurately charged if the 
actual cost of the disbursement were charged, rather than an arbitrary maximum 
initiation fee.  Third, what justification is there for permitting widely differing maximum 
initiation fees on different size money loans205 when the disbursements for different 
size loans will surely be similar?  Fourth, the disbursements incurred in respect of a 
money loan are likely to be minimal when compared to, for example, a mortgage 
agreement.206  There would seem to be little justification for charging, for example, an 
initiation fee of R550 for a money loan of R5 000207 if it is intended to cover 
disbursements only, because it is highly unlikely that such disbursements would ever 
amount to anything close to R550.   
 
If the initiation fee is not to cover disbursements only, then it has to be compensating 
the credit grantor with a profitable fee for services rendered in initiating the loan.  
However, what justification could there be for such compensation, when the lender is 
already earning interest on the loan and charging a monthly service fee?  Because 
the actual cost of disbursements is limited, it seems clear that at least part of the 
                                                 
199 Table P, Example 3 – a loan of R500 repayable over 4 months. 
200 Table P, Example 2 – a loan of R500 repayable over 1 month. 
201 Table Q, Example 8 – a loan of R30 000 repayable over 48 months. 
202 Table Q, Example 3 – a loan of R1 638 repayable over 12 months. 
203 6.2.3 above. 
204 See the comments of Ms Fontes of the Micro-finance Regulatory Council in Trade and Industry 
Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
205 Maximum initiation fees will, for example, range from R150 (in the case of a loan of R1 000) to 
R1000 (in the case of a loan of R9500 or more) – see Table M above. 
206 Such disbursements could conceivably include the cost of credit checks (if any), photocopying, 
stationery and telephone calls. 
207 See Table M above. 
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initiation fee will contribute to the compensation of lenders in the form of a profitable 
fee.  If this is so, then it appears that the initiation fee is designed as a method 
(alongside interest and the service fee) of contributing to the total cost of credit.  It will 
help to keep interest rates lower, arguably to make credit look cheaper, when in fact 
such credit may not be cheaper.208  
 
The actual purpose of the initiation fee remains obscure, and must be satisfactorily 
explained.  If its existence cannot be justified, then it should be removed altogether, 
or at least implemented with closer reference to actual disbursements incurred, which 
would introduce its own administrative difficulties.  Whatever the purpose of the 
initiation fee, however, what is certain is that it will markedly increase the cost of 
credit for the consumer.209 
 
6.4.3 The implications of the service fee 
 
The effect of the application of the service fee at the flat rate of R50 per month on 
different size loans is shown as a percentage of the loan amount in Table N below. 
 
Table N: The effective cost of the service fee on different size loans 
 
Loan amount 
 
Monthly service 
fee 
Monthly cost of service 
fee relative to loan 
amount (% of loan 
amount per month) 
Annual cost of service fee 
relative to loan amount (% 
of loan amount per year) 
R200 
 
R50 25% per month 300% per year 
R500 
 
R50 10% per month 120% per year 
R1 000 
 
R50 5% per month 60% per year 
R5 000 
 
R50 1% per month 12% per year 
R10 000 
 
R50 0,5% per month 6% per year 
 
The smaller the loan amount, the more expensive will be the service fee relative to 
the loan amount.  When this cost is reflected as a percentage, it is apparent that the 
service fee adds significantly to the cost of the loan, increasing exponentially with 
smaller and smaller loan amounts.  The “flat rate” service fee of R50 per month is out 
of all proportion to the initial loan amount in the case of smaller loans.  It will be 
                                                 
208 For a full explanation in this regard, see 6.4.4 below. 
209 See 6.4.5 below for a demonstration of the extent of this cost. 
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exorbitant in the case of very small loans of less than R500 (a cost of 10% per month 
and more, increasing exponentially), unduly onerous in the case of small loans of 
between R500 and R1 000 (a cost of between 10% and 5% per month), and is still 
too high in the case of loans up to R5 000 (between 5% and 1% per month).   
 
The effective cost of credit on a short term loan of R1 000, for example, will be 10% 
per month, which is double the maximum interest rate of 5% per month210 after the 
service fee of R50, or 5% per month, is added.  The effective cost of credit on a short 
term loan of R500 (the average size 30-day loan)211 will be 15% per month, which is 
three times the maximum interest rate of 5% per month.212  The effective cost of 
credit on a short term loan of R200 will be 30% per month, six times the maximum 
interest rate of 5% per month,213 which is the same as the common current interest 
rate on micro-loans, namely 30% per month, or 360% per year, and borrowers will be 
left no better off than in current practice.  If the initiation fee is paid off in monthly 
instalments, this will further add to the monthly cost of credit.214  
 
This surely cannot have been the intention of the Act, and the negative results in 
respect of small loans must surely outweigh the advantage of simplicity made 
possible by a standardised service fee.215  Such small loans are not uncommon,216 
especially amongst poor communities, and once again it will be the poorest, most 
desperate people, for whom small loans will mean the most relative to their other 
incomes, who will pay the most and be hardest hit by the cost of credit in terms of the 
National Credit Act.   
 
This result is in conflict with the intention of the Act, which provides that the service 
fee “must not exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt”.217  The 
purpose of the Act is would seem to be that the amount of the service fee should vary 
relative to the principal debt, just as in the case of the initiation fee – that is to say, it 
should be higher for bigger loans, and lower for smaller loans.  This purpose is not 
                                                 
210 Reg 42(1), Table A. 
211 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26. 
212 That is, after the service fee of R50, or 10% per month, is added. 
213 That is, after the service fee of R50, or 25% per month, is added. 
214 The cost of a loan of R200 will then be 46% per month. 
215 See 6.3.3 regarding the justification for a flat rate service fee.  A further inequity is that the flat rate 
service fee does not distinguish, for example, between consumers who use their cheque accounts on a 
very limited scale and consumers that are much more active in their financial dealings. 
216 The average size of 30-day loans was R500 per month in 2000 (Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26). 
217 Section 101(1)(c)(iii).  My underlining.  Exactly the same words are used in s101(1)(b)(i) in regard to 
the initiation fee. 
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born out in the Regulations, which may be ultra vires,218 and which should be 
amended.   
 
To cure this problem, the desired result could easily be achieved by amending the 
regulations to set the service fee at a percentage of the loan amount, subject to both 
a minimum and a maximum rand amount.  For example, a more equitable service fee 
could be 1% per month of the initial loan amount, subject to a minimum fee of R10 
per month and a maximum fee of R50 per month.  These limits would have the result 
that a service fee of R10 per month would be charged on all loans up to R1 000, a 
fee of R50 per month on all loans in excess of R5 000, and a pro rata amount for 
loans between R1 000 and R5 000.  Although this lower limit may seem very little: 
• A service fee of R10 on a loan of R200 will still amount to 5% of the loan 
amount, causing interest and service fee (without the initiation fee) to be 10% 
per month of the loan amount (which will still be double the maximum 
permissible interest). 
• A service fee of R10 on a loan of R500 will amount to 2% of the loan amount, 
causing interest and the service fee to be 7% of the loan amount. 
 
This would appear to be a fairer compromise having regard to the interests of both 
credit providers and consumers.  Credit providers would still be compensated for the 
administration of every credit agreement, no matter how small the initial transaction, 
and borrowers of small loans would be protected from exorbitant service fees.   
 
This discussion begs the question whether the service fee is necessary at all on 
small credit agreements.  Why could the interest rate not simply be increased by 1% 
or another appropriate amount, and the service fee be scrapped altogether?  The 
result of such an approach would be that the amount of these costs would always be 
in direct proportion to the size of the credit agreement, which is the time-honoured 
method for calculating interest.  The Act itself provides that the service fee “must not 
exceed the prescribed amount relative to the principal debt”,219 a provision that 
seems to have been ignored by the Minister.  There can surely be no fairer approach 
than this for credit provider and consumer alike.  Further advantages of such an 
approach are that the calculation of the cost of credit would be simpler for all parties 
                                                 
218 Otto The National Credit Act Explained 78. 
219 Section 101(1)(c)(iii). 
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to understand, and the actual cost of credit would be more evident since it would not 
be obscured by the service fee.220   
 
Rather, the result of the standardised service fee is to maintain the effective cost of 
credit on very small loans at exorbitant levels which are comparable with those that 
currently prevail, ensuring that lenders of small amounts (especially 30-day lenders) 
will be able to continue to do business profitably.  A R50 per month service fee on a 
big loan may not seem like much to a relatively wealthy consumer, but it is enormous 
for a poor borrower of a small loan.  It will usually be the poor, who have little voice in 
policy-making, who will borrow small amounts and who will pay the most for credit, 
which appears to have escaped the notice of the Minister.  Are such high credit costs 
justifiable for the reason that they are necessary to keep small lenders in business 
and thereby ensure continued access to expensive credit for the poor?  It would 
seem not. 
 
For these reasons serious consideration should be given to scrapping the service fee 
altogether and raising interest rates by an appropriate amount to compensate for the 
resultant loss of income to lenders.221 
 
6.4.4 The danger of masking the total cost of credit 
 
An issue that has been alluded to already222 is the concern that the drastic reduction 
in interest rates will mask or obscure the actual total cost of credit when the initiation 
and service fees are added.  It is possible that these fees could to a large extent 
remain hidden, with the emphasis being placed on interest rates (which are familiar 
to consumers) when products are marketed.  The first set of credit costs (interest and 
fees) that were presented to the Minister of Trade and Industry prior to promulgation 
of the draft Regulations on 20 February 2006 provided for higher interest rates and 
lower fees, in order “to make expensive credit look expensive”.223  After a long 
process and much input from political stakeholders, however, interest rates were 
lowered and fees increased in the Regulations subsequently promulgated.224  There 
is little doubt that this skewing of credit costs away from interest and towards fees, 
with which consumers will not be familiar, will increase the chances of consumers 
                                                 
220 For further discussion in this regard, see 6.4.4 below.  
221 Unless, of course, interest rates are already too high. 
222 See 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 above. 
223 See the comments of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
224 Ibid. 
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being misled as to the actual cost of credit and being lured into borrowing money 
which will end up costing much more than they had initially expected.  This result is 
likely to inhibit disclosure and exacerbate rather than combat over-indebtedness, 
both of which are important objectives of the Act.225 
 
A significant and essential consumer protection measure could be achieved by 
increasing interest rates relative to fees and decreasing fees relative to interest rates, 
and still arriving at the same overall cost of credit.226  This will enable consumers to 
make a more accurate assessment of the true cost of credit, with no negative impact 
on the income of lenders. 
 
6.4.5 The combined impact of interest, the initiation fee and the service 
fee 
 
6.4.5.1 An illustration of the total cost of credit 
 
In Tables P and Q below, the total cost of credit is demonstrated in the case of short-
term loans and unsecured loans respectively.  In each case, a range of appropriate 
loan amounts and loan periods are assumed, and maximum permissible interest 
rates, initiation fees and service fees are applied to these amounts.227  The total cost 
of credit is reflected in two ways: 
• The monthly cost of interest and service fees only, on the assumption that the 
initiation fee has already been paid on conclusion of the loan.228 
• The monthly cost of interest, initiation fees and service fees, on the 
assumption that the initiation fee has been capitalised, i.e. it has been 
charged to the borrower and is being paid back in the same number of 
monthly instalments at the same interest rate as the initial loan amount.229 
 
Using each of these methods, the total monthly cost of credit is then indicated in 
rands.  Finally, this rand amount is indicated as a monthly percentage of the initial 
                                                 
225 Section 3(e)(ii) and s3(g) of the Act respectively. 
226 Assuming of course that the same overall cost of credit is the desired result. 
227 See 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 for the maximum amounts permissible.  It is assumed that the interest, 
initiation fees and service fees will always be these maximum amounts for the reasons advanced in 
6.3.4 above, which also helps to simplify this illustration. 
228 The difficulty with this approach is that the cost born by the borrower of the payment of the initiation 
fee is not able to be reflected in any way in the total cost of credit. 
229 It is likely that the initiation fee will be charged to the borrower, especially in the case of poorer 
borrowers, for the reasons given in 6.4.2.  This approach is therefore favoured, and is adopted in the 
analysis of the tables that follows. 
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loan.  This monthly percentage gives the most accurate possible indication of the 
total cost of credit in each case.   
 
For the sake of simplicity and to allow for useful comparison, only monthly rand and 
percentage figures are used throughout both tables, in the case of both short-term 
and unsecured loans.  Annualised figures are of course easily able to be calculated 
by simply multiplying these figures by 12, and have been included in the analysis that 
follows the tables.  It is, however, important not to lose sight of the fact that these are 
monthly figures only, and that interest rates are traditionally reflected as annual rates.  
The full extent and impact of high interest rates is often obscured by reflecting them 
as monthly figures, and the Act saw fit to require that interest “must be expressed in 
percentage terms as an annual rate”.230  This requirement is contradicted in 
Regulation 42(1), which provides that “[t]he interest rate on short term credit 
transactions and incidental credit transactions must be disclosed as a monthly 
interest rate”.231 
 
It is assumed for the purposes of these calculations that: 
• The maximum rates of interest and fees are charged, for the reasons set out 
in 6.3.4 above. 
• The total initiation fee is capitalised i.e. paid off over the same period as the 
duration of the loan, at the same interest rate (5% per month).  If the initiation 
fee were charged to the consumer as a separate loan, it could attract its own 
initiation and service fees, which would make the initiation fee more 
expensive. 
• For the purposes of simplicity, interest is charged only on the loan amount,232 
whereas the Regulations allow interest to be charged on unpaid interest and 
other fees,233 which would make the total cost of credit more expensive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
230 Section 101(1)(d)(i).  My underlining. 
231 My underlining. 
232 That is, the calculations are based upon simple interest. 
233 Reg 39(1)(a)(iii) read with reg 40(2). 
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Table P: Illustration of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations  
– short-term loans234 
 
 Amount of 
initial loan 
Duration of 
loan235 
Interest 
(always  
5% pm236 
/ 60% 
pa)237 
(R) 
Initiation 
fee, 
when 
paid up 
front 
(R) 
Initiation 
fee (pm, 
when paid 
in instal-
ments)238 
(R) 
Service 
fee 
(always  
R50 pm)239 
(%) 
Total cost 
of credit  
(interest 
+ service 
fee)240 
R (%) 
Total cost 
of credit 
(interest + 
initiation + 
service 
fees)241 
R (%) 
1 R200 1 month R10 pm R30  R32 pm 25% pm R60 pm R92 pm 
       30% pm 46% pm 
2 R500242 1 month R25 pm R75  R79 pm 10% pm R75 pm R154 pm 
       15% pm 31% pm 
3 R500 4 months R25 pm R75 R21 pm 10% pm R75 pm R96 pm 
       15% pm 19% pm 
4 R1 000 4 months R50 pm R150 R42 pm 5% pm R100 pm R142 pm 
       10% pm 14% pm 
5 R1 638243 6 months244 R82 pm R214  R42 pm 3% pm R132 pm R174 pm 
       8% pm 11% pm 
6 R5 000 1 month R250 pm R550 R578 pm 1% pm R378 pm R878 pm 
       6% pm 18% pm 
7 R8 000245 6 months R400 pm R850  R167 pm 0,6% pm R450 pm R617 pm 
       6% pm 8% pm 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
234 All figures in the tables in Chapter Six are rounded off to the nearest rand or percentage point (or on 
occasion ½ a percentage point). 
235 Appropriate loan periods for short-term loans of between 1 and 6 months are assumed. 
236 The abbreviation “pm” means “per month” throughout the tables in this chapter. 
237 The abbreviation “pa” means “per annum” throughout the tables in this chapter. 
238 This amount is calculated by applying the formula FV = PV(1+it) used in Table B of Chapter Five 
above.   
239 The service fee is expressed as a percentage of the initial loan.   
240 The monthly combined cost of interest and service fee are expressed in rands and as a percentage 
of the initial loan.  It is assumed that the total initiation fee has been paid on payment of the loan.  
241 The monthly combined cost of interest, the initiation fee and the service fee are expressed in rands 
and as a percentage of the initial loan.  It is assumed that the total initiation fee is paid off monthly. 
242 The average size 30-day loan was R500 per month in 2000 (Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26). 
243 The loan amount of R1 638 has been illustrated since it represents the average size loan for the year 
ended May 2006 (Micro-finance Regulatory Council “Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter” 
http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=91) (accessed 13 October 2006). 
244 The maximum permissible duration of a short term loan. 
245 The maximum permissible short term loan amount. 
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Table Q: Illustration of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations  
– unsecured loans246 
 Amount 
of initial 
loan 
Duration of 
loan247 
Interest 
(always  
38,7% 
pa / 
3,2% 
pm) 
(R) 
Initiation 
fee, 
when 
paid up 
front 
(R) 
Initiation 
fee (pm, 
when paid 
in instal-
ments) 
(R) 
Service 
fee 
(always  
R50 pm) 
(%) 
Total cost 
of credit  
(interest + 
service 
fee) 
R (%) 
Total cost 
of credit 
(interest + 
initiation + 
service 
fees) 
R (%) 
1 R500 6 months R16 pm R75 R14 pm 10% pm R66 pm R80 pm 
       13% pm 16% pm 
2 R1 000 12 months R32 pm R150 R15 pm 5% pm R82 pm R97 pm 
       8% pm 10% pm 
3 R1 638 12 months R52 pm R214 R22 pm 3% pm R102 pm R124 pm 
       6% pm 7,5% pm 
4 R5 000 24 months R160 pm R550 R33 pm 1% pm R210 pm R243 pm 
       4% pm 5% pm 
5 R8 000 24 months R256 pm R850 R51 pm 0,6% pm R306 pm R357 pm 
       4% pm 4,5% pm 
6 R10 000 36 months R320 pm R1000 R46 pm 0,5% pm R370 pm R416 pm 
       4% pm 4% pm 
7 R20 000 36 months R640 pm R1000 R46 pm 0,25% pm R690 pm R736 pm 
       3% pm 3,5% pm 
8 R30 000 48 months R960pm R1000 R40 pm 0,2% pm R1010pm R1050 pm 
       3% pm 3% pm 
 
 
6.4.5.2 A review of the illustration of the cost of credit by way of selected 
examples248 
 
(a) A loan of R200: 
 
A one month loan of R200249 will cost 46% of the initial loan amount (equivalent to 
552% per year), amounting to R92 (R10 interest + R32 initiation fee + R50 service 
fee).  Thus on a loan of R200, the sum of R292 will have to be repaid at the end of a 
month.  The total cost of this loan will therefore be approximately: 
                                                 
246 Table Q is very similar to Table P to allow for comparisons to be made.  Thus, unless otherwise 
indicated in the footnotes to this table, all footnotes to Table P above are equally relevant to Table Q. 
247 Appropriate loan periods of between 6 and 48 months are assumed. 
248 It is assumed for the purposes of this review that the initiation fee will be charged to the borrower for 
the reasons given in 6.4.2 above. 
249 Table P, Example 1. 
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• Nine times more than the maximum interest rate of 5% per month in terms of 
the National Credit Act. 
• 50% more than the typical cost of a 30-day loan exempt from the Usury Act 
(30% per month). 
 
(b) A loan of R500: 
 
A one month loan of R500250 will cost 31% per month (equivalent to 372% per year) 
of the initial loan amount, amounting to R154 (R25 interest + R79 initiation fee + R50 
service fee).  The total cost of this loan will therefore be approximately: 
• Six times more than the maximum interest rate of 5% per month in terms of 
the National Credit Act. 
• A little more than the typical cost of a 30-day loan exempt from the Usury Act 
(30% per month). 
 
A loan of R500 repayable over 4 months251 will cost 19% per month (equivalent to 
228% per year) of the initial loan amount, amounting to R96 per month.  When R500 
is repaid over 6 months at the lower maximum interest rate,252 it will still cost a 
considerable 16% per month (equivalent to 192% per year) of the loan amount (R80 
per month), which is five times the maximum interest rate of 3,2% per month. 
 
(c) A loan of R1 638:253 
 
A short term loan of R1 638 repayable over 6 months254 will cost 11% per month 
(equivalent to 132% per year) of the initial loan amount, amounting to R174 per 
month.  This loan will therefore cost: 
• More than double the maximum interest rate of 5% per month in terms of the 
National Credit Act. 
• More than one third of the typical 30% per month for loans exempt from the 
Usury Act. 
 
                                                 
250 Table P, Example 2. 
251 Table P, Example 3. 
252 Table Q, Example 1. 
253 As indicated in Table P, R1 638 is the average size loan for the year ended May 2006 (Micro-finance 
Regulatory Council “Micro-lending industry overview May 2006 quarter”). 
254 Table P, Example 5. 
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When repaid over 12 months at the lower maximum interest rate,255 a loan of R1 638 
will cost 7,5% per month (90% per year) of the initial loan amount, amounting to 
R124 per month. 
 
(d) A loan of R8 000: 
 
A loan of R8 000 repayable over 6 months256 will cost 8% per month (equivalent to 
96% per year) of the initial loan amount, amounting to R617 per month.  This loan will 
therefore cost: 
• Nearly double the maximum interest rate of 5% per month in terms of the 
National Credit Act. 
• Less than one third of the typical 30% per month for loans exempt from the 
Usury Act. 
• Nearly five times the current Usury Act maximum rate.257 
• Over 50% more than the envisaged maximum cost of credit for a secured 
bank loan of R8 000 in terms of the National Credit Act.258 
 
When repaid over 24 months at the lower maximum interest rate,259 a loan of R8 000 
will cost 4,5% per month (54% per year) of the initial loan amount, amounting to 
R357 per month. 
 
(e) A loan of R20 000: 
 
A loan of R20 000 repayable over 36 months at the lower maximum interest rate260 
will cost 3,5% per month (equivalent to 42% per year) of the initial loan amount, 
amounting to R736 per month.  This loan will therefore cost: 
• Only a little more than the maximum interest rate of 38,7% per year in terms 
of the National Credit Act. 
• Approximately 2 ½ times the current Usury Act maximum rate for such a loan 
of 17% per year. 
                                                 
255 Table Q, Example 3. 
256 Table P, Example 7. 
257 The Usury Act maximum interest rate is 20% per annum for loans less than R10 000, and 17% per 
annum for loans greater than R10 000 (GN 1100, Government Gazette 26809, 17 September 2004). 
258 The envisaged maximum cost of credit on a secured bank loan of R8 000, repayable over 6 months, 
will be 60% per annum, obtained by adding to the maximum interest rate of 28,7% per annum the 
annualised monthly initiation fee (R167 per month, which is 24% per annum of R8 000) and service fees 
(R50 per month, which is 7,5% per annum of R8 000) for the loan period concerned. 
259 Table Q, Example 5. 
260 Table Q, Example 7. 
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• Not much more than the envisaged maximum cost of credit for a secured 
bank loan of R20 000 in terms of the National Credit Act.261 
 
6.4.5.3 Deductions from the illustration of the total cost of credit 
 
Based on the figures in Tables P and Q and their review above, the following 
deductions can be made regarding the envisaged cost of credit:262 
 
(a) The smaller the loan, the more expensive it will be.  On short-term loans, for 
example, the total cost of credit is not 5% per month (the maximum interest 
rate), but 8% per month (96% per year) on a loan of R8 000.  This cost rises 
steadily to 11% per month (132% per year) on a loan of R1 638.  Thereafter, 
the cost of credit rises first steeply, then exponentially to the exorbitant level 
of 46% per month (552% per year) on a one month loan of R200.   
 
(b) Although big unsecured loans will be expensive when compared to the 
current Usury Act maximum,263 this is not a helpful comparison since loans in 
excess of R10 000 which are bound by the Usury Act are almost invariably 
secured.264 
 
(c) The capping of interest rates on smaller loans currently exempt from the 
Usury Act (a maximum loan of R10 000) will markedly reduce the cost of 
credit on loans in excess of about R1 000 from the common 30% per month.  
The cost of credit will be less than one third of this 30% in the case of loans 
over R5 000,265 and less than one half of this 30% in the case of loans over 
R1 000.266  When these costs are annualised and compared with the Usury 
Act maximum rate,267 however, it becomes clear that they are still far too 
high, despite these reductions.268 
 
                                                 
261 The envisaged maximum cost of credit on a secured bank loan of R20 000, repayable over 36 
months, will be 34,7% per annum.  The calculation used is the same as in 6.4.5.2 (d) above. 
262 The figures indicated below are estimates only based upon the figures in the tables for purposes of 
illustration, and do not purport to be 100% accurate. 
263 Some 42% in the case of a loan of R20 000, and some 36% in the case of a loan of R30 000, 
compared to 17% per annum in the case of loans in excess of R10 000. 
264 DTI “Policy Framework” paras 3.4-3.11. 
265 Table P, Example 6, and Table Q, Example 4. 
266 Table P, Example 4, and Table Q, Example 2. 
267 20% per year for loans less than R10 000. 
268 The cost of a R1 000 loan will be 168% per year, and the cost of a R5 000 loan will be 108% per year 
(Table P, Examples 4 and 6). 
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(d) The impact of the capping of interest rates on loans between R1 000 and 
R500 will be minimal.  The cost of credit will remain excessive, becoming 
exorbitant the smaller the loan.269   
 
(e) There will be a negative impact on loans of R500 and less, and credit will 
become more expensive than the already exorbitant current 30% per month.  
A loan of R500 will cost 31% per month,270 and a loan of R200 will cost 46% 
per month, which is over 50% more than the former 30%.271 
 
(f) One month loans will be much more expensive than other short-term loans.  
If R500 were to remain the average size of a one month loan,272 then 31% 
per month (372% per year) will be the average cost of credit on one month 
loans, and borrowers will be no better off than they currently are.  Even if the 
average size one month loans were to rise to R1 000 by 2007, then 25% per 
month (300% per year) will be the average cost of credit on one month loans, 
which is not much lower.  The cost of a one month loan of R5 000 is still 18% 
per month (216% per year), and the cost of a one month loan of R8 000 is 
nearly 17% per month (204% per year),273 which is excessive. 
 
(g) For smaller loans of less than about R8 000, the positive impact of capped 
interest rates will to a large extent be negated by the high maximum initiation 
and service fees.274  This is most marked in the case of the smallest loans: on 
a one month loan of R500,275 for example, the monthly interest (R25) will be 
only 16% of the total cost of credit (R154).276  On a one month loan of R8 000 
the monthly interest (R400) will be only 30% of the total credit cost (R1 342). 
 
For bigger loans the converse occurs, and this is where the initiation and 
service fees work optimally: on a 36 month loan of R20 000,277 for example, 
                                                 
269 Loans between R1000 and R500 will cost between 14% and 31% per month of the initial loan 
amount. 
270 Table P, Example 2. 
271 Table P, Example 1. 
272 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26. 
273 Interest at 5% per month (R400) + initiation fee at R850 + 5% interest (R892) + service fee (R50) = 
total monthly cost of credit (R1 342, or 16,8% per month of initial loan of R8 000). 
274 Conversely, the negative impact on borrowers of the service fee and initiation fee is obscured by the 
interest rate cap. 
275 See Table P, Example 2. 
276 On a one month loan of R200, the monthly interest (R10) is only 11% of the total cost of credit (R92).  
See Table P, Example 1. 
277 See Table P, Example 2. 
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the interest of 38,7% per annum is 92% of the total cost of credit of 42% per 
annum. 
 
(h) The impact of the initiation and service fees on smaller loans amounts to a 
skewing of the cost of credit away from interest and towards these fees, so 
that interest decreases relative to these fees.  This skewing has the 
dangerous effect of masking the true cost of credit from the consumer for the 
reasons set out in 6.4.4 above, and thereby misleading the consumer.  
Further, it will inhibit the Act’s objectives of promoting disclosure and 
combating over-indebtedness.278 
 
6.4.6 The socio-economic impact of the new cost of credit 
 
6.4.6.1 Policy, regulation and practical results 
 
From the deductions above, it is apparent that the new structure for costing of credit 
will work best for the biggest loans in excess of R8 000.279  This is so clearly evident 
that it appears to have been designed for such loans.  For loans between R1 000 and 
R8 000, the interest and initiation fees will cause the cost of credit to be far too high.  
As for small loans of less than R1 000,280 it is possible that the Minister may have 
overlooked the resultant exorbitant cost of credit.  If this result was intended, then it 
would seem that the Minister more or less wishes to maintain the status quo 
regarding the cost of credit for such loans.  It is a matter for speculation as to why he 
might have done so.  The intention of the Department of Trade and Industry in regard 
to the cost of credit was “to make credit as cheap as possible and at the same time 
allow lenders to make a living”.281  In the case of small loans of less than R1 000, it is 
clear that the Minister has erred in favour of the latter at the expense of the former.  
Such lenders will be able to continue to charge an effective cost in the region of the 
current 30% per month (360% per year), ranging from 14% per month (168% per 
year) on loans of R1 000 to 46% per month (552% per year) on loans of R200.  We 
are therefore likely to see a continuation of “two credit markets” in the money lending 
sector which was identified by the Department of Trade and Industry and which the 
Department sought to combat: one market for middle and high-income borrowers 
benefiting from cheaper credit; the other market for low income borrowers paying 
                                                 
278 See 6.4.4 and s3(g) and s3(e)(ii) of the Act. 
279 See 6.4.5.3 (g) above. 
280 In particular one month loans. 
281 See the comments of Dr J Erasmus, Legal Drafter in the Department of Trade and Industry, in Trade 
and Industry Portfolio Committee (24 March 2005) “National Credit Regulations: briefing”. 
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excessive, and frequently exorbitant, prices for credit.282  From the practical results of 
applying the regulated limits on the cost of credit to smaller loans, it seems clear that 
the Department’s stated policy has not been implemented. 
 
The excessive cost of small loans will of course have dire consequences for 
borrowers.  These have already been thoroughly canvassed in Chapter Five above, 
and the issues raised need not be repeated here.283  These costs will continue to 
have a negative socio-economic impact on individuals and poor communities alike, 
as is the case with loans currently exempt from the Usury Act.  The new cost of credit 
will also impact negatively on borrowers of short-term loans of between R1 000 and 
R8 000, but to a lesser extent. 
 
6.4.6.2 Impact on individual consumers 
 
The impact of the new credit costs on individual consumers is demonstrated in Table 
R below by way of examples of various loan sizes, repayment periods and consumer 
incomes.284  The assumed figures upon which this analysis is based are explained in 
the footnotes to the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
282 DTI “Policy framework” paras 2.1-2.6.  See also 5.1 above. 
283 Such issues include, for example, the implications of consumption finance (5.4 above) and consumer 
ignorance and illiteracy (5.5 above). 
284 This table is similar to Table B of Chapter Five. 
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Table R: Sample survey of variable short term loan sizes and repayment 
periods at the new cost of credit,285 viewed against monthly income286 
 
 A B C D E F G H 
 Amount 
of loan 
Period of 
repayment
287 
Instalment 
per 
month288 
Monthly 
wage / 
pension of 
borrower
289 
Percentage 
(%) of  
income 
available 
for all other 
expenses 
(after loan 
repayment) 
Total 
interest 
and fees 
paid during 
loan period 
290  
Percentage 
(%) of total 
income 
utilised to 
pay interest 
and fees 
during loan 
period 
Percentage 
(%) of total 
amount 
repaid 
which is 
utilised to 
pay interest 
and fees 
1 R200 1 month R292 R820291 64% R92292 11% 32% 
2 R500 1 month R654 R820 20% R154293 19% 24% 
3 R500 6 months R193 R1 000 81% R659 11% 57% 
4 R1 000 1 month R1 257 R2 000 37% R257 13% 21% 
5 R1 000 6 months R338 R3 000 89% R1 032 6% 51% 
6 R1 000 12 months R147 R4 000 96% R761 2% 43% 
7 R1 638 6 months R387 R2 000 81% R685 6% 29% 
8 R1 638 12 months R217 R4 000 95% R970 2% 37% 
9 R5 000 6 months R1 081 R2 000 46% R1 489 12% 23% 
10 R5 000 24 months R362 R3 000 88% R3 696 5% 43% 
11 R8 000 6 months R1 730 R4 000 57% R2 383 10% 23% 
12 R8 000 24 months R579 R5 000 88% R5 914 5% 43% 
 
 
 
                                                 
285 It is assumed that the maximum permissible interest rate is charged for the reasons given in 6.3.4 
above. 
286 Simple interest is assumed, that is interest on the capital only, not compound interest, which includes 
interest on interest. This is done in order to make the calculations simpler.  If interest were to be 
compounded, the cost of credit would be higher.  Reg 39(1) read with reg 40(2) allows interest to be 
charged on unpaid interest and all other costs. 
287 A spread of repayment periods is assumed in the examples, with the emphasis being on short-term 
loans of 1 or 6 months, charged at a maximum 5% per month (60% per year).  Several longer term 
“unsecured” loans are included, which can be charged at the lower current interest rate of 38,7% per 
year. 
288 The monthly instalments are calculated by adopting the following formula: FV = PV(1+it)  
(FV = future value; PV = present value; i = interest rate; t = time).  The present value is the loan amount 
plus the initiation fee, which is assumed to be capitalised, and the standard service fee of R50 is then 
added. 
289 The bulk of the client base of micro-lenders earned between R2 000 and R4 000 per month in 2003, 
and it is for this reason that figures in this vicinity have been assumed for the incomes of borrowers in 
column D of the table [MFRC Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Indebtedness dated 17 June 
2003 (Appendix para 5.1)]. 
290 This amount is calculated as follows: instalment per month x number of months, less loan amount. 
291 This amount equates to the current monthly old age state pension. 
292 See Example 1 of Table P above. 
293 See Example 2 of Table P above. 
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The following deductions can be made from Table R: 
 
(a) Many very low income earners (eg pensioners) borrowing relatively small 
amounts will remain vulnerable, as they already are under the Usury Act 
exemption.294  The borrowers in examples 2 and 4 will have available only 
20% and 37% respectively of their income to pay for all their other expenses 
(Column E).  The result of having taken out this loan will be that they have 
only a small percentage of their original low income to live on. 
 
(b) Between 10% and 19% of borrowers’ total income is used to service the loan 
in question – that is to say, to pay interest and fees during the loan period – in 
6 of the 8 examples of short-term loans (Column G).  The impact of the cost 
of credit on the personal incomes of borrowers is lower than the impact on 
borrowers under the Usury Act exemption,295 but is nonetheless still alarming. 
 
(c) Between 21% and 57% of the total repayments made are utilised towards the 
payment of interest and fees (Column H).  These figures are much lower than 
the same figures in relation to loans under the Usury Act exemption when the 
cost of credit is 30% per month on all loans,296 but again are still considerable. 
 
6.4.6.3 One-month loans and the debt spiral 
 
Tables P and R above show that one month loans are much more expensive than 
other short-term loans.  Thus, on a loan of R200, R292 will have to be repaid at the 
end of a month,297 and on a loan of R1 000, R1 257 will have to be repaid at the end 
of a month.298  It is unlikely that many low-income borrowers will be able to afford to 
pay back such loans,299 and frequently repeated loans will have to be taken out to 
fund in full the re-payment of previous loans.  This will result in debt spirals and 
subsequent debt traps, and borrowers will in effect remain permanently indebted.  
This disastrous phenomenon has been thoroughly discussed in 5.3.1 above, and is 
equally relevant here. 
 
                                                 
294 See 5.2, Table B, Note (a) above. 
295 See 5.2, Table B, Note (b) above. 
296 See 5.2, Table B, Note (c) above, in which over 73% of total repayments made are utilised towards 
the payment of interest in most cases. 
297 The cost of credit will be 46% on this loan.  See Table P, Example 1 above. 
298 Interest at 5% per month (R50) + initiation fee at R150 + 5% interest (R157) + service fee (R50) = 
total monthly cost of credit (R257, or 25,7% per month of initial loan of R1000). 
299 Hawkins “The cost, volume and allocation of consumer credit in South Africa” para 4.7.1. 
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In Table S below the new cost of credit is applied to a number of loan amounts.300 
  
Table S: Illustration of the application of the new cost of credit to one-month 
loans and resultant debt spiral 
 
 Month 
 
Loan amount Cost of 
credit301 
Re-payment 
amount 
Income 
Example A 1 R200 
 
R92 R292 R820 (old 
age pension) 
 2 R292 
 
R107 R399  
 3 R399 
 
R133 R532  
 4 R532 
 
R161 R693  
 5 
 
R693 R194 R887  
Example B 1 R500 R154 
 
R654 R1 000 
(wage) 
 
 
2 R654 R186 R840  
 3 
 
R840 R225 1065  
Example C 1 
 
R1 000 R257 R1 257 R2 000 
(wage) 
 2 
 
R1 257 R311 R1 568  
 3 
 
R1 568 R375 R1 943  
 
In Example A, by Month 2 the loan repayment is already double the initial loan.  By 
Month 3 the pensioner’s loan repayment (R532) amounts to 65% of his monthly 
pension of R820.  By Month 5, the loan repayment (R887) exceeds the pension.  In 
Example B, by Month 3 the loan repayment (R1 065) has already exceeded the 
worker’s wage of R1 000, and the loan repayment in Month 3 in Example C almost 
exceeds the total wage.   
 
Table S confirms that debt spirals and debt traps will continue to occur on a wide 
scale when the new cost of credit is applied, and could prove to be one of its greatest 
dangers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
300 This table is similar to Table C, Chapter Five above in which the debt spiral was demonstrated in the 
case of loans currently exempt from the Usury Act. 
301 In each case the cost of credit is calculated as follows: Interest at 5% per month + initiation fee at 
15% of loan amount (+5%) + service fee (always R50). 
  
 
143
6.4.6.4 Over-indebtedness and poverty 
 
The vast majority of borrowers of micro-loans are from low income groups,302 and 
levels of indebtedness and consumption debt are increasing in the poorest 
households.303  Further, the poorest households carry the greatest debt servicing 
burden.304  All of this has been discussed at length in Chapter Five in relation to the 
impact of current interest rates exempt from the Usury Act.  The excessive cost of 
credit on smaller short-term loans in terms of the National Credit Act will ensure that 
these trends continue, and will contribute to the perpetuation of poverty.  
 
6.4.7 Suggested amendments to the Regulations 
 
For the reasons set out above, the overall cost of credit is too high for all loans of 
less than about R5 000, and becomes more and more expensive the smaller the 
loan.305  The cost of all short-term loans is too high, once again the more so the 
smaller the loan.306  Finally, the costs of the initiation and service fees are far too high 
relative to interest, negating the gains made in interest rate reduction307 and masking 
the true cost of credit.308  Changes to the credit costing structure should therefore aim 
to reduce the overall cost of credit on all loans less than R5 000 (especially short-
term loans).  This can be achieved primarily by significantly reducing the cost of the 
initiation and service fees, if they are to be retained at all, and reducing the maximum 
limit on the size of short-term loans.  A number of amendments to the regulations that 
the Minister could adopt are therefore suggested below. 
 
6.4.7.1 Remove or reduce the initiation fee 
 
The reason for the introduction of the initiation fee is not clear.  Its purpose, whether 
it be to provide compensation for disbursements and/or fees for profit, is obscure and 
therefore questionable.309  Unless its purpose can be satisfactorily justified, then it 
should be removed.  It will not be practicable to implement an initiation fee with closer 
                                                 
302 MFRC “Submission to the Portfolio Committee on Indebtedness” (Appendix para 5.1). 
303 Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 1995 and 2000” 5–9. 
304 According to the Human Sciences Research Council “Household Indebtedness in South Africa in 
1995 and 2000” 7–8, 60,2% of regular disposable income of households in the poorest income category 
(less than R5 000 per year) was used to service debt in 2000. 
305 6.4.5.3 (a) to (e) above. 
306 6.4.5.3 (f) above. 
307 6.4.5.3 (g) above. 
308 6.4.5.3 (h) above. 
309 See 6.4.2 above. 
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reference to disbursements incurred, and credit providers could be permitted to 
charge reasonable disbursements incurred on presentment of an invoice.310   
 
If the initiation fee can be justified and must remain for good reason, then it must be 
reduced considerably.  The envisaged initiation fee will make an enormous 
contribution to the total cost of credit on smaller loans,311 and is therefore a major 
factor in maintaining high credit costs.  The following reduction is therefore proposed: 
 
(a) The maximum initiation fee on both short term and unsecured credit 
transactions should be reduced to R50 per credit agreement, plus 5% of the 
amount in excess of R1 000, but never to exceed R1 000.312 
 
(b) The initiation fee may never exceed 5% of the total principal debt (reduced 
from 15%).313 
 
The effect of this proposed reduction is demonstrated in Table T below, which can be 
compared with Table M above since the same size loan amounts have been used. 
 
Table T: Effect of proposed lower initiation fees on different size loans 
 
Loan amount 
 
Initiation fee Initiation fee as 
a percentage of 
loan amount 
Method of calculation 
R200 
 
R10 5% 5% of R200 
R500 
 
R25 5% 5% of R500 
R1 000 
 
R50 5% 5% of R1 000 
R2 000 
 
R100 5% R50 + R50 (5% of R1 000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1 000) 
R5 000 
 
R250 5% R50 + R200 (5% of R4 000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1 000)  
R8 000 
 
R400 5% R50 + R350 (5% of R7 000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1 000) 
R20 000 
 
R1 000 5% R50 + R950 (5% of R19 000, which is the 
amount in excess of R1 000) 
Loans greater 
than R20 000 
R1 000 Less than 5% The maximum limit [reg 42(2)] 
                                                 
310 The type of disbursements that may be recovered could be listed in the regulations, and should not 
include minor expenses such as photocopying, telephone calls and stationery.  This approach could, 
however, introduce a degree of uncertainty and the potential for abuse, so a regulated initiation fee may 
still be necessary. 
311 Between 28% and 105% of the total cost of credit in the case of short-term loans (Table P, Examples 
3 and 2). 
312 Compare reg 43(2). 
313 Compare reg 43(3). 
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6.4.7.2 Remove or reduce the service fee 
 
The “flat rate” service fee of R50 per month on all credit agreements results in the 
service fee on small loans being way out of proportion to the loan amount, 
increasingly so the smaller the loan.314  The service fee is too high for loans less than 
R5 000, and exorbitant for loans less than R500.  Further, there is an enormous 
disparity between the cost of the service fee relative to bigger loan amounts on the 
one hand, and the cost of the service fee relative to smaller loan amounts on the 
other hand.315  The service fee on a loan of R10 000 will be 0,5% per month of the 
loan amount, whilst the service fee on a loan of R200 will be 25% per month.  This 
disparity is untenable, being unfair and discriminatory, and having terrible 
consequences for borrowers of small amounts, who are invariably very poor.   
 
The Act in any event provides that the service fee “must not exceed the prescribed 
amount relative to the principal debt”.316  The term “relative” can have no other 
meaning than that the service fee should be proportionate to the principal debt, which 
is the foundational principle underlying percentages and interest, and the regulations 
thus appear to be ultra vires.  That being so, why should there be a service fee at all 
which is measured, for example, at 1% of the principal debt?  A better approach 
would be to scrap the service fee altogether on short-term loans, and raise the 
interest rate by the desired amount, if indeed this is necessary.  The resultant 
advantages would be that the cost of credit would be simpler to understand for both 
the lender and the borrower, easier to administer, and the actual cost of the debt will 
not be obscured. 
 
Should it be found necessary to retain the service fee for good reason,317 then it must 
be considerably reduced relative to the initial loan amount.  In order to combat the 
disparities referred to above, the regulations could be amended to provide for a 
service fee at a percentage of the loan amount (eg 1% per month), subject to a 
minimum fee (eg R10 per month) and a maximum fee (eg R50 per month).318 
 
                                                 
314 See Table N above. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Section 101(1)(c)(iii). 
317 A good reason for retaining the service fee could be that it is necessary in order to ensure that credit 
providers are adequately compensated for the smallest loans, even if this will have the result that the 
cost of servicing a loan relative to the loan amount is somewhat higher in the case of small loans than 
larger loans. 
318 The practical results of this proposal are set out in 6.4.3 above and Table U below. 
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6.4.7.3 Lower the maximum size of short-term loans 
 
The maximum limit on the size of short-term loans (R8 000) is inconsistent with 
current practice.319  The average size loan to allow for the “optimal functioning”320 of 
the 30-day credit market – considering the capacity of the borrower to repay the loan 
at the end of the month – was R500 in 2000.321  Even if this figure were to be doubled 
in 2007, it would still be way below the R8 000 maximum.  It will simply be 
unaffordable for a borrower to repay R9 360 on a loan of R8 000 at the end of a 
month or to repay R5 878 on a loan of R5 000.322  Even if such a loan were repaid 
over 4 or 6 months, it would still be too expensive.323 
 
The maximum limit on the size of short-term loans should therefore be lowered from 
R8 000 to no more than R5 000, or even as low as R3 000.324  The result will be that 
bigger loans will always be subject to the lower interest rate for unsecured loans, the 
total cost of credit will be lower, and instalments will be more affordable.325  Further, 
this will prevent lenders from offering bigger loans on only a short term basis and 
thereby benefiting from the higher interest rate. 
 
6.4.7.4 Setting appropriate levels for interest rates 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis in 
order to propose definitive figures to achieve a desired result for the cost of credit.  
Rather, a suitable approach to achieving such a result, which has regard to all the 
issues raised in this chapter, is suggested below. 
 
The drastic reduction in interest rates in the Regulations will mask or obscure the 
actual total cost of credit when the initiation and service fees are added.326  It is 
therefore essential that these fees be reduced relative to interest rates if they are not 
to be removed altogether.327  If the same overall cost of credit is desired, then interest 
rates can be increased in turn.  Lower fees relative to interest rates will ensure that 
borrowers are not misled as to the true cost of credit.   
                                                 
319 See the discussion in 6.4.1(c) above. 
320 Section 105(2)(b). 
321 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 26. 
322 6.4.5.2(f). 
323 A loan of R8 000 repayable over 6 months will cost R617 per month. 
324 R3 000 would still be much higher than the average size micro-loan, which is currently R1 638. 
325 See Table U below for an illustration of the cumulative effect of the amendments suggested. 
326 See 6.4.4 above. 
327 This provides another reason for reducing the initiation and service fees. 
  
 
147
 
If the fees are to be removed or reduced, how can suitable interest rates be 
established?  It is not appropriate to address the issue of interest rate levels alone, 
but rather to do so in the context of the cost of credit as a whole.  In order to ensure 
that an equitable result is achieved, it is necessary to “work backwards”, so to speak: 
to decide first on the desired total cost of credit for different sizes and types of 
loans328 (without overlooking the smallest loans),329 and then to set appropriate levels 
of interest and fees, with fees much lower relative to interest than in the Regulations.  
If, for example, it is decided that the fees must remain, suitable levels for these fees 
should first be established and then applied to different sizes and types of loans.  The 
difference between the desired total cost of credit and the cost of the initiation and 
service fees will then give an indication of the level at which interest rates should be 
set.   
 
This approach can be adopted by applying different suggested figures for interest 
and fees to tables P and Q above on a “trial-and-error” basis, and testing the 
resultant total cost of credit against the desired total cost determined at the outset.  In 
order to illustrate this approach and by way of an exercise, the suggested 
amendments to the regulations proposed above330 are applied to different sizes and 
types of loans in Table U below.331  Having done so, and in order to achieve an 
equitable total cost of credit, fair interest rates could be set at 4% per month for short-
term loans and remain the same as in the Regulations for unsecured loans.332  The 
results of applying these interest rates and fees are illustrated in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
328 The extreme right hand column of Tables P, Q and U (below). 
329 The various skewed results for the total cost of credit according to the Regulations, demonstrated in 
6.4.5.3 above, strongly suggest that the Minister did not have regard to the resultant total cost of credit 
for different sizes and types of loans when establishing levels for interest and fees. 
330 In 6.4.7.1 to 6.4.7.3. 
331 Table U is modelled on Tables P and Q above, and is a combination of both tables. 
332 Reg 42 of the Draft National Credit Regulations, published on 20 February 2006, provided for a lower 
maximum interest rate on “short-term loans” of 4% per month, or 48% per annum.  It is not clear why 
this limit was increased to 5% per month in the final Regulations. 
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Table U: Illustration of the application of reduced interest and fees to different loan 
sizes and types333 
 
 Amount 
of initial 
loan 
Duration of 
loan334 
Interest 
(4% pm for 
short-term 
loans/38,7
% pa for 
unsecured 
loans) (R) 
Initiation 
fee, 
when 
paid up 
front335 
(R) 
Initiation 
fee (pm, 
when 
paid in 
instal-
ments)336 
(R) 
Service 
fee337 
(%) 
Total cost 
of credit  
(interest + 
service 
fee)338 
R (%) 
Total cost 
of credit 
(interest + 
initiation + 
service 
fees)339 
R (%) 
1 R200 1 month R8 pm R10 R11 pm R10 pm R18 pm R29 pm 
       9% pm 14% pm 
2 R500 1 month R20 pm R25 R26 pm R10 pm R30 pm R56 pm 
       6% pm 11% pm 
3 R1 000 6 months R40 pm R50 R10 pm R10 pm R50 pm R60 pm 
       5% pm 6% pm 
4 R1 000 12 months R32 pm R50 R5 pm R10 pm R42 pm R47 pm 
       4% pm 5% pm 
5 R5 000340 1 month R200 pm R250 R260 pm R50 pm R250 pm R510 pm 
       5% pm 10% pm 
6 R5 000 12 months R200 pm R250 R27 pm R50 pm R250 pm R277 pm 
       5% pm 5,5% pm 
7 R8 000 24 months R256 pm R400  R24 pm R50 pm R306 pm R330 pm 
       4% pm 4% pm 
8 R10 000 36 months R322 pm R500 R24 pm R50pm R372 pm R396 pm 
       4% pm 4% pm 
9 R20 000 48 months R645 pm R1 000 R40 pm R50 pm R695 pm R735 pm 
       3,5% pm 4% pm 
10 R30 000 48 months R967 pm R1 000 R40 pm R50pm R1 017 pm R1 057 pm 
       3% pm 3% pm 
 
                                                 
333 This table includes short-term and unsecured loans, with the maximum size of short-term loans set at 
R5 000 (according to the suggestion in 6.4.7.3 above), repayable over 6 months.  Fees and interest are 
reduced according to the suggestions in 6.4.7.1, 6.4.7.2 and 6.4.7.4 above.  
334 Appropriate loan periods for short-term loans (up to R5 000) of between 1 and 6 months and longer 
term unsecured loans are assumed. 
335 The proposed initiation fee on both short-term and unsecured loans is R50, plus 5% of the amount in 
excess of R1 000, but never to exceed R1 000 and never to exceed 5% of the principal debt. 
336 In this column it is assumed that the total initiation fee is being paid off over the same period as the 
duration of the loan, at the same interest rate (4% per month). This amount is calculated by applying the 
formula FV = PV(1+it) used in Table B of Chapter Five above. 
337 The service fee is calculated at 1% per month of the loan amount, subject to a minimum fee of R10 
and a maximum fee of R50. 
338 The monthly combined cost of interest and service fee are expressed in rands and as a percentage 
of the initial loan.  It is assumed that the total initiation fee has been paid on payment of the loan.  
339 The monthly combined cost of interest, the initiation fee and the service fee are expressed in rands 
and as a percentage of the initial loan.  It is assumed that the total initiation fee is paid off monthly. 
340 The maximum permissible short term loan amount. 
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In Table V below, the cost of credit in the examples in Table U is compared with the 
cost of credit for the same examples in terms of the National Credit Regulations. 
 
Table V: Comparison of the cost of credit in terms of the National Credit 
Regulations and suggested amendments 
 
 Amount 
of initial 
loan 
Duration of 
loan 
Total cost of credit 
(interest + initiation fee 
+ service fee) in terms 
of National Credit 
Regulations (Tables P 
and Q). R (%) 
Total cost of credit 
(interest + initiation 
fee + service fee) – in 
terms of suggestions 
in Table T.  R (%) 
Percentage 
decrease 
(%) 
1 R200 1 month R92 pm R29 pm 68% 
   46% pm 14% pm  
2 R500 1 month R154 pm R56 pm 63% 
   31% pm 11% pm  
3 R1 000 6 months R130 pm R60 pm 54% 
   13% pm 6% pm  
4 R1 000 12 months R97 pm R47 pm 51% 
   10% pm 5% pm  
5 R5 000 1 month R878 pm R510 pm 42% 
   18% pm 10% pm  
6 R5 000 12 months R362 pm R277 pm 23% 
   7,5% pm 5,5% pm  
7 R8 000 24 months R357 pm R330 pm 8% 
   4,5% pm 4% pm  
8 R10 000 36 months R396 pm R396 pm 0% 
   4% pm 4% pm  
9 R20 000 48 months R735 pm R735 pm 0% 
   4% pm 4% pm  
10 R30 000 48 months R1 057 pm R1 057 pm 0% 
   3% pm 3% pm  
 
The following deductions can be made from the suggested reduced interest and fees 
(Table U) and the comparison of the results of these reduced figures with the results 
for the same examples in terms of the National Credit Regulations (Table V): 
 
(a) In terms of the suggested changes, the cost of credit on the smallest loans 
(including one month loans) is substantially reduced, but is still 14% per 
month in the case of a loan of R200, and 11% per month in the case of a loan 
of R500.  Loans in excess of R10 000 cost 4% per month and less, as is the 
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case under the Regulations.  It is therefore still questionable for reasons of 
fairness that the smallest loans should be over three times more expensive 
than the bigger loans, which may need to be given closer attention.  It is 
acknowledged, however, that the nature of the initiation and service fees 
(assuming, of course, that there are good reasons for them to remain) dictate 
that every loan, no matter how small, should bear a minimum cost in respect 
of these fees.341  Thus, so long as these fees are included, smaller loans will 
always be more expensive than larger loans.  A key question is therefore 
raised once again by this illustration: should the initiation and service fees 
remain?  One of the most important results of these fees is the disparity 
between the cost of credit for bigger relative to smaller loans, which it seems 
the Regulations were designed to achieve. 
 
(b) When comparing the Regulations with the suggested changes in Table V, it is 
immediately apparent that the biggest decreases in the cost of credit occur in 
the case of the smallest loans (68% for a loan of R200), with the smallest 
decreases in the case of loans up to R10 000 (e.g. 8% for a loan of 
R8000).342  The cost of credit for loans of R10 000 and more will remain the 
same.  This result has achieved an appropriate partial reversal of the 
Regulations’ exorbitant cost of credit for small loans as opposed to larger 
loans. 
 
(c) The suggested changes have also achieved a reversal of the skewing of 
interest rates relative to fees.  The interest on a one month loan of R500, for 
example, amounts to only 16% of the total cost of credit in terms of the 
Regulations.343  Interest on the same loan in terms of the suggested 
amendments amounts to 36% of the total cost of credit.344  The interest on a 6 
month loan of R1 000 amounts to 38% of the total cost of credit in terms of 
the Regulations,345 and 67% in terms of the suggested amendments.346  
Increased interest relative to fees will combat the masking of the true cost of 
                                                 
341 It is furthermore acknowledged that the cost of smaller, higher risk loans has to be higher than larger 
loans to compensate for such risk, failing which there will likely be little credit in the form of small loans 
available at all. 
342 See the right hand column of Table V. 
343 6.4.5.3 (g) above. 
344 Table U, Example 2.  Note that the nature of one-month loans is such that interest will always be low 
(being for one month only) relative to the initial initiation fee, which will be the same no matter what the 
duration of the loan. 
345 The interest of R50 per month (5% of R1 000) is 38% of the total cost of credit, which is R130 per 
month. 
346 Table U, Example 3. 
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credit from the borrower, and subsequent misleading of the borrower.347  It will 
further enhance the Act’s objectives of promoting disclosure and combating 
over-indebtedness.348 
  
This exercise has served to demonstrate a suitable approach to determining 
equitable levels for the total cost of credit on different sizes and types of loans, and 
could serve as a useful starting point to this end.  Further adjustments to the fees and 
interest rates could be made in order to achieve better results, which could be tested 
by applying these adjustments to Table U above. 
 
6.4.8 The likely growth of the unregistered sector 
 
In 5.8 above it was argued that in the new era of the National Credit Act, the 
unregistered micro-lending sector is likely to grow relative to the registered sector, 
partly as a result of the legacy of the past 14 years of no interest caps.  This section 
will show that the envisaged growth of the unregistered sector will also be due in part 
to the financial and administrative constraints of the Act on credit providers, and 
should therefore be read in tandem with 5.8. 
 
A person must apply to the National Credit Regulator to be registered as a credit 
provider if that person provides credit in at least 100 credit agreements or the total 
principal debt on all outstanding debts exceeds the amount of R500 000, an amount 
prescribed by the Minister.349  These limits are high, and there are therefore 
numerous smaller micro-lenders who are not required to register as credit providers, 
and the Act does not prohibit them from trading as such.  They are therefore partially 
exempt from the Act. 
 
If, however, an unregistered micro-lender at any stage exceeds either of the limits 
referred to above, then any credit agreement subsequently concluded will be 
unlawful and subject to the remedies contained in section 89(5).350  Further, all loans 
from unregistered lenders will still be subject to the usual limits on the cost of credit in 
the Act.351  If these limits are exceeded, the offending provisions will be unlawful and 
                                                 
347 6.4.4 above. 
348 See 6.4.4 and s3(e)(ii) and s3(g) of the Act. 
349 Section 40(1) read with National Credit Act (34/2005): Determination of Thresholds, GN713, 2006, 
Government Gazette 28893, 1 June 2006. 
350 See 6.2.6 above. 
351 A loan made by an unregistered lender falls within the definition of a “credit transaction” in terms of 
s8(4)(f) of the Act and, as such, it will be either a short term or an unsecured credit transaction and 
therefore subject to the regulated limits on the cost of credit applicable to such transactions. 
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subject to the remedies contained in sections 90(3) and 90(4) as read with section 
89(5).352  Importantly, in neither event will the unregistered lender’s conduct be an 
offence, as was the case in terms of the Usury Act, so this will no longer be a 
deterrent to unlawful trading.353  The civil remedies do, however, include the possible 
cancellation or forfeiture to the State of the lender’s rights to recover the amount 
loaned,354 which is a severe penalty that might well discourage unregistered lenders 
from acting unlawfully. 
 
Such civil remedies will of course assist only if affected borrowers go to court to 
protect their rights.  In order to do so, affected borrowers will need to know that 
lenders are acting unlawfully and be able to access and afford legal representation in 
order to undertake the necessary litigation.  It is therefore likely that relatively few 
unlawful credit agreements or provisions of credit agreements will be brought before 
the courts.   
 
As explained in 5.8 above, there has for many years existed a large unregistered 
micro-lending sector, estimated by Ebony Consulting International to be more than 
one half the size of the registered sector.355  This informal sector appears to have 
traded unlawfully for many years with little recourse to the courts, charging very high 
interest rates.  It is very likely that this sector will continue to trade unlawfully356 – 
although the civil remedies will be more severe, there will be no criminal sanction.  
The unregistered sector is furthermore likely to grow relative to the registered sector.  
With the lower total cost of credit, especially on bigger loans, there will be little 
incentive for many formerly registered lenders to register.  They may choose not to 
do so, but rather to operate unlawfully, “driven underground” by the Act’s limitations 
on the cost of credit and other administrative burdens and costs.357  It is therefore 
possible that low income groups will become more marginalised and driven to illegal 
credit facilities outside the protection of the Act where they will pay more for credit as 
                                                 
352 See 6.2.6 above. 
353 Section 17 of the Usury Act.  If the unlawful conduct of an unregistered lender comes to the attention 
of the National Credit Regulator, however, it may issue a notice to the lender to stop acting unlawfully, 
and failure to comply with such a notice will constitute an offence (s54). 
354 Section 89(5)(c). 
355 Ebony “DTI Interest Rate Study” 35. 
356 Abedian “Consumer Credit Bill: the debate rages on” (2006) Leadership 41 at 42 argues that 
unregistered lenders will be less likely to make the transition to the registered sector since the lending 
volumes of the unregistered sector will increase to meet increased demands for credit in this sector. 
357 As argued in 5.8 above, this likely trend will also be attributable to the legacy of no interest caps in 
the last 14 years. 
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a result of the formal sector not being willing to give them loans.358  The Free Market 
Foundation of Southern Africa had this to say regarding the prospect of interest rate 
caps:359 
 
“Levels of exclusion from access to formal / legal credit under this scenario is as a 
consequence likely to be systemically increased with a concomitant escalation in 
illegal credit extension activities.  The Bill is therefore likely to reinforce and 
exacerbate the dual credit market presently in existence.” 
 
This likely growth of the unregistered sector at the expense of the registered sector 
will be an unfortunate direct consequence of the imposition of limits on the cost of 
credit, and the Department of Trade and Industry will have to develop mechanisms to 
control such illegal trade.   It is submitted, however, that the need to limit the cost of 
credit for the reasons explained in this study far outweighs the risk of the growth of 
the unregistered sector.  This is clearly the approach of the legislature and the 
Department of Trade and Industry too, and is therefore no longer a moot point. 
 
6.5 Legal challenges to the high cost of credit on smaller 
loans 
 
In 6.4 above a number of problems were identified in the Regulations that cause the 
cost of credit to be too high on smaller loans, and the socio-economic impact of these 
high costs was demonstrated.  Suggested changes to the Regulations were then 
proposed, and it is hoped that the Minister will effect the necessary amendments, 
which would be a relatively simple task.360  If the Minister fails to do so, however, 
then aggrieved consumers will have to resort to the courts for legal recourse.  A 
number of possible legal bases for challenging the high cost of credit on smaller 
loans are discussed below.  The first two legal bases361 concern legal recourse to 
which a borrower can resort in the case of individual small loans.  The second two 
                                                 
358 Submission by the Free Market Foundation of Southern Africa to the Portfolio Committee on Trade 
and Industry regarding the National Credit Bill [B18-2005] (19 August 2005) pg 6 (unpublished). See 
also Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12. 
359 Ibid. 
360 The Department has indicated that it will monitor the market closely, and will change the Regulations 
should the market go for the maximum interest rates and fees, or should existing products be re-priced.  
It remains to be seen, however, how willing the Department will be to change the Regulations because 
of an inherent fault therein, no matter what the market does. 
361 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 below. 
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legal bases362 concern challenges to the Regulations which make possible excessive 
credit costs on small loans.   
 
6.5.1 Application of the in duplum rule 
 
The Act has caused the in duplum rule to become an increasingly important 
mechanism for limiting the cost of credit, provided that consumers and their advisers 
know about their rights in terms of this rule and take the necessary steps to enforce 
them.  In terms of section 103(5) of the Act, all interest, fees and other costs that 
accrue during the time that a consumer is in default under a credit agreement may 
not together exceed the unpaid capital of the principal debt at the time the debt was 
incurred.  Given the high cost of smaller loans, the chances of default will be 
extremely high, and it will not take long for interest and fees to exceed the unpaid 
capital.  This was clearly demonstrated in 5.7 above with reference to Table B, and 
the application of the in duplum rule to Table R and S above, which contain the new 
credit costs, will yield a similar result. 
  
6.5.2 Common law illegality of the high cost of credit on smaller loans 
 
The excessive credit costs on small loans may still be able to be challenged by 
consumers in terms of the common law on a case by case basis, notwithstanding the 
National Credit Regulations.  As is the case in regard to loans exempt from the Usury 
Act,363 the residual common law will still be applicable in view of the presumption that 
a statute alters the common law as little as possible, and the courts will interpret an 
act as ousting the common law only if this appears clearly from the intention of the 
legislature.364  The question then is: was it the intention of the legislature to provide 
for excessive cost of credit in the case of smaller loans?  The background to the 
Act365 indicates a contrary intention, namely to combat poverty and the dual 
economy, and to promote consumer protection through various means, including the 
capping of the cost of credit.366  This intention is borne out in the Act,367 which 
provides that when the Minister prescribes methods for calculating maximum interest 
rates and fees, the Minister must consider, inter alia, the social impact on low income 
                                                 
362 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 below. 
363 5.7 above. 
364 Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes (2002) 177-178. 
365 The Credit Law Review process, culminating in the Department’s Policy Framework for Consumer 
Credit. 
366 DTI “Policy Framework”.  See also 6.1.1 above. 
367 Section 3, s101–s106. 
  
 
155
consumers.368  When one considers the exorbitant cost of credit on small loans 
demonstrated in 6.4 above, it is clear that the Regulations do not accord with the 
intention of the legislature. 
 
Agreements that are contrary to public policy, as informed by constitutional values, 
will not be enforced.369  Public policy has been thoroughly discussed in 2.3 and 5.7.2 
above, and need not be repeated here.  An argument that the cost of credit on a 
small loan is excessive and therefore contrary to public policy would have to 
consider: current industry practice and the purpose of the Act; the combined impact 
of interest and fees on the total cost of credit; the negative socio-economic impact of 
the high cost of credit on small loans;370 and the specific circumstances of the lender, 
the borrower and other aspects of the case before the court.  It is interesting to note 
that nearly all the issues raised in 5.7.2 above371 will be relevant to a public policy 
enquiry regarding the cost of credit in terms of the Act.  It therefore appears that a 
court would be able to declare a very high cost small loan contrary to public policy 
and unenforceable, even if such loan complies with the cost of credit limits in the 
Regulations. 
 
The extremely high cost of credit on a small loan could amount to “extortion and 
oppression akin to fraud”, and the offending clause could be declared usurious and 
unenforceable.372  Alternatively, the usurious nature of the offending clause could be 
pleaded as a ground in support of a claim that a high cost small loan is contrary to 
public policy. Once again, common law usury has been discussed at length in 3.1 
and 5.7.3 above, and need not be repeated here.  
 
The defence to a claim that a provision of a loan agreement is unenforceable due to 
common law illegality will likely be that the provision is lawful in that it complies with 
the Regulations, even if they are flawed.  A court might then take the view that such a 
claim cannot be upheld, and that appropriate proceedings would rather be to 
challenge the flawed Regulations themselves, in which event an aggrieved borrower 
would need to proceed in terms of 6.5.3 or 6.5.4 below. 
 
                                                 
368 Section 105(2)(c). 
369 Smalberger JA in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A) 8C-D, read with Cameron JA in Brisley 
v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 34H–35B, and Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) 7A–B. 
370 6.4.6 above. 
371 These issues are relevant to the question of whether or not a loan exempt from the Usury Act which 
is charged at the typical 30% per month is contrary to public policy. 
372 Dyason v Ruthven 311–312; Reuter v Yates 858; SA Securities Ltd v Greyling 356. 
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6.5.3 Judicial review of the service fee 
 
The Act requires that the service fee “must not exceed the prescribed amount relative 
to the principal debt”.373  The maximum service fee prescribed by the Minister, 
however, is simply set at R50 per month for every type of credit agreement, 
irrespective of its size.374  This fee bears no relation to the principal debt, but is rather 
simply a fixed amount.375  As such, it renders the service fee in Regulation 44 ultra 
vires, and it seems that an application to have this provision set aside on review 
would be successful.376 
 
6.5.4 Judicial review of various regulations that contribute to the 
excessive cost of credit 
 
It is possible that a number of offending regulations could be set aside on review on 
the basis that their combined effect causes the cost of credit on short-term loans to 
be excessive and, as such, are contrary to the purpose of the legislation.377  The 
offending provisions would be: the maximum interest rate and initiation fee in regard 
to short-term credit transactions only [contained in regulations 42(1) and 42(2)]; the 
maximum initiation fee and service fee [contained in regulations 43(3) and 44]; the 
maximum deferred amount of R8 000 in the definition of a short-term credit 
transaction [contained in regulation 39(2)(a)(i)]. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to build a comprehensive case in this 
regard.  Such a case would to a large extent rely on the arguments contained in 6.4 
and Chapter Five above.  Briefly, in such proceedings one would need to show how 
the different elements of the cost of credit combine to cause the total cost of credit on 
small loans to be excessive, pursuing all the arguments set out in 6.4.1 to 6.4.5 
above.  One would then go on to demonstrate the devastating socio-economic 
                                                 
373 Section 101(1)(c)(iii). 
374 Reg 44. 
375 Otto The National Credit Act Explained 78. 
376 The procedure for such review proceedings are discussed in further detail in 6.5.5 below. 
377 By launching review proceedings against the Regulations, one would be able to attack only the limits 
on the interest and fees.  The initiation and service fees are introduced in the Act, and an attack on their 
existence (the justification for which existence has been questioned in 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 above) would 
necessitate a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the sections of the Act which introduce these 
fees.  Such a challenge would probably be based upon an alleged infringement of the right to equality 
(s9) and the right to dignity (s10), with a view to having these sections declared unconstitutional in terms 
of s172(1)(a) of the Constitution.  On the available information as to the purpose and desirability of such 
fees, it would seem that such a challenge would not succeed.  In any event, it appears that the problem 
of the excessive cost of small loans can be cured by amending the Regulations, as has been 
demonstrated in 6.4.7 and this paragraph, and a review of the offending Regulations would therefore 
suffice. 
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impact of excessive credit costs on low-income individuals and communities with 
reference to the arguments in Chapter Five and 6.4.6 above.  The intention of the 
legislature in regard to the setting of maximum limits on rates of interest and fees 
would then need to be established, and it would be necessary to show that the 
legislature’s intention is not borne out in the Regulations. 
 
In establishing the intention of the legislature, it would be necessary first to consider 
the background to the Act378 and the general purposes of the Act.379  One would then 
need to address the cost of credit provisions in Part C of Chapter 5 of the Act in 
general, before considering the provisions that enable the Minister to prescribe 
maximum rates of interest and fees for each sub-sector of the consumer credit 
market.380  The intention of the Act in regard to the desired levels of the cost of credit 
is most explicitly set out in section 105(2): 
 
“When prescribing a matter contemplated in subsection (1),381 the Minister must 
consider, amongst other things –  
(a) the need to make credit available to persons contemplated in s13(a);382 
(b) conditions prevailing in the credit market, including the cost of credit and the 
optimal functioning of the consumer credit market; and 
(c) the social impact on low income consumers.” 
 
The court would therefore have to test the total cost of credit against these three 
factors which the legislature requires the Minister to consider.  In short, it would be 
argued that the devastating socio-economic impact of the excessive cost of credit on 
small loans must lead the court to conclude that the Minister failed to consider “the 
social impact on low income consumers”, at the expense of the other two factors.   
 
6.5.5 The nature of the proposed judicial review proceedings 
 
The judicial review proceedings referred to in 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 above would be 
launched in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),383 which 
                                                 
378 6.1.1 and 6.5.2 above. 
379 6.1.2 above. 
380 Section 103(6) and s105. 
381 Section 105(1) empowers the Minister to prescribe a method for calculating a maximum rate of 
interest and maximum fees applicable to each subsector of the consumer credit market. 
382 These persons are historically disadvantaged persons, low income persons and communities, and 
remote, isolated or low density populations and communities. 
383 Act 3 of 2000.  In Minister of Health and another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 
(Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) SA 311 (C), five members of the 
court held that PAJA was applicable to both the recommendations of the Pricing Committee (regarding 
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was enacted to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution.384  The Act defines 
administrative action as any decision385 taken by an organ of state386 when, inter alia, 
“exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation”.387  Although the definition of “decision” in section 1 does not specifically 
include subordinate legislation, “it is clear that the definition ... is not intended to 
exclude ministerial regulations and proclamations”.388 The Act would therefore be 
applicable to a review of the offending provisions of the National Credit Regulations.  
Review proceedings can be instituted in, inter alia, the High Court within whose area 
of jurisdiction the party whose rights have been affected is domiciled or ordinarily 
resident.389 
 
There are three general grounds for review in administrative law, namely: irrationality, 
unreasonableness and proportionality.  The extent to which they could be applicable 
to the National Credit Regulations is briefly considered below. 
 
6.5.5.1 Reasons for administrative action 
 
Review proceedings cannot be instituted until the reasons for an administrative 
action have been provided.390  Any person whose rights have been “materially and 
adversely affected”391 (namely, the applicant in the review proceedings) by 
administrative action (namely, the prescribing of offending regulations by the Minister 
of Trade and Industry) may within 90 days of coming to know of the administrative 
act request that the administrator392 concerned (namely, the Minister) furnish written 
reasons for the action.393  The administrator must, within 90 days of receiving the 
                                                                                                                                            
the pricing system for the sale of medicines) and the subsequent making of regulations by the Minister 
of Health, one member of the court held that PAJA was only partially applicable, whilst the five other 
members of the court did not find it necessary to decide whether or not PAJA is applicable.  Chaskalson 
CJ concludes at para 118: “Properly construed, therefore, ‘administrative action’ in s33(1) of the 
Constitution, includes legislative administrative action.” 
384 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Section 33(3) of the Constitution requires 
that national legislation be enacted to give effect to the s33 rights to just administrative action. 
385 In s1, “decision” is defined in paragraph (g) as, inter alia, “doing or refusing to do any other act or 
thing of an administrative nature”. 
386 An “organ of state” is defined in s1 as bearing the meaning assigned to it in s239 of the Constitution.  
Section 239, in turn, defines an organ of state as, inter alia, any functionary or institution exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation. 
387 Section 1. 
388 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 3 ed (2006) 131. 
389 Section 1, definition of “court”.  This definition extends the common law jurisdiction of the courts with 
regard to review proceedings, and will make it easier and cheaper for an applicant to launch such a 
review. 
390 Section 5. 
391 Secion 5(1). 
392 An “administrator” is defined in s1 as, inter alia, an organ of state. 
393 Section 5(1).  This request could be made by addressing a letter to the Minister. 
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request, give that person adequate reasons in writing for the administrative action.394  
The review must be instituted within 180 days of knowledge of the administrative 
action.395  All periods of time mentioned above can be adjusted on application and on 
good cause shown.396  Proceedings for review of the relevant regulations will be able 
to be instituted only after 1 June 2007 when the new limits on the cost of credit 
become effective, but it is possible that the request for reasons could be made earlier 
and in anticipation of the coming into force of the regulations. 
 
6.5.5.2 Irrationality as a ground for judicial review 
 
Should the reasons given by the Minister for the offending regulations not be 
satisfactory, the application for judicial review can be instituted.  A challenge to the 
Regulations is most likely to succeed on the ground of irrationality.  PAJA provides 
that, at the instance of any person, a court has the power to judicially review an 
administrative action if, inter alia, the action itself is not rationally connected to the 
purpose for which it was taken397 or the purpose of the empowering provision,398 or 
the action was taken because “relevant considerations were not considered”.399  
 
The offending regulations identified in 6.5.4 above could therefore be reviewed and 
set aside if the court were to find that: 
(a) the relevant regulations do not accord with the purpose of the Regulations, 
namely to provide appropriate limits on the cost of credit;400 or 
(b) the relevant regulations do not accord with the purpose of the National Credit 
Act, namely to limit the cost of credit to appropriate levels after due 
consideration of the provisions of section 105(2) of the Act, which includes 
the social impact on low-income consumers;401 or 
(c) the Minister did not adequately consider the social impact on low-income 
consumers.402 
 
                                                 
394 Section 5(2).  Section 5(3) provides that if the administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons, it will 
be presumed in review proceedings that the administrative action was taken without good reason. 
395 Section 7(1)(b). 
396 Section 9. 
397 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa). 
398 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(bb). 
399 Section 6(2)(e)(iii). 
400 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa), read with Chapter 5 of the National Credit Regulations, from which the purpose 
of the Regulations can be implied. 
401 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(bb), read with s101(1)(b)–(d) and s105 [in particular s105(2)] of the National Credit 
Act. 
402 Section 6(2)(e)(iii), read with s105(2)(c) of the National Credit Act. 
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These grounds for review could be pleaded together or in the alternative, although it 
would seem that the ground referred to in (b) above would provide the most 
compelling basis for review. 
 
Likewise, the service fee in Regulation 44 could be set aside on review on the basis 
that the regulation does not accord with the purpose of section 101(1)(c)(iii) of the 
National Credit Act,403 namely that the service fee may not exceed the prescribed 
amount relative to the principal debt.  Such a review would be bolstered by ground 
(c) above. 
 
In the constitutional era, however, it is arguable that the enquiry should go further 
than the purpose or intention of the enabling legislation.  In Minister of Health and 
another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Treatment Action 
Campaign and Another as Amici Curiae),404 for example, Sachs J held that “the 
power and the constraint come not only from the empowering statute, but from the 
Constitution, which governs the manner in which the statute must be applied”.405  It is 
helpful to quote him extensively on this point: 
 
“In my view, if rationality is required as the minimum for the legality of primary 
legislation, something more than mere rationality will be needed to ensure the legality 
of subordinate legislation. The functionaries who are responsible for drafting 
subordinate legislation are exercising a public power of great significance, but with no 
overt checks and balances. It is they who are responsible for translating the general 
precepts of the statute into operational standards and processes. Even if they choose 
to consult widely and actively, their ultimate deliberations will ordinarily take place 
behind closed doors. The principles of accountability and responsiveness require that 
the procedures for public involvement they establish in each case be reasonably 
related to the material they have to consider. If challenged, they should be able to 
account for the regulations they have adopted, and to do so in a manner that shows a 
reasonable fit between the requirements of the empowering statute, the material at 
their command and the final text.” 
 
                                                 
403 Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(bb) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. 
404 2006 (2) SA 311 (C). 
405 Para 632.  Sachs J was referring to the constitutional requirement of legality, which “requires 
compliance not only with the empowering statute, but with general constraints on the exercise of public 
power flowing from the nature of our constitutional democracy, in particular the requirement that 
government be open, responsive and accountable”. 
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Sachs J thus provides a sobering reminder of the weighty responsibilities of the 
authors of subordinate legislation and the necessity for close scrutiny of such 
legislation on review. 
 
6.5.5.3 Unreasonableness as a ground for review 
 
Unreasonable administrative action, on the other hand, generally relates to the 
unreasonable exercise of a discretionary power or abuse of a discretionary power, 
and the courts have for years struggled to find a consistent approach to this concept 
in terms of the common law.406  The Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”,407 
although there is no definition of reasonableness in the Constitution. 
 
This ground for review is captured in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA: 
 
 ”A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if – 
(h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by 
the empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action 
was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power or performed the function.” 
 
A conclusive interpretation of this provision is problematic.  On a literal interpretation, 
the legislature seems to have adopted a limited view of unreasonableness, with the 
focus placed on the state of mind and subjective attitude of the administrator rather 
than the objectively unreasonable result of the action.408  Burns and Beukes argue 
that this provision cannot be confined to the administrator’s subjective state of mind 
only, but should be given a wide interpretation to include the question of whether or 
not the decision itself is unreasonable.409  On this wider interpretation, it is arguable 
that the offending regulations are unreasonable and therefore fall within the ambit of 
section 6(2)(h) of PAJA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
406 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 390. 
407 Section 33(1). 
408 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 399–400. 
409 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 400. 
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6.5.5.4 The role of proportionality in controlling administrative action 
 
The principle of proportionality “requires a reasonable and justifiable relation between 
the objectives of the administrative decision and the facts and circumstances which 
were taken into consideration by the administrator in reaching the decision”.410  It 
invokes a duty on decision-makers to consider available alternatives and to opt for 
the least restrictive or least drastic option where possible.411  There is no direct 
reference to disproportionality as an independent ground for review in terms of PAJA.  
Plasket, however, argues that the formulation of section 6(2) of PAJA allows for the 
principle of proportionality to be invoked:412 
 
“The Act could not have intended that the consideration of alternatives and issues of 
proportionality be excluded.  Parliament did not have the power to do this as its 
constitutional mandate was to pass national legislation to give effect to the right to 
just administrative action, which includes the right to reasonable administrative action.  
The consideration of alternatives and the proportionality of administrative action are 
part of the right in its common law form and, therefore, of its constitutional form too.” 
 
It would therefore seem that a low-income consumer being charged a 
disproportionately exorbitant amount for a small loan (as opposed to a very much 
cheaper big loan) could appeal to the principle of proportionality in review 
proceedings.  
 
6.5.5.5 Remedies in proceedings for judicial review 
 
A number of possible remedies are set out in section 8 of PAJA.  In the judicial 
review proceedings contemplated in 6.5.3 and 6.5.4 above, the applicant would seek 
to have the offending regulations set aside413 and remitted for reconsideration by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, possibly with specific directions in this regard.414  On 
this basis the problematic regulations could be reviewed and set aside, and the 
Minister would then have to apply his mind again to prescribing regulations that have 
due regard to all the relevant purposes and considerations of the National Credit Act 
and Regulations. 
                                                 
410 Burns and Beukes Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution 408. 
411 Plasket “The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in the Democratic South Africa” (PhD thesis, Rhodes University, 2002) 382–383. 
412 Plasket “The Fundamental Right to Just Administrative Action: Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in the Democratic South Africa” 383–384. 
413 Section 8(1)(c). 
414 Section 8(1)(c)(i). 
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6.5.6 Other legal remedies 
 
 
Further possible legal remedies for borrowers of small loans which have been 
canvassed earlier in this chapter and are not strictly relevant to the cost of credit 
include: 
(a) A court order declaring a loan agreement to be reckless, which could result in 
the setting aside of all or part of the borrower’s rights and obligations under 
the agreement, or the suspension of the force and effect of the agreement for 
a determined period.415 
(b) A finding that a consumer was over-indebted at the time of the conclusion of 
the agreement, in which event the court may order the suspension of the 
force and effect of the agreement and the restructuring of the consumer’s 
obligations under any other credit agreements.416 
(c) A court order declaring an unlawful loan agreement (e.g. a loan from an 
unregistered lender) void, all instalments refunded to the consumer and the 
credit provider’s rights to recover the loan amount cancelled or forfeited to the 
state.417 
(d) A court order that a provision of a loan agreement (e.g. a provision allowing 
for interest or fees in excess of the maximum amounts permissible) is 
unlawful, in which event the offending provision will be declared void, and the 
provision will be severed or altered, or the entire agreement will be declared 
unlawful.418 
 
                                                 
415 Section 83(2).  See also 6.4.1 above. 
416 Section 83(3)(b).  See also 6.4.1 above. 
417 Section 89(5).  See also 6.2.6 above. 
418 Section 90.  See also 6.2.6 above. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Outline 
 
Most of the conclusions which will be mentioned in this chapter have already been 
thoroughly discussed in the thesis, and they therefore need not be repeated in detail 
here.  This chapter will draw together a summary of only the specific findings made in 
this study, and will not attempt to summarise the entire thesis. 
 
7.1 The rapid growth of the micro-lending industry with no 
interest rate limits 
 
For nearly 14 years, from 31 December 19921 to date, there has been no limit on the 
interest rates that registered micro-lenders may lawfully charge,2 and until 1 June 
2007 there will continue to be no such limit.3  Thus, at a stroke of the ministerial pen 
in 1992,4 the micro-lending industry was legitimised, making possible “limitless profit” 
for lenders “unbounded by any finance charge limit at all!”5  There is little evidence of 
any research into the question of interest rate limits having been conducted by the 
Department of Trade and Industry prior to this decision.6  The Minister’s decision 
appears to have been made without proper planning and foresight, ignorant of its 
consequences, with which we still live today.  Very soon, the industry spiralled out of 
control, growing rapidly year-on-year, with registered micro-lenders charging 
exorbitant interest rates, typically 30% per month, or 360% per annum.  The Minister 
belatedly attempted to retrieve the situation in 1999,7 but this attempt was swiftly set 
aside in the Lurama decision, because of procedural irregularities.   
 
                                                 
1 Notice in terms of section 15A of the Usury Act 73 of 1968, GN R3451, Government Gazette 14498, 
31 December 1992. 
2 Excluding a period of less than six months during 1999 when the 1999 Exemption Notice was in force. 
3 Proclamation No. 22, Commencement of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005, Government Gazette 
28824, 11 May 2006. 
4 The 1992 Exemption Notice. 
5 Yacoob J in AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v The Micro-finance Regulatory Council and the Minister of 
Trade and Industry 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC) paras 9–10. 
6 The South African Law Commission Working Paper 46 – Project 67: The Usury Act and Related 
Matters: New Credit Legislation for South Africa (proposed to the South African Law Commission by JM 
Otto and NJ Grové) (1991), Chapter 4, para 1.5.1did give attention to this issue, and recommended that 
interest rate limits should be retained 
7 The 1999 Exemption Notice. 
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7.2 The dire consequences of excessive interest rates 
 
Excessive interest rates have caused heinous socio-economic hardships and 
suffering for low-income individuals and communities.  A high percentage of personal 
income is used merely to service micro-lending debt,8 leaving very little of borrowers’ 
personal income to pay for other household expenses.9  Further, a very high 
percentage of the total amount repaid to micro-lenders is in respect of interest on 
debt,10 and borrowers of 30-day loans are very soon caught in debt traps from which 
they are unable to escape.11  The considerable size and rapid growth of the industry 
has the effect that tens of billions of rands are lost to lower-income communities in 
the form of interest on micro-loans every year,12 thus contributing to the perpetuation 
of poverty.  Levels of indebtedness are high and appear to be increasing.13 The 
problem of over-indebtedness is further compounded by high levels of consumption 
finance14 and consumer ignorance and illiteracy.15  Thus, by allowing the micro-
lending industry to function without legislated and enforced interest rate limits since 
1992, the Government has effectively made possible the exploitation of the ignorance 
of lower-income communities, which arguably amounts to legislated economic abuse. 
 
A further negative consequence of the failure to cap interest rates is the likely growth 
of the unregistered sector when the new limits on the cost of credit become effective 
in 2007, due in part to the legacy of no interest rate limits for the past 14 years.16  
This could lead ultimately to less credit being available and to many people being 
denied access to any credit at all.17  Had the necessary considered research been 
undertaken more than a decade earlier,18 the industry could have been properly 
regulated with interest rate limits from the outset, and would not have been beyond 
the control of the Department of Trade and Industry to the extent that it is today. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Note (b) to Table B. 
9 Note (a) to Table B. 
10 Note (d) and (e) to Table B. 
11 Illustrated in Table C. 
12 See 5.6 above. 
13 Most poorer households earning less than R25 000 per year showed increases in levels of 
indebtedness of over 200% between 1995 and 2000 (Table K). 
14 43% of micro-loans were used for consumption purposes in 2000 (Table F). 
15 32% of the adult population of South Africa were functionally illiterate in 2001 (Table G). 
16 See 5.8.  This likely growth will of course also be due to the advent of the imposition of limits on the 
cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Regulations. 
17 Ebony Consulting International “DTI Interest Rate Study” http://www.mfrc.co.za/detail.php?s=12 
(accessed 14 March 2006). 
18 This research could have taken the form of the credit law review process initiated in 2002. 
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7.3 Legal recourse and the need for legislative intervention 
 
What legal recourse, if any, does a borrower have in the face of an exorbitantly-
priced loan legitimised by exemption from the Usury Act?19  Contract provisions that 
are contrary to public policy, as fortified by constitutional values, can be declared to 
be unenforceable.20  The courts have made steady progress in recent years in 
developing this principle, which is a promising ground for recourse, but it is 
unfortunately limited in several respects.21  First, a suitable test case will need to be 
brought before the court (preferably the Supreme Court of Appeal), demanding an 
appropriate set of facts, enabling the question of public policy to be the decisive issue 
before the court.  Second, it will normally be worthwhile for a litigant to incur the 
expense of fighting an opposed case only when there is a large amount of money at 
stake, which will of course not be so in the case of micro-loans.  Third, the borrower 
must be able to afford to pay the necessary legal fees, which a recipient of a small 
loan is unlikely to be able to do.  Fourth, once seized with an appropriate case, many 
courts may be hesitant boldly to develop the law in regard to contractual fairness in 
the face of the almost sacrosanct principle of freedom of contract and pacta sunt 
servanda.  Finally, even if the Supreme Court of Appeal were to make a finding that a 
high credit cost provision in a micro-loan is contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable, such a finding would have limited impact beyond similar micro-loans 
that are actually challenged in court on this basis. 
 
It is, furthermore, possible to challenge a high-interest loan on the ground that it is 
usurious if it amounts to “extortion or oppression akin to fraud”, after examining the 
particular circumstances of each case.22  It is uncertain, however, how much the 
courts would be willing to rely on common law usury, which is based upon cases that 
are nearly 100 years old.  This legal basis will further be subject to the same five 
constraints raised in regard to public policy.  Finally, the common law in duplum rule 
can assist borrowers when unpaid interest equals the outstanding capital, in which 
event interest stops accruing.23  
 
                                                 
19 The common law illegality of high interest-bearing loans is reviewed in 5.7. 
20 Sasfin v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 
(4) SA 1 (SCA). 
21 A full discussion in this regard is set out in 2.6 above – the conclusion to Chapter Two. 
22 Dyason v Ruthven 1860 Searle 282 at 311–312. 
23 See, for example, Standard Bank of South Africa v Oneanate Investments (in Liquidation) 1998 (1) 
SA 811 (SCA) 827H. 
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For these reasons, the development of the common law towards contractual fairness 
in the micro-lending industry in general, and fairer interest rate levels on micro-loans 
in particular, could not be relied upon.  The considered view of the legislature was 
therefore that broad, policy-based legislative intervention was required.24  Thus, the 
Consumer Protection Bill,25 published on 15 March 2006, is concerned with, inter 
alia, fundamental consumer rights26 and promotes contractual fairness, introducing 
the notions of unreasonable, unfair, unjust and unconscionable transactions.27  
Further, the National Credit Act28 seeks to regulate every conceivable sector of the 
consumer credit market.  The common law of contract remains the milieu within 
which money is lent, but it is now overlaid with legislation, resulting increasingly in a 
legislated form of contract law. 
 
7.4 The cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Act 
 
The cost of credit in terms of the National Credit Act and its impact has been 
thoroughly analysed in Chapter Six.29  Suggested amendments to the Regulations 
have been proposed,30 and potential legal challenges discussed.31  What follows is 
therefore a brief summary of these findings. 
 
7.4.1 Shortfalls in the credit costing structure 
 
A thorough analysis of the cost of credit in terms of the Act and Regulations reveals 
the following shortfalls.  First, the overall cost of credit on all loans of less than about 
R5 000 will be too high, becoming more and more expensive the smaller the loan, 
and exorbitant in the case of the smallest loans.  Second, the cost of all short-term 
loans is too high, once again the more so the smaller the loan.  Third, the cost of the 
“flat rate” service fee of R50 is exorbitant for small loans and way out of proportion to 
the initial loan amount.  Fourth, the cost of both the initiation and service fees is far 
too high relative to interest, negating the gains made in interest rate reduction.  Fifth, 
                                                 
24 The principle of “freedom of contract” has to some extent been modified by legislation in a number of 
areas of law, in order to give greater protection to consumers (see 2.5).  Further, the South African Law 
Commission Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts (Final 
Report; Project 47) (1998) addressed directly the issue of fairness in the law of contract. 
25 Draft Consumer Protection Bill, GN R418, Government Gazette 28629, 15 March 2006.  
26 Sections 7–76 of the Bill.  
27 Sections 52–54. 
28 Act 34 of 2005. 
29 6.4.1– to 6.4.6. 
30 6.4.7. 
31 6.5. 
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the expensive initiation and service fees relative to interest have the effect of 
masking the true cost of credit.   
 
7.4.2 The impact of the excessive cost of smaller loans 
 
Since the cost of credit on short-term loans of less that R1 000 will be comparable 
with the current typical 30% per month, low-income individuals and communities who 
borrow small amounts are likely to suffer the same socio-economic hardships that 
they currently do.  Most of the conclusions drawn in Chapter Five and 7.2 above will 
therefore still be relevant to these loans in the new era, including the grave danger of 
debt entrapment and over-indebtedness.  This impact will to some extent be offset by 
the numerous progressive consumer protection measures introduced in the Act, 
including: the measures to combat over-indebtedness and reckless credit;32 the 
rather drastic provisions relating to unlawful credit agreements and unlawful 
provisions of credit agreements;33 provisions in regard to disclosure;34 and a number 
of other consumer rights. 
 
7.4.3 Suggested amendments to the Regulations 
 
In considering the question of appropriate levels for the cost of credit, it is necessary 
to have regard to: (i) section 105(2) of the Act, which sets out the factors which the 
Minister is required to consider when prescribing limits on the cost of credit, as well 
as (ii) Regulation 45(2), which sets out the factors that the National Credit Regulator 
is required to consider when making periodic recommendations to the Minister in 
regard to the cost of credit.  In short, a balance needs to be struck between keeping 
credit as cheap and accessible for borrowers as possible (on the one hand), and 
ensuring that it remains economically viable for moneylenders to advance smaller 
loans (on the other hand). 
 
In order to address the shortfalls referred to above, the following amendments to the 
National Credit Regulations are therefore suggested:35 
 
 
                                                 
32 Sections 78–88. 
33 Sections 89–90. 
34 Section 92(1) and s93(1). 
35 If the initiation or service fees were to be removed, the Act would also have to be amended. 
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(a) The initiation fee should be removed if its purpose cannot be satisfactorily 
justified.  Alternatively, the maximum initiation fee on both short-term and 
unsecured credit transactions should be considerably reduced to 
approximately R50 per credit agreement, plus 5% of the amount in excess of 
R1 000, but never to exceed R1 000, and never to exceed 5% of the total 
principal debt [cf Regulations 42(1) and 43(3)]. 
 
(b) The monthly service fee on short-term loans should be removed, unless 
there is good reason for it to remain.36  Alternatively, the maximum service 
fee should be considerably reduced relative to the loan amount, to 
approximately 1% per month of the loan amount, subject to a minimum fee of 
R10 per month, and never to exceed R50 per month [cf Regulation 44]. 
 
(c) The maximum permissible rate of interest on short-term loans should be 
reduced to approximately 4% per month [cf Regulation 42(2)]. 
 
(d) The maximum deferred amount in the definition of a short-term credit 
transaction (i.e. the maximum limit on the size of a short-term loan) should be 
reduced to no more than R5 000 [cf Regulation 39(2)(a)(i)]. 
 
When these suggested amendments are applied in a number of examples37 and 
compared with the cost of credit in terms of the Regulations,38 the amendments 
appear to adequately address the shortfalls in the Regulations referred to above and 
to achieve a fairer result, having regard to the need to balance the interests of both 
micro-lenders and borrowers. 
 
7.4.4 Legal challenges to the high cost of credit on smaller loans 
 
Finally, there are several legal bases that could be used to challenge the high cost of 
credit on smaller loans in terms of the Regulations.  These include the application of 
the codified in duplum rule39 and a challenge to the common law legality of high 
interest provisions on the basis of public policy or usury law.40  A more far-reaching 
                                                 
36 Interest could be increased in turn to compensate for the loss of the service fee, should this be 
deemed necessary to achieve an equitable result. 
37 Table T. 
38 Table U. 
39 Section 103(5). 
40 Such a challenge would, however, be subject to the same constraints as those explained in 7.3 
above. 
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high impact challenge, however, could take the form of an application to have a 
number of offending provisions of the Regulations set aside on review in terms of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.41  Chief amongst these is the service fee of 
R50 per month, as also several provisions whose combined effect causes the cost of 
credit on short-term loans to be excessive and, as such, contrary to the intention of 
the legislature.  Such provisions could be set aside on the ground of irrationality, 
although the ground of unreasonableness could be relevant, and proportionality 
could also have a role in controlling the Minister’s administrative action. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Act 3 of 2000. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Micro-lending loan amortisation
(loan of R1 638 at 30% per month, repayable over 24 months, 
borrower earning R3 000 per month) 
   
VARIABLE 
 
Input 
 
Output 
 
     
Loan amount 
 
R 1 638,00
  
     
Number of months 
 
24
  
     
Interest rate per 
month 
30%
  
     
Required payment per 
month   
R 492,31
        
DISPOSABLE INCOME RAMIFICATIONS 
 
      
Monthly wage / 
pension R 3 000   
      
Percentage of income 
available for other 
expenses after loan 
payment  84%
      
TOTAL INTEREST 
COST  R10 177,37
      
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
  
R11 815,37
      
Percentage of total  
income utilised to pay 
interest charges in the 
loan period  14%
      
Percentage of total 
amount repaid utilised 
to pay interest 
charged  86%
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Loan amortisation schedule 
(loan of R1 638 at 30% per month, repayable over 24 months) 
Month Payment Interest Capital portion 
Balance 
outstanding
    R 1 638,00 
1 R 492,31 R 491,40 R 0,91 R 1 637,09 
2 R 492,31 R 491,13 R 1,88 R 1 635,91 
3 R 492,31 R 490,77 R 1,54 R 1 634,38 
4 R 492,31 R 490,31 R 1,99 R 1 632,39 
5 R 492,31 R 489,72 R 2,59 R 1 629,80 
6 R 492,31 R 488,94 R 3,37 R 1 626,43 
7 R 492,31 R 487,93 R 4,38 R 1 622,05 
8 R 492,31 R 486,62 R 5,69 R 1 616,36 
9 R 492,31 R 484,91 R 7,40 R 1 608,96 
10 R 492,31 R 482,69 R 9,62 R 1 599,35 
11 R 492,31 R 479,80 R 12,50 R 1 586,84 
12 R 492,31 R 476,05 R 16,25 R 1 570,59 
13 R 492,31 R 471,18 R 21,13 R 1 549,46 
14 R 492,31 R 464,84 R 27,47 R 1 521,99 
15 R 492,31 R 456,60 R 35,71 R 1 486,28 
16 R 492,31 R 445,88 R 46,42 R 1 439,85 
17 R 492,31 R 431,96 R 60,35 R 1 379,50 
18 R 492,31 R 413,85 R 78,46 R 1 301,04 
19 R 492,31 R 390,31 R 101,99 R 1 199,05 
20 R 492,31 R 359,71 R 132,59 R 1 066,46 
21 R 492,31 R 319,94 R 172,37 R 894,09 
22 R 492,31 R 268,23 R 224,08 R 670,00 
23 R 492,31 R 201,00 R 291,31 R 378,70 
24 R 492,31 R 113,61 R 378,70 R 0,00 
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